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Abstract
A theoretical model is developed to explain how specific legal rules affect the types
of contracts managed care organizations (“MCOs”) use to compensate physicians. In
addition, the analysis provides insights into how physician treatment decisions and
the patient litigation decisions react to different legal rules. In particular, the model
predicts that outcomes in jurisdictions forcing MCOs to disclose contract terms to
patients differ from those that do not. Contracts vary depending on the disclosure rule
and how treatment costs relates to expected damages and litigation costs. Moreover,
the model predicts that jurisdictions forcing contract disclosure observe higher rates
of legally compliant treatment and lower rates of medical malpractice claims.
The model’s results also provide insights into how expected damages affect treat-
ment and litigation decisions. Using these insights, an efficient damage rule is con-
structed and then compared to two commonly used damage rules to illuminate the
rules’ inefficiencies. Finally, it is shown that, regardless of the disclosure rule, treat-
ment and litigation decisions do not depend on whether the patient can sue only the
physician, only the MCO, or both. MCO contract choices, however, do vary with the
composition of the group of potential defendants.
In addition, an empirical study is employed to test three predictions of the the-
oretical model. The study uses data on medical malpractice insurance premiums
per physician in the 50 U.S. states for the period 1991–2001 as a proxy for ex ante
expected damages arising from medical malpractice claims. The data support the
prediction that mandatory disclosure laws (weakly) decrease ex ante expected dam-
ages. The data also support the prediction that implementing damage caps in the
presence of a disclosure law (weakly) increases ex ante expected damages. The results
on the final prediction, that implementing damage caps in the absence of a disclosure
law most likely increases ex ante expected damages, are mixed.
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1Chapter 1 Introduction
The purposes and consequences of legal rules were once thought to be very simple.
For example, conventional wisdom held that the main purpose of tort law was to
compensate injured victims for losses caused by culpable injurers. Relatively recent
examinations of legal rules, however, have demonstrated that the law can lead to
much more complex consequences than once thought. For example, tort law might,
in fact, encourage change in the behavior of potential injurers.
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the consequences of legal rules designed
to regulate health care markets. Regulation of this industry is necessary, in part,
because of the asymmetry of information between MCOs and physicians, between
physicians and patients and between MCOs and patients.1 Legislators and judges
have formulated a patchwork of legal rules to mitigate the negative effects of market
imperfections in an attempt to reach more efficient outcomes. In addition, rules have
been formulated to address other concerns including medical malpractice insurance
crises and MCO advertising practices.
The usefulness of these normative prescriptions is bounded, however, by our lim-
ited understanding of how various legal rules affect the behavior of actors participating
in health care markets. For example, we do not yet fully understand how changes in
the law affect MCO choices over provider contracts. In addition, we are only begin-
ning to grasp how health care providers (e.g., physicians) react to different provider
contract structures and the legal rules governing their behavior. Finally, our theories
regarding injured patients’ decisions to file claims for medical malpractice are often
in conflict with observed behavior.
This thesis investigates the consequences of three particular legal rules: manda-
tory contract disclosure rules, medical malpractice damage rules and tortfeasor rules
1Arrow [5] was the first to formalize how health care markets are different from perfectly com-
petitive markets. He noted asymmetric information as one of the most important distinctions.
2(i.e., rules specifying the parties a plaintiff may sue). Although mandatory contract
disclosure rules were meant to provide consumers with information during the health
care plan selection process, it is quite possible that these rules have unintended conse-
quences. By changing the information structure of the interactions between actors in
health care markets, mandatory disclosure rules affect not only the types of contracts
used by MCOs to compensate providers, but also treatment and litigation decisions
by providers and injured patients, respectively. Similarly, damage rules and tortfeasor
rules have the ability to change the behavior of actors in health care markets. Until
we develop a solid understanding of how the law affects behavior, changes in the law
have the potential to lead to unintended (and perhaps undesirable) consequences.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literatures to
which this thesis contributes. Several theoretical literatures covering different topics
are described including general litigation and deterrence studies, analyses of how
legal rules affect behavior in health care markets and studies specifically investigating
mandatory disclosure laws, medical malpractice damage rules and tortfeasor rules. In
addition, the chapter provides a review of empirical investigations of how legal rules
affect medical malpractice insurance premiums, often used as a proxy for claim rates
or expected damages arising from medical malpractice claims. Finally, the previous
empirical findings are critiqued and reconciled with both the theoretical predictions
presented in Chapter 3 and the empirical results presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical model of how these different legal rules affect
behavior in health care markets. The results set out predictions of MCO contract
choices, physician treatment decisions and injured patient litigation decisions made
in the context of particular legal environments (e.g., in the presence of mandatory
disclosure rules and in the absence of such rules). In addition, based on the model’s
results, an efficient medical malpractice damage rule is constructed to act as a bench-
mark for the evaluation of two commonly used damage rules: the all-or-nothing rule
and the loss-of-a-chance rule. Finally, an investigation of how different tortfeasor
rules affect behavior and outcomes is provided.
Chapter 4 includes an empirical investigation of predictions derived from the the-
3oretical model. The model predicts that disclosure rules decrease ex ante expected
medical malpractice damages. In addition, the model’s results regarding the effects
of damage caps on ex ante expected damages2 challenge conventional theories that
caps necessarily decrease ex ante expected damages. The present theory suggests
that caps actually could increase or decrease ex ante expected damages depending on
certain conditions. The study uses data on medical malpractice insurance premiums
from all 50 U.S. states for the years 1991–2001 to test the model’s predictions. Med-
ical malpractice premiums are used as a proxy for ex ante expected damages. The
empirical study’s results, for the most part, support the model’s predictions.
Finally, Chapter 5 offers conclusions and discussion.
2Ex ante expected damages are calculated prior to the physician’s treatment choice and before the
patient’s outcome and litigation decision are known. The calculation incorporates expected damages
along with the probability that the physician will satisfy the standard of care, the probability that
the patient experiences a negative outcome and the probability that the patient, if injured, sues for
medical malpractice. These factors depend highly on the legal rules in effect when the decisions are
made.
4Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This thesis contributes to several literatures addressing general theoretical law and
economics, the theory of health care law and economics and empirical work focusing
on how various legal rules affect the health care industry. The purpose of this chapter
is to provide a review of these various literatures.
Section 2.2 summarizes several literatures pertaining to the theoretical analysis of
health care law and economics (or general law and economics) to which this thesis
contributes. First, the general literature covering the theoretical relationship between
litigation and deterrence is summarized. Second, a general literature regarding health
care markets is discussed. Third, a relatively short literature covering mandatory
disclosure laws is summarized. Fourth, the literature focusing on medical malpractice
damage rules is described. Finally, the studies focusing on tortfeasor rules as they
relate to medical malpractice cases are discussed.
Section 2.3 provides a short summary of empirical studies related to the effects of
medical malpractice damage caps on the health care industry. These studies include
evaluations of how damage caps affect medical malpractice insurance premiums, losses
and prices,1 malpractice claim frequency and severity, profitability of the insurance
industry and underwriting risk. The studies are then critiqued and reconciled with
the theoretical predictions presented in Chapter 3 and the empirical results reported
in Chapter 4.
Lastly, Section 2.4 concludes and summarizes the contributions of the remainder
of this thesis to the various literatures.
1The price of insurance is measured by dividing premiums by losses. The inverse of this measure
is referred to as the loss ratio.
52.2 Theoretical Analyses
2.2.1 Litigation and Deterrence
Law and economics scholars have taken significant steps toward untangling the rela-
tionship between litigation and deterrence2 in cases in which the victim is not certain
about the level of care taken by the injurer.3 These studies focus on two decisions
influenced by the legal environment: (1) a victim’s decision regarding whether to file
or pursue a claim against an injurer, and (2) a potential injurer’s decision regarding
the amount to expend on costly precautions to avoid injury to a potential victim.
Polinsky and Shavell [82] construct a general model to study the effect of court
error on a potential injurer’s level of care decision and a victim’s litigation decision
when the victim does not observe the injurer’s level of care. They show that Type
I errors4 lead to suboptimal levels of care by potential injurers and Type II errors5
lead to superoptimal litigation rates. They suggest that these inefficiencies can be
mitigated by fining losing plaintiffs or subsidizing lawsuits. They also demonstrate
the effect of legal errors on the incentive to comply with the law by observing that
errors determine, in part, whether a suit will be filed. They suggest various policy
instruments to mitigate the effects of legal errors.
The model assumes that the plaintiff’s belief that the defendant is truly “guilty”
is exogenous and “not essential to the analysis.” This assumption ignores the fact
that the plaintiff’s belief about the probability that the injurer complied with the
law, in large part, drives the plaintiff’s litigation decision. The method by which this
belief is formed is crucial to determining the level of care a potential injurer will take
and the probability that an injured party will file a claim. The model presented in
Chapter 3 allows the injured party’s beliefs to form endogenously. This modelling
technique greatly affects the predictions regarding the behavior of both the potential
2See Brown [19], Landes and Posner [66] and Shavell [91] for comprehensive analyses of tort law
and deterrence.
3Note that the literature reviewed here is not meant to be all-inclusive. Instead, it is meant to
provide a few examples of how injurer and victim decisions are modelled.
4A Type I error results when a truly “guilty” party escapes liability.
5A Type II error results when a truly “innocent” party is held liable.
6injurer and the injured.
Several other studies modelling litigation decisions do not tie the litigation decision
to the legal environment, but make very simple assumptions about the formation of
beliefs regarding the injurer’s action. First, Simon [92] models how costly litigation
and imperfect information regarding the quality of products in the market and the
outcome of litigation affect the choices of producers.6 The model demonstrates that
firms will take differing levels of care depending on the distribution of consumer risk
aversion. The intuition behind the result hinges on the fact that risk averse consumers
will file claims less often. This leads to the production of lower quality products. The
model shows that litigation costs work in much the same way. Any circumstance
that makes litigation less likely will allow the production of less costly, but less safe,
products.
Simon extends this result to medical malpractice. She notes that risk-averse pa-
tients will be hesitant to expend the necessary costs to collect information regarding
whether the physician complied with the legal standard of care for medical malprac-
tice. In addition, as litigation costs increase, the likelihood that an injured patient
will file suit decreases. Therefore, highly risk averse patients with relatively high
litigation costs will, in equilibrium, receive a relatively low quality of medical care.
Second, Schweizer [88] uses similar modelling techniques to study the settlement
process when both parties make decisions under conditions of incomplete information.
His model focuses on the parties’ decisions regarding whether to settle the dispute
prior to pursuing costly litigation. The purpose of the paper is to explain why some
suits proceed to the litigation stage even though the efficient outcome suggests that
the parties should always settle. He finds that under all possible equilibria the parties
will decide to pursue litigation with some positive probability when each potential
litigant’s information regarding the utility function of the other party is incomplete.
The paper also considers refinements to eliminate all but one equilibrium. This equi-
librium is used to develop comparative statics regarding how information affects the
probability that the parties will settle the dispute without resorting to costly litiga-
6The model assumes that low quality products lead to buyer injury more often.
7tion.
Third, Cooter and Rubinfeld [23] review models of the choice between settlement
and litigation. The study accounts for the sequential nature of dispute resolution
by considering theories on behavior during the following stages of the process: (1)
injurer’s choice of the level of care to take, (2) the victim’s decision under uncertainty
regarding whether to assert a legal claim, (3) strategic bargaining during the settle-
ment negotiations, and (4) litigant and court behavior if the case proceeds to trial
including effort levels of both plaintiff and defendant and the outcome of the trial.
Several assumptions are made regarding the actors’ beliefs that the injurer did not
meet the legal standard of care. For example, the litigants’ expenditures on the trial,
which are exogenously given, signal the probability that the court will find negligence.
In addition, the injurer’s decision regarding the level of costly care to expend is based
on the assumption that all victims will file claims.
Fourth, Kaplow [57] compares two different ways to increase plaintiff’s incentives
to sue: shifting victorious plaintiffs’ litigation costs to defendants and increasing
damage awards. He finds that increasing damages is more efficient because “fee
shifting is more valuable for plaintiffs with higher litigation costs.” Using damages
rather than fee shifting as the incentive to sue leads to a decrease in total litigation
costs because the costliest suits are eliminated.
As discussed previously, these models assume that the injured party’s beliefs over
the injurer’s “guilt” are formed exogenously. Simon assumes that, to form beliefs,
the potential plaintiff costlessly collects a signal of the injurer’s negligence. The
signal is in no way related to the legal environment or any other parameters of the
model. This assumption ignores the fact that victims are able to use information
about the legal environment (e.g., the level of damages a negligent injurer may face
in an environment which imposes a statutory cap on damages) in which the injurer
decides on his level of care. Likewise, Schweizer assumes that nature simply provides
the parties with information on the merits of the case. Cooter and Rubinfeld assume
that the subjective probability of a trial payoff to the plaintiff is determined solely
by the parties’ expenditures on the trial. In addition, to determine the deterrence
8effect of legal rules, they assume that a victim will file a claim with certainty. Finally,
Kaplow assumes the plaintiff’s probability of victory does not depend on the incentives
of the defendant to take care and concludes that increasing damages will lead to an
increase in the plaintiff’s willingness to sue.
The present study7 employs an equilibrium model of deterrence and litigation
to account for the fact that, when deciding whether to take costly precautions, a
potential injurer considers the possibility of litigation and, when deciding whether
to sue the injurer, a victim updates her belief of injurer “guilt” by considering how
legal rules affect injurer behavior. Modelling behavior in this way captures the subtle
interactions between legal rules, the likelihood of compliant treatment and the rate of
claims filed by injured patients. The injured party’s beliefs are formed endogenously
by taking into account how the legal environment affects the injurer’s level of care
decision. In addition, the model assumes that physicians choose levels of care by
considering not only the legal environment but also an injured patient’s beliefs about
the physician’s action given the legal environment. These assumptions might lead
to more accurate predictions regarding behavior in health care markets and help to
explain observed behavior that does not comport with the predictions of conventional
theoretical models.
Others have studied litigation and deterrence in different settings by considering
the equilibrium effects of various legal environments. For example, Png [80] models
litigation, liability and incentives for care to analyze the effects of various legal re-
forms. His model assumes that the victim does not know the type of the defendant
(i.e., negligent or non-negligent) prior to deciding whether to file a claim but that
beliefs are formed endogenously by considering the probability of harm given negli-
gence. He finds that if the negligence standard is tightened, some potential injurers
will take more care, but some will take less. He also finds that increasing damages
will induce a general upward shift in the level of care taken by potential injurers.
With respect to litigation rates, the results suggest that increasing the standard of
care will lead to less litigation and increasing damages could lead to an increase or de-
7See infra Chapter 3.
9crease in litigation. The latter result hinges on the model’s assumption that potential
injurers differ with respect to the cost required to satisfy the legal standard of care.
The model also considers the effects of the settlement process and the transmission
of information regarding the merits of the case during settlement negotiations. The
analysis, however, does not seem to address the fact that the legal environment not
only affects the potential injurer’s exposure to liability, but also the probability that
a victim will file a claim. The model presented infra in Chapter 3 emphasizes both
effects to make sharper predictions of level of care decisions and litigation decisions.
In addition, Bernardo, Talley and Welch [10] construct an equilibrium model to
study the effects of legal presumptions on principal-agent relationships. In this sem-
inal paper, they construct a Bayesian game of incomplete information to analyze the
capacity of court presumptions8 to mediate between costly litigation and ex ante in-
centives of agents who perform unobservable and unverifiable actions on behalf of
principals. They find that strong pro-agent presumptions will eliminate lawsuits but
also allow agents to shirk. On the other hand, strong pro-principal presumptions
encourage principals to bring lawsuits whenever a bad outcome occurs. In this case,
agents will never shirk. The authors find that the socially optimal presumption bal-
ances agency costs with litigation costs, and depends on three exogenous variables:
(1) social importance of effort, (2) costs of filing suit and (3) the comparative advan-
tage that diligent agents have over their shirking counterparts in mounting a defense.
They also show that giving more weight to agents’ evidence in court can lead to
more litigation because the principals find it more likely that agents shirked.9 One
important point emphasized by Bernardo et al. is that complex interactions deserve
attention and warrant careful analysis. One cannot fully understand the implications
of tinkering with one parameter or another unless these complex interactions are well
understood.10
8A presumption is a legal device that operates in the absence of other proof to require that
certain inferences be drawn from the available evidence. The most famous presumption is one that
presumes an accused’s innocence until guilt is proven by the state.
9This is akin to the results found in Chapter 3.
10The model presented infra in Chapter 3 is similar in construction to the model employed by
Bernardo et al. [10].
10
The theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 focuses not on legal presumptions,
but on mandatory disclosure laws, statutory damage caps and medical malpractice
damage rules. Using an equilibrium model to analyze the complex interactions be-
tween damages, treatment decisions and litigation decisions (e.g., endogenizing the
victim’s belief regarding the action of the injurer) illuminates the non-obvious poten-
tial effects of changes in legal rules. For example, the results suggest that the intended
goal of reducing lawsuits might not be achieved by reducing damages. Depending on
the relationship between treatment costs and damages, lowering damages might lower
the probability that the physician’s treatment choice satisfies the legal standard of
care, which in turn could increase the probability that the patient is negligently in-
jured. Therefore, lowering damages could increase the rate of litigation, contrary to
the intended effect.
2.2.2 Health Care Markets
Health care economics scholars draw on general models of agency relationships and
litigation and deterrence to explore the imperfections of health care markets. Arrow’s
[5] seminal paper is the first of many to address health care market imperfections.
The purpose of the study is to compare perfectly competitive markets with health
care markets. Arrow notes several significant differences: demand is irregular and
unpredictable, sellers are not expected to be motivated by profits, supply is restricted,
price competition is frowned upon (although price discrimination is common) and
buyers are uncertain about the quality of the product. The present study focuses on
the problem of incomplete information that leads to uncertainty regarding quality.
Supplier-induced demand opens the door for physicians to act in their own self interest
and disregard the benefits of medical care for their patients. Legal institutions address
this market imperfection by implementing rules to achieve efficient outcomes (i.e., the
provision of medical care when the expected benefits of care outweigh the costs of
providing it).
A handful of studies focuses on how physicians respond to various legal rules.
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Green [44] constructs a model to analyze how changes in the legal standard of care
affect physician behavior when patients are not able to observe physician action. In
addition, the model considers how the standard of care influences the probability that
an injured patient will file a claim. Green predicts that an increase in the negligence
standard will lead to an increase in the level of compliant treatment and an indetermi-
nate change in claim rates. The results suggest that the patient’s cutoff point for filing
a claim will increase as the court’s cutoff point for finding negligence increases, but
that the likelihood of the court finding negligence decreases, leading to the indeter-
minacy. The present model sharpens this prediction by endogenizing the probability
that the patient will file a claim, the probability that the physician will satisfy the
standard of care and the probability that the court will find negligence. Therefore,
a definite prediction can be made regarding claim rates. In addition, Green’s model
does not consider the influence of MCO-physician contracts on physician behavior.
The present model takes into account how legal rules affect contract choices and how
different contracts affect physician behavior.
Blomqvist [14] develops a formal model of health care markets with incomplete
information to evaluate the efficiency of two structures: (1) the provision of medical
services by physicians paid by conventional insurers under fee-for-service contracts
and (2) the provision of medical services by physicians employed by MCOs. The study
also proposes a liability rule designed to mitigate the negative effects of information
asymmetries that cannot be remedied by simply switching to the second structure.
The study’s results are limited, however, by the fact that the industry’s organization
is exogenous to the model. The present study assumes that the organization of health
care markets (specifically, how insurers contract with health care providers) will adjust
to the legal regime. This allows for a richer understanding of how behavior adapts to
various legal environments.
Danzon’s [26] study of physician behavior under various legal regimes11 appears
to be most closely related to the present study. She uses simulation analysis to
examine behavior and outcomes under various MCO contracts (i.e., capitation and
11Specifically, she considers no liability, negligence and strict liability regimes.
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fee-for-service reimbursement). The main result of the study is that outcomes depend
greatly on whether the physician is assumed to be purely selfish or a moderately
good agent for patients. As in the previously mentioned studies, however, the model
does not allow physician contracts to adjust to various legal regimes. Therefore, the
predictions of the model are limited in their descriptive ability.
These studies, while providing important insights into the behavior of various
actors in health care markets, do not consider how MCOs adjust contracts to account
for changes in legal rules. Given the modern structure of the health care industry, a
richer understanding of treatment and litigation decisions is gained by exploring how
various contract types affect physician treatment choices and how these contracts
change as legal rules evolve.
2.2.3 Mandatory Disclosure Laws
As of 2001, 21 states have passed some form of mandatory disclosure statute. The
purpose of these rules is to force MCOs to disclosure information about the types
of health care provider contracts used to obtain medical services for their enrollees.
Rather than regulate the types of contracts MCOs are able to use, the states simply
force disclosure and allow consumers to choose a health plan based, in part, on the
types of provider contracts used by MCOs.
Several papers addressing disclosure rules provide useful background information.
For example, Hellinger [50] provides details on disclosure rule proliferation and a brief
discussion of the debate surrounding these rules. The study lists the states with a
disclosure law in place and discusses the variations in content required to be disclosed.
Proponents of mandatory disclosure laws argue that the consumer should be provided
with the appropriate information to be able to make an informed decision about which
plan to join. On the other hand, opponents argue that consumers are unable to assess
the ramifications of certain types of contracts.
Morreim [76] focuses on who should be required to disclose contract information,
what information should be disclosed and how disclosure rules should be implemented.
13
Morreim suggests that both MCOs and physicians should be required to disclose infor-
mation about provider contracts. He also provides a sample disclosure and discusses
the importance of balancing the provision of information on cost controls and conflicts
of interest with an explanation of why cost controls are sometimes in the patient’s
best interest.
Miller and Horowitz [73] address the challenge of informing consumers about
MCOs provider contracts without doing harm to the physician-patient relationship.
The article discusses data suggesting that patients do not understand fully the in-
centives used in provider contracts. Patients tend to trust physicians despite the
incentives and are hesitant to believe that physicians make treatment decisions based
on financial considerations. Miller and Horowitz offer suggestions for altering dis-
closures to increase the salience of incentive information without eroding the trust
relationship between the patient and physician.
Hall, Kidd and Dugan [46] evaluate whether disclosure accomplishes the goals it
sets out to achieve. The study is based on interviews of academics, public policy
analysts, regulators, health plan representatives, patient and consumer advocates
and a private lawyer. A general consensus was reached among the participants that
consumers generally do not understand disclosures or use them to choose a health
care plan. In addition, the participants agreed that disclosures should also aim to
educate consumers about the benefits of cost controls; but, many pointed out that
MCOs might avoid this because of the risk of disclosing information that does not
comply with the law. The article offers suggests using a “layered approach” to provide
information to consumers in a manner that is best fitted to the decisions and concerns
faced by them at different times.
Miller and Sage [74] provide a useful summary of the state of disclosure laws
and discuss the potential problems with implementing the rules. The authors note
that forced disclosure has many benefits. It increases consumer bargaining power
and results in informed choices over health plans. In addition, forcing disclosure
might discourage use of compensation methods that compromise patient’s access to
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treatment.12 The study considers how the content, timing and scope of disclosure
might affect the physician-patient relationship.
In a recent and quite comprehensive study, Sage [83] summarizes the debate over
whether information disclosure is an effective means to regulate health care markets.
The debate is presented in terms of the various rationales supporting disclosure laws:
(1) to increase competition among MCOs, (2) to strengthen agency relationships and
enforce fiduciary duties, (3) to mitigate the negative effects of incomplete information,
and (4) to increase public awareness and political accountability. The article offers
specific recommendations for optimal methods of disclosure.
While these papers provide interesting perspectives on disclosure rules, none stud-
ies the complicated effects of these rules on health care actors’ behavior. In particular,
no study evaluates how these rules lead MCOs to choose different contracts which
influence treatment and litigation decisions. Without a comprehensive analysis of the
behavioral effects of these rules, the usefulness of normative prescriptions is limited.
The purpose of designing the model presented infra in Chapter 3 is to analyze
the effects of contract disclosure rules on MCO contract choices, physician treatment
decisions and patient litigation decisions. No study of disclosure laws seems to analyze
formally the effects of these laws on behavior in health care markets.
2.2.4 Medical Malpractice Damage Rules
The theoretical model presented infra in Chapter 3 also provides a means to evaluate
the efficiency of medical malpractice damage rules courts implement when an injured
patient proves that a physician’s negligent behavior caused her injury. The two most
commonly used damage rules are the all-or-nothing rule13 and the loss-of-a-chance
rule.14 Studies that analyze the efficiency of medical malpractice damage rules are
sparse.
12The study presented in Chapter 3 focuses on this particular benefit.
13The all-or-nothing damage rule awards no compensation if the chance of recovery with treat-
ment is less than one-half. If this probability is at least one-half, then the patient recovers full
compensatory damages if the physician’s treatment choice did not meet the legal standard of care.
14The loss-of-a-chance rule provides compensation for only the lost chance of recovery related to
a physician’s negligent action.
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King [59] analyzes the all-or-nothing damage rule and suggests that courts em-
ploy a loss-of-a-chance framework to more fairly compensate an injured patient for
losses due to negligent care. King points out the importance of properly valuing a
“chance of avoiding some adverse result or of achieving some favorable result.” In
particular, he notes that allowing recovery for lost chances contributes to the optimal
allocation of resources by internalizing externalities. In adopting the loss-of-a-chance
rule, some courts expound on the deterrence effects of various medical malpractice
damage rules.15
In a recent article, Fischer [36] justifies applying the loss-of-a-chance rule by argu-
ing that it provides better deterrence than the all-or-nothing rule.16 He lists several
rationales for the loss-of-a-chance rule including (1) the fact that “chance has value”
and is therefore entitled to legal protection, (2) interference with the victim’s personal
autonomy justifies imposing liability for the loss of a chance, (3) fairness requires
recovery where “the defendant’s tortious conduct creates the lack of evidence that
prevents the plaintiff from proving damages by a preponderance of evidence,” and
(4) efficient deterrence is achieved by shifting the loss of a chance to the potential
injurer.17 Fischer offers limiting principals for the application of the loss-of-a-chance
damage rule that will prevent the plaintiff from escaping the burden of proving that
the defendant’s action actually caused the injury.
The present study considers the efficiency of both the all-or-nothing rule and the
loss-of-a-chance rule in the context of the model used to analyze the effects of different
legal rules on behavior in health care markets. The analysis goes one step further
than previous studies by analyzing how these rules affect MCO contract choices which
in turn influence physician treatment choices and patient litigation decisions. By
stretching the analysis to include the MCOs contract choice, the precise inefficiencies
15See Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984) (concluding that the all-
or-nothing rule “declares open season on critically ill or injured persons.”); Shively v. Klein, 551
A.2d 41 (Del. 1988) (arguing that the physician should be held responsible for any decrease in the
patient’s chance of recovery).
16This article refers to similar studies regarding the evolution and application of the loss-of-a-
chance rule.
17The analysis presented in Chapter 3, however, will show that this damage rule will not lead to
efficient behavior when litigation is costly and the victim is not able to observe the injurer’s action.
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of the damage rules can be characterized.18
2.2.5 Tortfeasor Rules
A significant literature is devoted to the study of enterprise liability (also known as
vicarious liability) and the influence of tortfeasor rules on outcomes.
Kornhauser [61] shows that, under certain conditions, individual liability19 and
enterprise liability20 will result in identical injurer behavior.21 Kornhauser assumes
that the principal can only condition the wage on whether an accident occurred (and
not on the level of care taken by the agent). He offers two arguments to support
the “equivalence” claim. First, if the legal environment allows employment contracts
to include indemnification22 and insurance claims,23 the principal is able to transfer
liability to or from the agent under any tortfeasor rule. Therefore, the principal can
induce the agent to perform identically under any rule. In fact, Kornhauser argues
that “[i]f these provisions were strictly barred, the two liability regimes would lead to
different care levels....” Second, by conditioning wages on the outcome, the principal
is able to create incentives for the agent to take the optimal amount of care (according
to the principal).
The Neutrality Result presented infra in Section 3.8 shows that, under the con-
ditions of the present study, individual liability and enterprise liability will result
in identical treatment and litigation decisions. The formal result confirms that the
conclusions drawn by Kornhauser apply in the presence of litigation costs and victim
18See infra Section 3.7 for a formal analysis of the inefficiencies of both damage rules when litigation
is costly and the victim is unable to observe the action of the injurer.
19Individual liability holds the agent who acted liable, but not the principal.
20Enterprise liability holds the principal liable for the wrongful acts of its agents.
21The study also considers the effects of vicarious liability under various market conditions includ-
ing the presence of wealth-constrained agents, significant transaction costs, the employer’s ability
to condition wages on care levels, proof problems, conflicts of interest and the employer’s ability to
communicate incentives, screen and supervise. If any of these conditions is present, then enterprise
liability and individual liability might not produce identical outcomes. The present study does not
consider these cases, but could easily be extended to account for them.
22Indemnification clauses bind the agent to reimburse the principal for any liability imposed on
the principal due to the agent’s actions.
23An insurance claim is a device the principal can use to insure the agent against liability resulting
from the agent’s action.
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uncertainty over whether the injurer met the legal standard of care. In addition,
the results show that, in contrast to Kornhauser’s claim, indemnification clauses and
insurance are not necessary for the result to hold. In other words, identical outcomes
result even if the principal is not able to condition wages on outcomes. The Neu-
trality Result is based on the notion that the principal must compensate the agent
through the wage contract in order for the physician to accept exposure to liability
(i.e., agree to work as a physician). Therefore, regardless of the tortfeasor rule, the
principal always incurs the cost of ex ante exposure to liability and induces the agent
to perform identical actions regardless of the tortfeasor rule. The Neutrality Result
provided in the following Chapter can be viewed as a generalization of Kornhauser’s
equivalence result.
Sykes [98] also considers the differences in outcomes caused by various liability
regimes when precautionary behavior is influenced by financial incentives to exercise
care, but the level of care is under the exclusive control of the agent.24 Sykes considers
only the case in which the agent is judgment-proof (i.e., the agent’s wealth is less
than the total damage award), arguing that “[i]f the agent is not judgment proof,
then any Pareto optimal agency agreement in the absence of vicarious liability can
be contractually recreated after the imposition of vicarious liability.” Sykes does not
make any claims regarding what the legal environment must allow for this claim to
hold (e.g., indemnification and/or insurance).25
Others have considered the differences between enterprise liability and individual
liability when the conditions are not such that equivalent outcomes result under
each rule. For example, Latin [67] analyzes tortfeasor rules under the assumption
that actors are severely restricted by cognitive constraints. Polinsky and Shavell [81]
suggest that different tortfeasor rules result in different behavior if the principal is not
24The study also considers differences in outcomes under other circumstances such as when the
principal can monitor the agent’s level of care.
25In a second article covering the same topic, Sykes [97] analyzes the differences between Ko-
rnhauser [61] and Sykes [98]. The article focuses mainly on the trade off between optimal risk
sharing between risk averse principals and agents and the optimal incentives for care. The analysis
of the present study assumes risk neutrality of all parties. The model, though, could be extended to
consider the effects of risk aversion.
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able to penalize the agent an amount more than the amount of the harm his actions
might cause.26
Relatively few studies focus on the theory of enterprise liability in the context
of health care markets. Sage [84] considers the political aspects of imposing lability
for medical malpractice on managed care organizations as they relate to the Clinton
health plan proposal. The study includes an analysis of the law’s response to managed
care in terms of using medical malpractice liability as a deterrent. Sage makes several
general suggestions for socially constructive federal legislation and identifies a set of
principles that should guide policy.
Epstein [33] analyzes the efficacy of enterprise liability and other governmental
regulation of health care markets by comparing the medical malpractice system to
the federal workers’ compensation system. He maintains that regulations, including
imposing liability for medical malpractice on MCOs, might cause more problems than
they solve. For example, he warns that if injured patients are allowed to sue MCOs,
“the physician [could] join forces with the patient in attacking the health plan for
its distant and hostile attitude to the welfare of plan participants.” He argues for
contract solutions and suggests that relying on reputation effects might lead to more
efficient outcomes.27
While contributing greatly to the understanding of how the structure of liability
affects health care markets, these studies do not analyze formally how tortfeasor rules
combine with disclosure rules to affect contract, treatment and litigation choices.
Without a clear understanding of the effects of legal rules on the behavior of actors in
health care markets, normative prescriptions are severely limited in their ability bring
about efficient outcomes. The theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 facilitates a
formal analysis of tortfeasor rules. The present study offers predictions regarding how
26Other studies considering the differences between enterprise liability and individual liability
include Stone [96], Kraakman [63], Macey [70], Chapman [22], Croley [24], Segerson and Tietenberg
[90], Schwartz [87], and Arlen and Kraakman [4]. None of these provides a formal analysis of the
differences between enterprise liability and individual liability given litigation costs and uncertainty
regarding the injurer’s action.
27Several other studies were written about enterprise liability after the demise of the Clinton
health plan. See, e.g., Abraham and Weiler [1], Furrow [39], Sage et al. [85] and Havighurst [48].
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MCO contract choices react to various tortfeasor rules.
The following section summarizes and critiques the empirical findings regarding
how legal rules affect medical malpractice insurance premiums and other indicators.
2.3 Empirical Analyses
Chapter 4 presents an empirical analysis of the effects of mandatory disclosure laws
and damage caps on claim rates and ex ante expected damages. Although no previous
empirical study considers mandatory disclosure laws, many studies have examined the
effects of damages caps, not only on claim rates, but on other variables of interest
including severity of claims paid by insurance companies to cover losses caused by
insured physicians, medical malpractice insurance premiums and insurance industry
profitability. The evidence seems to be mixed: the literature does not provide a
definitive answer regarding the effects of damage caps. To illustrate, a summary of
several studies is provided here. Following the summary is a brief analysis of the
literature.
2.3.1 Summary of Empirical Studies
Table 2.1 provides a summary of results from empirical studies described in this
section.
Danzon’s [29] seminal study on the effects of tort reforms on medical malprac-
tice claim frequency and severity finds that torts reforms significantly affect both
measures. Although Danzon does not estimate the effect on claim rates of damage
caps independent of other legal reforms,28 she includes damage caps as one of the
legal reforms under investigation. She employs data on claims closed in 1970 and
1975–78 gathered by insurance company surveys. Results from pooled, cross-section
equations show no evidence that tort reforms (including damage caps) taken together
28Danzon considers four independent variables in her study: an aggregate total number of 12
possible reforms which were passed, limits on attorney contingent fees, reduction in the statute of
limitations and the number of years of the new statute of limitations.
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Summary of Empirical Results Related to Damage Caps
Effect of Damage Caps on
Premiums Losses Price Claim Rate Claim Severity Risk
Danzon [29] ↓
Danzon [27] ↓
Sloan [93] ↓
Sloan [94] NE
Zuckerman [103] ↓a NE ↓
Barker [8] ↑ ↓b
Viscusi [101] NE ↓c NE
Viscusi [100] NE ↓ ↑
Gius [41] NE
Bhat [11]d ↓ ↓
Bhat [11]e NE ↑
Table 2.1: This table summarizes the empirical literature focusing on how damage caps affect
various insurance industry measures. “NE” indicates “no effect.” “Losses” are a measure of the
amount paid out by insurance companies for claims against insured physicians won by injured
patients though settlements or judgments. “Price” refers to the cost of $1 of coverage calculated
by dividing total premiums received by total losses paid. “Risk” refers to the probability that the
actual losses an insurer faces differ from expected losses. The standard deviation of the loss ratio
is used as a proxy for underwriting risk.
Only first authors are mentioned. See bibliography for full list of authors.
a decrease for cap on total damage amount recoverable (NE for caps on non-economic damages
only)
b decrease for some types of insurers only
c for non-economic damage caps only (not punitive damage caps)
d economic and non-economic damages taken together
e non-economic damages considered alone
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contributed to post-1975 claim rates. She does, however, find that caps significantly
lower claim severity.29
Sloan [94] performs a similar analysis, except that he uses premiums paid by physi-
cians in three fields. The observational unit is the state, and the study incorporates
data covering the years 1974–1978. Sloan runs two specifications: (1) premiums levels
as the dependent variable and (2) annual percentage change in premiums as the de-
pendent variable.30 He finds that damage caps significantly affect neither premiums
for any of the three fields tested nor annual percentage change in premiums.
Zuckerman et al. [103] take another look at similar issues using data covering a
13-year period—1974 through 1986. The unit of observation is individual insurance
companies. Most states were included in the analysis. The study finds that caps
significantly reduce premiums and claims severity. Interestingly, the study found
that caps did not have a significant effect on claim rates. The authors suggest that
the incongruent results might be due to the methods used to collect the data (i.e.,
many companies that provided data on premiums were not included in the survey of
insurers to collect frequency and severity data).
Other studies take a different tack by investigating how tort reforms, including
damage caps, affect the insurance industry’s performance. Barker [8] empirically
investigates how damage caps affect relative medical malpractice insurance prices,
profitability of the insurance industry and underwriting risk. Barker uses statewide
loss ratio data from 1977–1986. The loss ratio (i.e., the ratio of incurred losses to
earned premiums) is often used as a proxy for the relative price of insurance. The
standard deviation of the loss ratio acts as a proxy for underwriting risk. Barker finds
that damage caps significantly improve relative underwriting profits. The effect of
caps on underwriting risk depends on the type of insurance company. Caps had no
29Danzon [27] updated this study using nationwide claims experience for the years 1975–1984
gathered through insurance company surveys. She controls for endogenity by using a two-stage least
squares estimator. Again, she finds that damage caps significantly reduce claim severity. Sloan et
al. [93] replicated this finding using data on indemnity payments during the years 1975–1978 and
1984.
30The models account for fixed effects with the use of a covariance model, using state dummies to
control for omitted state effects on premiums and year dummies to account for time-related effects
common to all states.
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significant effect on the underwriting risk of national agencies or direct writers. They
did, however, significantly decrease underwriting risk for state agencies.
Viscusi et al. [101] focus mainly on the effects of the second generation of tort
reforms to be implemented by state legislators. These reforms took effect during the
mid-1980s when the second (perceived) medical malpractice crisis hit the U.S. This
study uses 1988 aggregated premiums and losses by state and considers the change
in premiums and losses from 1985 to 1987. The analysis controls for differences in
state regulation of insurers. The authors considered limits on non-economic damages
and limits on punitive damages. The only significant result indicated that limits on
non-economic damages significantly reduce losses. Limits on non-economic damages
did not affect premiums or loss ratios. In addition, limits on punitive damages did
not affect losses, premiums or loss ratios.
Viscusi and Born [100] extend the study of Viscusi et al. [101] by examining the
effect of liability reform on medical malpractice insurance over the 1984–1991 period.
Rather than using data aggregated by state, the authors employ firm-level data for
every firm writing medical malpractice insurance during the period of interest. They
find that damage caps significantly decrease loss ratios and incurred losses.31 They
find, however, that damage caps do not significantly affect earned premiums.32
Gius [41] challenges the methodology of some previous studies33 by pointing out
that state-level heterogeneity must be taken into account when examining the effects
of tort reforms and other factors on medical malpractice insurance premiums. He
employs a panel data set consisting of observations from all 50 states for the years
1976–1990. He finds that when state-level differences are controlled, damage caps do
not have a significant effect on premiums. He concludes that results from previous
studies that do not account for state-level differences might be biased.
The most extensive study of the effects of legal rules on medical malpractice insur-
31The study employs several specifications to test the robustness of the results.
32Born and Viscusi [16] find similar results using data from 1984–1991 and employing quantile
regressions to account for differences in effects of the reforms across insurer profitability and size
distributions. They do find, however, that damage caps do not have a uniform effect on premiums
across the distribution of insurers.
33E.g., Barker [8], Sloan [94] and Zuckerman [103].
23
ance was recently reported by Bhat [11]. He examines the influences of legal reforms
on several indicators including claim rates, severity of claims and premiums. Using
data on the payment rate per physician of each state for the period 1991–1995, Bhat
finds that caps on economic and non-economic damages (taken together) are likely
to reduce malpractice payment rates. Caps on non-economic damages (taken alone),
however, increase payment frequencies. In addition, using the same data, he finds
that caps on economic and non-economic damages encourage settlement. Caps on
non-economic damages, though, do not affect the likelihood of settlement. Finally,
Bhat considers the effects of caps on medical malpractice insurance premiums.34 He
finds that caps on economic and non-economic damages significantly decrease premi-
ums.35 Similar to other results, he finds that caps on non-economic damages have no
effect on premium levels.
2.3.2 Reconciliation and Critique of the Empirical Literature
The purpose of this section is to reconcile and critique the studies summarized in the
previous section. In addition, the studies’ results will be compared to the theoretical
predictions of the model presented in Chapter 3 and the empirical results reported in
Chapter 4.
Most studies, including the present analysis, find that damage caps have no effect
on premiums. Zuckerman et al. [103] and Bhat [11], however, find that damage caps
significantly decrease premiums. Although the studies testing the effect of caps on
premiums employ different methodologies and incorporate different independent vari-
ables to control for other determinants of premiums, particular specification choices
may account for the results obtained by Zuckerman et al. and Bhat.
Zuckerman et al. might have found that damage caps significantly decrease premi-
ums because of the unique specification they use to test the prediction. They regress
each year’s premiums on prior year legal rules to account for the fact that insurers
34Bhat employs malpractice premiums of Class 3 doctor-mature claims-made rates at $1 million
to $3 million limits of the St.Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company for 1990–1994.
35This result is significant, though, at only the 0.10 level.
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set premiums for a particular year at the beginning of that year; therefore, only legal
rules in effect during the prior year can influence premium levels. The present study
reported in Chapter 4 reports results derived from this particular specification and
finds that the coefficient on damage caps becomes more negative and more statisti-
cally significant (although not statistically significant at the 10% level) compared to
the results obtained by regressing each year’s premiums on the current year’s legal
rules.
Bhat’s analysis is also unique. His is the only study that controls for the lengthy
delay from filing to resolution common among medical malpractice claims. This
attempt to control for the timing of claims is akin to that used by Zuckerman et
al. and the present study and may account for the significance of the coefficient on
damage caps.
Next consider the findings regarding how damage caps affect losses incurred by
insurers. Only two other studies investigate the relationship between losses incurred
and damage caps (Viscusi and Born [100] (finding that damages caps reduce incurred
losses by between 15% and 30% with estimates statistically significant at a 95%
confidence level) and Viscusi et al. [101] (finding that limits on non-economic damages
lower incurred losses by 45% with the estimate statistically significant at the 90%
confidence level)). The present study finds that damage caps of any sort reduce
incurred losses by roughly 30% (statistically significant at the 95% confidence level).
Therefore, the present results are consistent with results from previous studies, but
not with the theoretical predictions provided in Chapter 3.36
Finally, consider the results related to claim rates. The theoretical model pre-
sented in Chapter 3 predicts that damage caps lead to (weakly) higher claim rates.37
The results reported by Zuckerman et al. [103] support this claim. Bhat’s [11]
study, however, reports inconsistent results. Using a generalized estimation equation
methodology to account for the fact that claim rates follow a Poisson distribution,
Bhat finds that claim rates are 0.5% higher when non-economic damages are capped
36See Section 4.4.3 for a possible explanation of this discrepancy.
37See infra Section 3.6 for details behind this claim.
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and 0.8% lower when both economic and non-economic damages are capped.38 Bhat
does not offer an explanation for this discrepancy. Consider the following explanation
derived from the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3. The model shows that
claim rates will increase as damages decrease unless the damage cap is so restrictive
that litigation costs exceed recoverable damages. When this occurs, claim rates ac-
tually decrease because injured patients will not pursue claims when the recoverable
amount will not cover litigation costs. When both economic and non-economic dam-
ages are capped, damages are more likely to fall below litigation costs than when only
non-economic damages are capped. Therefore, Bhat’s results do not seem completely
anomalous.
All empirical results related to claim severity indicate that the average severity
of claims paid is lower when damage caps are imposed. These results are consistent
with the theoretical predictions specified in Chapter 3. Finally, it should be noted
that the theoretical model does not make predictions about the relationship between
damage caps and the price of medical malpractice insurance or underwriting risk.
These results are included in Table 2.1 to provide a more complete picture of the
research regarding the effects of damage caps on the medical malpractice insurance
industry.
2.4 Conclusion
Health care law and economics has received a great deal of attention from scholars.
Much has been written about the effects of legal rules on behavior in health care
markets. This study aims to contribute to each of the literatures described in this
Chapter to advance our understanding of the behavior of MCOs, physicians and
injured patients given particular legal regimes.
First, most formal models of litigation and deterrence in cases where the victim
is uncertain about whether the injurer met the legal standard of care assume that
the patient’s belief regarding the injurer’s action is exogenously determined. The
38Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
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theoretical model provided in Chapter 3 assumes that the victim’s belief over the
injurer’s action is a function of the legal environment and the injurer’s incentives.
The model monopolizes on the fact that as the legal environment changes, so will
the actions of the injurer. This, in turn, will alter the beliefs of the victim and the
likelihood that the victim will file a claim against the injurer. By noting this seemingly
trivial aspect of litigation, we gain a more thorough understanding of behavior in
health care markets.
Second, many important studies have advanced our understanding of how physi-
cians react to changes in legal rules governing the provision of medical care. Many of
these studies also focus on how physician behavior changes under different compen-
sation structures. The formal model takes this research one step further by observing
that MCOs will react to changes in the law, as well. Physician behavior is better un-
derstood if we fully comprehend how legal rules affect MCO decisions over physician
compensation methods.
Third, since the first mandatory disclosure law went into effect in 1996, several
scholars have commented on the efficacy of disclosure laws in bettering the health care
plan selection process and suggested ways in which the rules can be implemented to
least disturb the physician-patient relationship. None of these studies, however, con-
siders how disclosure laws will affect behavior in health care markets. The present
study investigates how disclosure laws affect MCO contract choices, physician treat-
ment choices and patient litigation decisions.
Fourth, comparisons have been made between various damage rules courts use
to compensate patients injured by negligent physicians. In particular, many studies
argue that the loss-of-a-chance rule better compensates injured patients than the all-
or-nothing rule. The results of the model in the following Chapter take the analysis
of damage rules one step further. Using the predictions of behavior under varying
legal regimes, an efficient damage rule is constructed. The efficient rule is used to
characterize the specific inefficiencies of both the all-or-nothing rule and the loss-of-
a-chance rule.
Fifth, several scholars have identified the pros and cons of enterprise liability,
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generally and in the context of health care markets. The model presented infra in
Chapter 3 generalizes Kornhauser’s equivalence claim. In addition, the model’s results
are extended to provide predictions of how various tortfeasor rules will affect the types
of contracts MCOs will use to compensate physicians.
The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 4 attempts to update the results
regarding how damage caps affect claim rates. In addition, the analysis provides a first
look at how mandatory disclosure laws affect claim rates. Before the empirical analysis
is presented, however, Chapter 3 will provide a theoretical framework facilitating the
study of the interactions between legal rules and behavior in health care markets.
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Chapter 3 An Equilibrium Model of
Behavior in Health Care Markets
3.1 Introduction
National health expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product have been
increasing steadily. They rose from roughly 9% in 1980 to approximately 13% in
2000 and are projected to increase to approximately 16.5% by the year 2010.1 The
significant and growing size of the health care industry coupled with its inherent
market imperfections justify the voluminous literature related to it.
How judicial and legislative rules affect behavior in health care markets has been
widely studied.2 Despite the attention devoted to this field, our understanding of the
intricate interactions between legal rules and behavior remains blurred. Most studies
focus narrowly on one or two actors and do not account for how legal rules affect
the contracts managed care organizations (“MCOs”) use to compensate physicians.
These effects are important to study because they influence treatment decisions made
by physicians and litigation decisions made by injured patients. The purpose of this
paper is to take another step toward clarifying exactly how legal rules affect behavior
in health care markets by including a wide range of actors and analyzing how the
behavior of one affects the choices of the others. Understanding these interactions
aids in discovering whether legal rules achieve desired goals and lead to efficient
outcomes.
Even though judges and legislators create legal rules with specific goals in mind,
they might perversely affect the behavior of actors they influence. For example, courts
1These statistics were reported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Office
of the Actuary, National Health Statistics Group. Information is posted on the web at
http://cms.hhs.gov/researchers/.
2See Danzon [25] and McGuire [72] for recent literature reviews.
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might assume that decreasing damage awards will reduce the number of lawsuits
filed. This might not be the case, however. When courts reduce damages, those with
legal duties might benefit by taking fewer precautions even though they might face
lawsuits if injuries result from their negligent acts. This, in turn, might lead to an
increase in injuries and a resulting increase in lawsuits. Unless law makers consider
the incentives of all actors involved, predictions of the effects of changes in the law
could be misguided. Furthermore, unless we have a clear understanding of the effects
of current legal rules on behavior in health care markets any normative analysis of
these legal rules is severely limited. For these reasons, a theoretical investigation of
how current legal rules affect behavior in health care markets is an important step
toward successful legal reform.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how particular judicial and legislative
rules affect behavior in health care markets. Specifically, the paper develops a game
theoretic model to provide insight into how certain legal rules affect contracting be-
tween physicians and “MCOs,” physician treatment choices and litigation decisions
by injured patients. In the first stage of the model, the MCO considers the cost
of compliant treatment3 and expected damages from a medical malpractice lawsuit
and chooses a contract to obtain medical services for its insured patient (in need of
medical treatment). Knowing the contract terms selected by the MCO, the physician
then determines whether he will provide compliant treatment to the insured patient.
Compliant treatment is assumed to be more costly than non-compliant treatment, but
results in a positive outcome for the patient more often than non-compliant treat-
ment. Given the physician’s action, Nature chooses whether the patient will enjoy a
positive outcome or suffer a negative outcome. If a positive outcome is realized, the
game ends. If a negative outcome occurs, the patient, not able to ascertain whether
the physician provided appropriate medical care, decides whether to file a costly neg-
ligence suit for medical malpractice. If a suit is filed, the court hears the case and
3Compliant treatment is treatment that meets the legal standard of care. For those not familiar
with legal terminology, “standard of care” refers to the level of effort such that if an actor’s effort
level is equal to or above the specified level, the court does not assign liability to that actor for any
related injuries.
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rules on the issue of liability.4
The paper focuses mainly on how health care market actors react to disclosure
rules. Some states require MCOs to disclose to their insured members the contract
terms they use to compensate physicians for providing medical services to their mem-
bers. As of 2001, 21 states require MCOs to disclose to enrollees physician compen-
sation methods used (Miller and Sage [74]). Although mandatory contract disclosure
is intended to provide prospective enrollees with information when choosing health
plans, it also affects MCO contract choices, physician treatment decisions and liti-
gation decisions by injured patients. Therefore, the analysis is performed assuming
patients can observe the contract terms and again assuming they cannot. The re-
sults provide insights into the effects of disclosure laws on the behavior of health care
market actors.
By analyzing a model of the interactions among actors in health care markets,
I find that the relationship between the cost of compliant treatment and expected
damages determines the MCO’s contract choice. Also, the contract disclosure rule
(i.e., whether the patient can observe the contract terms) affects the contract chosen
by the MCO. Assuming damage awards exceed litigation costs, when contracts are
observable and expected damages are high relative to the expected cost of compliant
treatment, the MCO employs a standard fee-for-service contract with full reimburse-
ment for cost and no fixed payment. The physician will compliantly treat with a
probability high enough so that the patient will never sue, and the patient never
sues. If damages are low relative to the expected cost of compliant treatment, the
MCO prefers a capitated contract with no reimbursement for cost and a positive fixed
payment to compensate the physician for exposure to liability. The physician will not
provide compliant treatment and the patient will sue with certainty if a negative
outcome is realized.
Actors behave somewhat differently when the patient is unable to observe the
contract terms. In this case, when the court sets damages high relative to the cost
4Of course, a settlement might occur before this stage. See infra Section 3.4.3 for a discussion of
this issue.
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of compliant treatment, the MCO prefers a fee-for-service contract with partial reim-
bursement and a positive fixed payment to cover the physician’s exposure to liability.
The physician will compliantly treat at a probability high enough so that the patient
does not sue with certainty. Unlike in the observable contract case, the patient will
sue with some positive probability. Injured patients sue with a strictly positive proba-
bility because the patient is unable to observe the contract terms and so must use the
threat of a lawsuit to ensure that the MCO encourages the physician to compliantly
treat with some positive probability. When the court sets damages low relative to the
cost of compliant treatment, however, actors behave as they would in the observable
contract case. That is, the MCO employs a capitated contract with no reimbursement
for the cost of treatment but a positive fixed payment to compensate the physician
for exposure to liability. The physician never provides compliant treatment and the
patient sues with certainty.
In addition, the model shows that, for any damage rule, regimes in which contracts
are observable by patients will enjoy a lower rate of claims filed and a higher rate of
compliant treatment than regimes in which contracts are not observable by patients.
These results follow directly from the reasoning provided previously. First, consider
the likelihood of claims. When contracts are observable, the patient can infer the
physician’s strategy based on the outcome and the contract terms. Therefore, upon
realizing a negative outcome, the patient will never file a claim if the contract is fee-
for-service and will file a claim with certainty if the contract is capitated. On the other
hand, if the patient is unable to observe the contract, she cannot discover whether
the MCO induced compliant treatment. When the cost of compliant treatment is low
relative to expected damages, the patient finds it necessary to sue with some positive
probability so that the MCO has an incentive to induce compliant treatment. Without
the threat of a lawsuit, the MCO simply would never provide the physician with an
incentive to meet the legal standard of care when making the treatment decision.
For these reasons, the claims rate is higher in a regime in which contracts are not
observable compared to a regime in which patients are able to observe them.
Next, consider the likelihood of compliant treatment under each regime. When
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the patient is able to observe the contract terms and the cost of compliant treat-
ment is low relative to damages, the patient will never sue. Therefore, if the MCO
induces compliant treatment, it will incur costs for the provision of treatment only.
In contrast, if contracts are not observable, the patient always sues with some posi-
tive probability. This implies that if the MCO induces compliant treatment it incurs
costs related to liability exposure in addition to the provision of compliant treatment.
Therefore, the total expected costs incurred if the MCO induces compliant treatment
are higher in a regime in which contracts are not observable. For this reason the
MCO induces compliant treatment less often when patients are unable to observe the
contract terms.
Given the analysis of behavior in observable and unobservable contract regimes,
it is possible to characterize how adjusting damages (while holding constant all other
variables not affected by behavior) affects behavior in each regime. Variations in
treatment and litigation decisions resulting from changes in expected damages are
examined both in observable contract regimes and in unobservable contract regimes.
The observability of the contract significantly affects how treatment and litigation
decisions react to changes in expected damages. In addition, when contracts are
observable, patterns of behavior strongly depend on the cost of compliant treatment.
These results display the danger in assuming that decreasing damages will lead to a
decrease in medical malpractice claims. In addition, it might not be the case that
increasing damages will lead to a subsequent increase in compliant treatment levels.
The model’s results suggest that changes in damages affect behavior in much more
complex ways.
The results also suggest an efficient damage rule.5 When compliant treatment is
socially efficient (i.e., the cost of compliant treatment is low relative to its expected
benefit), the court should set damages high so that the physician will (almost) always
compliantly treat and the patient will (almost) never sue. The results show that, in
this case, the MCO chooses a fee-for-service contract to compensate the physician.
5The efficient damage rule is constructed under the assumptions of the model. The model assumes
that the court can perfectly verify the physician’s action. Relaxing this assumption significantly
changes the construction of the efficient damage rule. This is discussed infra in Section 3.7.
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On the other hand, when compliant treatment is socially inefficient (i.e., the cost of
compliant treatment is high relative to its expected benefits), the court should set
damages equal to zero so that the physician will never provide compliant treatment
and the patient will never sue. In this case, the MCO will pay the physician nothing.
Interestingly, the court can obtain this (approximate) first-best outcome regardless
of the observability of the contract terms. In addition, under the assumptions of the
model, outcomes under the efficient damage rule do not depend on which parties an
injured patient is allowed to sue.
The efficient damage rule is used as a benchmark to assess the efficiency of two
commonly used damage rules: the all-or-nothing rule and the loss-of-a-chance rule.
The analysis shows that both rules are inefficient because they merely attempt to
compensate the patient for her loss in the event the physician does not meet the stan-
dard of care. For this reason, the rules provide inefficient incentives for the physician
and the MCO to provide compliant treatment when it is socially optimal. The re-
sulting inefficiencies depend on various parameters of the model and are summarized
according to these parameters.
Finally, the model provides insight into the effects of allowing the patient to sue
certain parties. Treatment choices and litigation decisions do not depend on whether
the court allows the patient to sue the physician only, the MCO only or both. The
expected costs of lawsuits effectively are built into the contract between the MCO
and the physician. This result holds for any damage rule. Rules establishing potential
defendants, however, might affect the type of contract the MCO prefers.
To summarize, the paper first presents predictions of the MCO’s contract choice,
the physician’s treatment decision and the litigation decision by injured patients when
the contract is observable and when it is not. Second, it presents results showing that
more compliant treatment and fewer medical malpractice claims occur when contracts
are observable. Third, it characterizes for all cases the reactions of treatment and
litigation strategies to changes in damages. Fourth, it constructs an efficient damage
rule to analyze two commonly used damage rules. Finally, it presents an analysis of
how behavior is affected by rules regarding which parties the patient is allowed to
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sue.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the contributions
made by this study in relation to several literatures. As a prelude to the details behind
the formal model, Section 3.3 offers a simple numerical example to clarify the basic
intuitions of the model. Section 3.4 develops the framework applied to study how legal
rules affect behavior in health care markets. Section 3.5 provides a detailed analysis
of the model’s equilibria for observable contracts and unobservable contracts and dis-
cusses the intuition behind the results. The section also provides results showing that
more compliant treatment and fewer claims occur when contracts are observable. All
formal proofs can be found in the Appendix. Section 3.6 characterizes how treatment
and litigation decisions vary as damages change. Section 3.7 suggests an efficient
damage rule based on the results from Sections 3.5 and 3.6. The efficient damage
rule is used as a benchmark to analyze the efficiency of two commonly used damage
rules. Section 3.8 discusses the effects of rules regarding which parties the patient is
allowed to sue. Finally, Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 Background and Contributions
This paper contributes to several literatures related to general topics in law and
economics and to more specific literatures devoted to the regulation of health care
markets. This section is designed to identify the literatures to which the present
study contributes and to clarify the insights that the analysis provides.
First, law and economics scholars have taken significant steps toward untangling
the relationship between litigation and deterrence.6 Polinsky and Shavell [82] con-
struct a general model to study the effects of court error on a potential injurer’s
level of care decision and a victim’s litigation decision when the victim does not ob-
serve the injurer’s level of care. The model, however, assumes that the plaintiff’s
belief that the defendant is truly “guilty” is exogenous and not essential to the anal-
6See Brown [19], Landes and Posner [66] and Shavell [91] for comprehensive analyses of tort law
and deterrence.
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ysis.7 The present study employs an equilibrium model of deterrence and litigation
to account for the fact that, when deciding whether to take costly precautions, a
potential injurer considers the possibility of litigation and, when deciding whether
to sue the injurer, a victim updates her belief of injurer “guilt” by considering how
legal rules affect injurer behavior.8 Modelling behavior in this way captures the sub-
tle interactions between damages, the likelihood of compliant treatment and the rate
of claims. For example, in an attempt to reduce claim rates, many states have es-
tablished maximum damage awards in medical malpractice cases (Browne and Puelz
[20]). The present model suggests that the intended goal of reducing the number
of claims might not be achieved by reducing damages. Depending on the relation-
ship between compliant treatment costs and damages, lowering damages might lower
the probability that the physician compliantly treats, which in turn could increase
the probability that the patient is negligently injured and the probability that an
injured patient will file a claim. Therefore, lowering damages could increase claim
rates, contrary to the intended effect. Using an equilibrium model to analyze the
complex interactions between damages, treatment decisions and litigation decisions
illuminates the non-obvious potential effects of changes in legal rules.
Health care economics scholars draw on general models of agency relationships and
litigation and deterrence to explore the imperfections of health care markets. Arrow’s
[5] seminal paper is the first of many to address health care market imperfections. A
handful of studies focuses on how physicians respond to various legal regimes. For
example, Green [44] constructs a model to analyze how litigation affects physician
behavior when patients are unable to observe physician action. Blomqvist [14] uses a
7Several other studies do not account fully for the equilibrium effects of litigation. For example,
see Simon [92] (assuming that the potential plaintiff costlessly collects a signal of the injurer’s
negligence); Schweizer [88] (modelling litigation and settlement by assuming that “nature provides
the parties with information on the merits of the case”); Cooter and Rubinfeld [23] (modelling the
choice between settlement and litigation by assuming that the subjective expected trial payoff to
the plaintiff is determined solely by parties expenditures on the trial); Kaplow [57] (assuming the
plaintiff’s probability of victory does not depend on the incentives of the defendant to take care and
concluding that increasing damages will lead to an increase in the plaintiff’s willingness to sue).
8Examples of other models of litigation and deterrence that consider equilibrium effects in dif-
ferent settings include Png [80] (modelling litigation, liability and incentives for care to analyze the
effects of the settlement process) and Bernardo, Talley and Welch [10] (constructing an equilibrium
model to study the effects of legal presumptions on principal-agent relationships).
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formal model of health care markets to propose a liability rule designed to mitigate the
negative effects of information asymmetries. Danzon’s [26] study of physician behavior
under various legal regimes9 appears to be most closely related to the present study.
She examines behavior and outcomes under various MCO contracts (i.e., capitation
and fee-for-service reimbursement). These studies, while providing important insights
into physician behavior, do not consider how MCOs adjust contracts to account for
changes in legal rules. Given the modern structure of the health care industry, a
richer understanding of physician behavior can be gained by exploring how various
contract types affect physician treatment choices and how these contracts change as
legal rules evolve.
The purpose of designing the model presented here is to analyze the effects of
contract disclosure rules on MCO contract choices, physician treatment decisions and
patient litigation decisions. No study of disclosure laws seems to analyze formally the
effects of these laws on behavior in health care markets.10 Miller and Sage [74] provide
a useful summary of the state of disclosure laws and discuss the potential problems
with implementing the rules. In a recent and quite comprehensive study, Sage [83]
summarizes the debate over whether information disclosure is an effective means to
regulate health care markets. While these papers provide interesting perspectives on
disclosure rules, neither studies the complicated effects of these rules on health care
actors’ behavior. In particular, no study evaluates how these rules lead MCOs to
choose different contracts which influence treatment and litigation decisions. Without
a comprehensive analysis of the behavioral effects of these rules, the usefulness of
normative prescriptions is limited.
The model also provides a means to evaluate the efficiency of medical malpractice
damage rules courts implement when an injured patient proves that a physician’s
9Specifically, she considers no liability, negligence and strict liability regimes.
10Several papers addressing disclosure rules provide useful background information. For example,
see Hellinger [50] (providing details on disclosure rule proliferation and a brief discussion of the
debate surrounding these rules); Morreim [76] (focusing on who should be required to disclose
contract information, what information should be disclosed and how disclosure rules should be
implemented); Miller and Horowitz [73] (addressing the challenge of informing without doing harm
to the physician-patient relationship); Hall, Kidd and Dugan [46] (evaluating whether disclosure
accomplishes the goals it sets out to achieve).
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negligent behavior caused her injury. Studies that analyze the efficiency of medical
malpractice damage rules are sparse. King [59] analyzes the all-or-nothing damage
rule and argues that employing a loss-of-a-chance framework more fairly compensates
an injured patient for losses due to negligent care. King’s study, however, does not
consider how physician treatment choices respond to damage rules. In adopting the
loss-of-a-chance rule, some courts expound on the deterrence effects of various medical
malpractice damage rules.11 In a recent study, Fischer [36] justifies applying the loss-
of-a-chance rule by arguing that it provides better deterrence than the all-or-nothing
rule. The present study goes one step further be analyzing how these rules affect
MCO contract choices which in turn influence physician treatment choices and patient
litigation decisions. By stretching the analysis to include the MCO’s contract choice,
the inefficiencies of the damage rules can be characterized.
Finally, the model facilitates a formal analysis of tortfeasor rules.12 A significant
literature is devoted to the study of vicarious liability and the influence of tortfeasor
rules on outcomes. For example, Kornhauser [61] and Sykes [98] consider the effects of
vicarious liability under various market conditions including the presence of wealth-
constrained agents, significant transaction costs, the employer’s ability to condition
wages on care levels, proof problems, conflicts of interest and the employer’s ability
to communicate incentives, screen and supervise.13 Although these conditions are not
considered in the present study, the model easily could be extended to take them into
account. A handful of studies focuses on the theory of enterprise liability in health
care markets.14 These studies, however, do not analyze formally how tortfeasor rules
combine with disclosure rules to affect contract, treatment and litigation decisions.
11See Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984) (concluding that the all-
or-nothing rule, which awards no compensation if the chance of recovery with treatment is less
than one-half, ”declares open season on critically ill or injured persons.”); Shively v. Klein, 551
A.2d 41(Del. 1988) (arguing that the physician should be held responsible for any decrease in the
patient’s chance of recovery).
12Tortfeasor rules specify the parties an injured plaintiff may sue.
13Also see Latin [67] (analyzing tortfeasor rules under the assumption that actors are severely
restricted by cognitive constraints); Polinsky and Shavell [81] (suggesting that principal-only liability
is not optimal if the principal is unable to penalize the agent an amount more than the amount of
the harm his actions might cause and that the negligence rule should govern sanctions on agents but
not those on principals).
14For example, see Sage [84] and Epstein [33].
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The present study offers predictions regarding how MCO contract choices react to
various tortfeasor rules.15
Section 3.3 provides a numerical example to illustrate some of the results’ intu-
itions.
3.3 Numerical Examples
This section provides numerical examples of the paper’s basic results regarding how
contract, treatment and litigation decisions react to disclosure rules. The first example
assumes patients are able to observe the contract between the MCO and the physician.
The second assumes that contracts are unobservable. The purpose of this section is
two-fold. First, the examples help to illuminate the intuitions behind the model’s
results. Second, it offers a framework to keep in mind while digesting the general
results.
3.3.1 The Observable Contract Case
This example assumes that patients are able to observe the contract the MCO uses
to compensate the physician for providing medical services to the MCO’s insured
members. Assume the following about player payoffs. The MCO pays the physician
a fixed payment (possibly zero), reimburses some amount (possibly zero) of the cost
of treatment when the physician treats a patient and faces exposure to damages if a
patient realizes a negative outcome and sues the MCO. The physician receives a fixed
payment from the MCO and, upon treating a patient, pays the cost of treatment
and is reimbursed some amount by the MCO. The physician also faces exposure to
damages given a negative outcome and a lawsuit. Finally, the patient, upon realizing
a negative outcome, must decide whether to sue without knowing the physician’s
action. In other words, an injured patient is unable to observe whether she received
compliant treatment. If a lawsuit is filed, the patient pays some cost to pursue the
15See supra Section 2.2.5 for a detailed explanation of the differences between the vicarious liability
literature and the results presented in this Chapter.
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medical malpractice claim. The court perfectly verifies the physician’s action and
awards damages if the physician did not treat.16
Imagine a population of 100 identical patients experiencing the same medical
condition. The condition is such that the probability of a positive outcome given
non-compliant treatment is 40%. Compliant treatment provided by the physician
will increase the chance of a positive outcome to 80%. If compliant treatment is
provided, the physician will incur a cost of $10,000 per patient ($1,000,000 to treat
all 100 patients). No cost will be incurred for non-compliant treatment.17 If a patient
experiences a bad outcome, the cost of bringing a lawsuit is $5,000.18
Consider the outcome under various damage levels. First, imagine that if a patient
experiences a negative outcome, files a lawsuit and wins in court (or settles), the
MCO and physician collectively must pay the patient $4,000 in damages. At this
damage level, the patient will not file a lawsuit because litigation costs ($5,000)
exceed damages ($4,000). Knowing this, the MCO will pay the physician nothing
and the physician will not compliantly treat.19
Consider the outcome if expected damages increase to $5,500.20 In this case, the
16The model is sufficiently general such that the court can provide a variety of incentives by
specifying any standard of care it wishes. For example, the court might award damages if the
physician does not implement the treatment that is customary in a particular locality given the
patient’s condition. Alternatively, the court might award damages only if the net benefit from the
physician’s action is greater than the cost. Therefore, imposition of liability “if the physician did not
provide compliant treatment ” can be interpreted in many different ways depending on the standard
of care the court specifies.
17The cost of non-compliant treatment is normalized to zero for ease of computation. Identical
results would obtain if the model assumed a strictly positive cost of non-compliant treatment. The
only necessary assumption is that the cost of compliant treatment must exceed the cost of non-
compliant treatment.
18Note that the primitives of the model are the probability that a positive outcome results given
compliant treatment, the probability that a positive outcome results given non-compliant treatment,
the cost incurred by the physician to provide compliant treatment, the cost to an injured patient to
file and pursue a medical malpractice claim, damages payable by a negligent physician and/or MCO,
the value of health for a patient who experiences a positive outcome and the insurance premium
paid by an enrollee to the MCO for health care insurance.
Note that optimal court rules are not considered in Sections 3.3 through 3.5. See infra Section
3.7 for the development of an optimal court rule under the conditions of the model.
19Note that calculations for all numerical examples are derived from the formal propositions
provided in Section 3.5.
20To simplify the example, assume that damages must be paid jointly by the MCO and the
physician. Section 3.8 will reveal that treatment and litigation decisions do not depend on which
parties the patient is allowed to sue. This results from the fact that the physician will reject the
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MCO knows that injured patients have some incentive to sue because expected dam-
ages exceed litigation costs. Therefore, it compares the expected cost of compliant
treatment and expected damages given non-compliant treatment to decide whether to
employ a fee-for-service contract (to induce compliant treatment and avoid litigation)
or a capitated contract (to avoid costly compliant treatment and accept exposure to
damages). If the MCO chooses a fee-for-service contract, its total expected treatment
cost is roughly $230,000 (23% of $1,000,000) because the physician need only compli-
antly treat 23% of the 100 patients to deter injured patients from suing.21 Recall that
patients face litigation costs if they sue partly due to the fact that they are unable
to observe the physician’s action in each case. Therefore, if the physician compli-
antly treats a high enough number of the 100 patients, each injured patient will find
litigation too risky to pursue. Although the patients are unable to observe the physi-
cian’s action in each case, they are ensured that the physician compliantly treated
some number of patients because contract terms are observable; therefore, they know
that the physician was compensated with a fee-for-service contract and compliantly
treated just enough patients such that no patient would risk filing a lawsuit.
On the other hand, if the MCO chooses a capitated contract, it expects to pay
$330,000 in damages (100 patients x $5,500 expected damages x 60% probability of a
negative outcome given non-compliant treatment). Therefore, the MCO will choose a
fee-for-service contract ($230,000 < $330,000). The physician will compliantly treat
23 of the 100 patients and no injured patient will file a medical malpractice claim.
Even though the cost of compliantly treating an individual patient exceeds expected
damages if that one patient sues, the physician must compliantly treat only a few
patients to avoid lawsuits because the patient’s expected gain from a successful lawsuit
is low ($5,500–$5,000=$500).
contract unless the MCO absorbs the physician’s exposure to liability. Therefore, the MCO considers
total expected damages regardless of whether the patient sues the MCO. The form of the contract,
however, does depend on the group of potential defendants.
21Studies have shown that MCOs sometimes authorize disparate treatment for similarly-situated
patients. For example, Peters and Rogers [79] report a study of authorizations for bone marrow
transplants to treat breast cancer. They found that MCOs approved the treatment in 77% of all
cases and denied identical treatment in 23% of similarly-situated cases, claiming that the treatment
was experimental in nature and not covered under the patients’ health care insurance policies.
41
Next, imagine that the court increases expected damages to $10,000 per case. As
before, the MCO compares the cost of compensating the physician using a fee-for-
service contract with that of a capitated contract. The increase in damages leads
to an increase in an injured patient’s expected gain from suing. Knowing this, the
physician must increase the number of patients he compliantly treats to keep the
patients from suing. Specifically, the physician must compliantly treat 75 of the 100
patients to ensure that no injured patient risks suing. Therefore, if the MCO chooses
a fee-for-service contract, expected treatment costs are $750,000. Alternatively, if
the MCO chooses a capitated contract, it faces expected damages of $600,000 (100
patients x $10,000 expected damages x 60% probability of a negative outcome given
non-compliant treatment). Therefore, under these conditions, the MCO will choose
a capitated contract and pay the physician a fixed payment to cover his exposure to
liability. The physician will never provide compliant treatment, and every injured
patient will observe that the contract is capitated, deduce that the physician did not
satisfy the legal standard of care and sue. Given that the physician must compliantly
treat a high number of patients to keep injured patients from suing, the MCO finds it
optimal to expose itself to liability rather than paying the expected cost of treatment.
Finally, imagine that the court increases damages one last time to $50,000 per
case. At this level, an injured patient’s expected gain from filing a claim is high.
Knowing this, the physician increases the number of patients he compliantly treats
to 97 out of 100. Given this treatment rate, the MCO expects to incur treatment
costs of $970,000 if it employs a fee-for-service contract. It compares this cost to its
expected cost from potential damages if it employs a capitated contract, encouraging
the physician to avoid costly compliant treatment. Given the high damage award,
this expected cost amounts to $3,000,000 (100 patients x $50,000 expected damages
x 60% probability of a negative outcome given non-compliant treatment). Therefore,
even though the required compliant treatment rate is high, the MCO finds it optimal
to compensate the physician using a fee-for-service contract to encourage compliant
treatment and avoid exposure to costly litigation. The physician will compliantly
treat 97 of 100 patients and injured patients, observing the fee-for-service contract,
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will never sue.
This example illustrates the complexities involved in predicting how changes in
damages will affect behavior by market actors when contracts are observable by pa-
tients. The next section provides an example of how actors react to changes in
damages when contracts are unobservable by patients.
3.3.2 The Unobservable Contract Case
This example assumes that patients are unable to observe the contract the MCO
uses to compensate the physician. Assume that we have the same 100 patients with
the same medical condition. The probability of a positive outcome is 40% without
compliant treatment and increases to 80% if the physician provides compliant treat-
ment. In addition, just as in the observable contract case, assume that if compliant
treatment is provided, the physician will incur a cost of $10,000 per patient and an
injured patient must pay $5,000 to pursue a medical malpractice claim. The case in
which litigation costs exceed expected damages results in the same outcome as the
observable contract case: injured patients will never sue, the MCO pays nothing to
the physician and the physician never compliantly treats.
First consider the effect of observability on the patients’ strategy. In the observ-
able contract case, patients are able to sue when suing is optimal because they can
observe the contract and know that the physician is either compliantly treating some
positive number of patients (i.e., fee-for-service contract) or providing no compliant
treatment (i.e., capitated contract). The MCO, knowing that the patient can observe
the contract and deduce the physician’s strategy, is forced to choose a fee-for-service
contract when expected compliant treatment costs are less than expected damages. If
the MCO employed a capitated contract instead, the physician would never provide
compliant treatment and all injured patients would sue. The MCO would be exposed
to expected damages rather than the lower expected cost of compliant treatment. In
other words, the patients’ ability to observe the contract keeps the MCO from dis-
couraging compliant treatment when expected compliant treatment costs are lower
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than expected damages.
Consider the effect of eliminating the patients’ ability to observe the contract.
Without this ability, the only way to force the MCO to encourage compliant treatment
when the cost of compliant treatment is low relative to expected damages is for some
number of the patients to sue with certainty upon experiencing a negative outcome.
Without the threat of lawsuits, the MCO would never induce compliant treatment.
Given that a certain number of injured patients will sue, the MCO has an incentive
to induce some level of compliant treatment so that not every patient who brings
a suit will win in court. Therefore, when contracts are unobservable some amount
of litigation will occur regardless of the relationship between the cost of compliant
treatment and damages.
With the patient’s optimal strategy in mind, imagine that the court sets damages
at $5,500 per case. Patients cannot observe the contract, so they are left to formulate
their litigation strategy based on the strategy of the MCO. Given the relationship
between cost of compliant treatment per patient ($10,000) and expected damages
per patient given non-compliant treatment and a lawsuit ($5,500 damage award per
injured patient x 60% probability of a negative outcome given non-compliant treat-
ment=$3,300), the MCO finds it futile to encourage compliant treatment because for
each patient treated the MCO pays $10,000 in treatment costs but saves only $3,300
in expected damages. Therefore, the MCO maximizes its payoff by choosing a capi-
tated contract, which encourages the physician to avoid costly compliant treatment
in all cases.22 The patients can infer the MCO’s strategy given the relationship be-
tween expected damages and the cost of compliant treatment. Therefore, knowing
that the court will award damages, every patient sues with certainty. This outcome
differs substantially from the observable contract case. Informing the patient about
the contract terms allows the MCO to communicate the physician’s level of compliant
treatment, which, in turn, reduces the rate of litigation. If the MCO finds it optimal
to conceal contracts for some reason (e.g., to protect their trade secret status), they
22Note that the MCO must pay the physician a fixed payment equal to the physician’s expected
damages or the physician will reject the contract.
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sacrifice the ability to reveal the physician’s strategy to patients.
Finally, imagine that the court increases damages to $50,000 per case. At this
damage level, the cost of compliant treatment per patient ($10,000) is less than ex-
pected damages per case filed ($50,000 x 60% probability of a negative outcome
given non-compliant treatment=$30,000). Therefore, the MCO finds it optimal to
encourage the physician to compliantly treat some number of patients and chooses
a fee-for-service contract to compensate the physician. The physician, however, will
not provide compliant treatment with certainty because he knows that each patient
is unable to observe his treatment choice. In fact, to encourage the physician to
compliantly treat at all, some number of injured patients must commit to suing with
certainty. In this particular situation, if one-third of all injured patients sue with cer-
tainty, the physician will provide compliant treatment to some number of patients to
reduce the exposure to liability. Specifically, considering the tradeoff between compli-
ant treatment costs and expected damages given that one-third of all injured patients
will sue, the physician will find it optimal to compliantly treat 97 of the 100 patients.
Section 3.4 develops the formal framework used to study the general effects of
various legal rules on contract, treatment and litigation decisions.
3.4 The Framework
This section develops an approach to study the role of specific judicial and legislative
rules in health care markets in a somewhat nonstandard agency model. The model
is unusual in that it involves two simultaneous principal-agent relationships. First,
the physician acts as an agent for the patient.23 In addition, the physician acts as an
agent for the MCO. Although the model assumes that the MCO can contract with the
physician based on the cost of treatment, it is unable to contract directly on the effort
level of the physician. The model’s stages progress as follows. First, the MCO selects
a contract. Second, the physician, knowing the contract terms, chooses whether to
23The model assumes that the physician sees one patient. Therefore, his behavior will be framed
in terms of the likelihood that he compliantly treats the one patient rather than treating a certain
percentage of a population of identical patients.
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compliantly treat the patient. Compliant treatment reduces the probability of a bad
outcome for the patient. Third, the patient either enjoys a positive outcome or suffers
a negative outcome. Fourth, upon realizing a negative outcome the patient decides
whether to file a medical malpractice claim.24 Finally, the court rules on liability and
awards damages to compensate the patient for her losses.25 All players are assumed
to be risk neutral and expected-utility maximizers. The following diagram presents
the stages of the game.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5
MCO Physician Nature Patient Court
chooses decides on determines decides on rules on
a contract treatment an outcome filing a suit liability
and damages
3.4.1 MCO Contract Choice
In the first stage of the game, the MCO chooses a contract to obtain physician services
for its insured patient. The contract consists of two terms: (1) a fixed payment, f ≥ 0,
which does not depend on the physician’s treatment decision, and (2) an amount the
MCO reimburses the physician for the cost of treatment, r ≥ 0. The model considers
all contracts (r, f) in <2+ (i.e., all possible combinations of reimbursement amounts
and fixed payments).
Given the patient’s illness, the MCO considers the cost of compliant treatment
relative to expected damages and, anticipating the reactions of the physician and the
24Sections 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 assume that the patient files claims against both the MCO and the
physician. Section 3.8 considers various tortfeasor rules dictating to the patient which parties she
may sue.
25The fact that the model does not consider a settlement option does not change the insights it
provides. The model can be extended to account for situations in which the parties might participate
in settlement negotiations. The extension, however, makes the model unnecessarily complicated
given its focus.
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patient, chooses a contract, κ = (r, f), to maximize its ex ante expected payoff.26
The contract will either induce compliant treatment or encourage the physician to
forego costly compliant treatment.
It is important to note that the MCO’s choice is constrained by the physician’s
individual rationality constraint. This means that the MCO must provide the physi-
cian with enough of an incentive to induce him to accept the contract rather than seek
employment elsewhere. The MCO is also constrained by the equilibrium behavior of
the other actors.
3.4.2 Physician Treatment Decision
Once the MCO chooses a contract, the physician considers the cost of compliant
treatment relative to expected damages, anticipates the patient’s strategy given a
negative outcome and decides whether to provide compliant treatment. In effect,
the physician in the model is an automaton, simply following the dictate the MCO
indirectly issues through its contract choice.27
The model assumes that the physician’s treatment decision is private. Although
the patient can observe the outcome, the patient is unable to observe or monitor
the physician’s action due to the asymmetric nature of the information necessary to
make sound medical decisions. While physicians are trained extensively in identifying
symptoms, diagnosing illnesses and treating ailments, most patients have little, if any,
knowledge of the intricacies of this highly technical field. Although patients might be
able to obtain multiple physician opinions, they could be of limited use in alleviating
asymmetries of information. Patients might not possess adequate information to
identify the most efficacious from among the multiple opinions. Furthermore, if the
patient is limited to receiving medical services from physicians contracting with his
26The process described here is akin to the current practice of utilization review. For each indi-
vidual case (usually with treatment costs above a certain threshold) the MCO will decide if com-
pensating the physician to perform the procedure that complies with the legal standard of care will
result in a higher expected payoff than denying reimbursement for the cost of such treatment.
27Evidence exists to suggest that physicians advocate on behalf of their patients to urge MCOs
to approve costly treatment. Countervailing evidence, however, indicates that physicians generally
are tied to following the dictates of the MCO.
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MCO, all available physicians likely are under the influence of the same financial
incentives. Therefore, the patient might receive similar opinions from all physicians
asked to diagnose the ailment and suggest a treatment. Finally, seeking multiple
opinions simply might be too costly.28
Even though the patient cannot observe the physician’s action, she does observe
the outcome. This information alone, however, does not enable the patient to identify
the action. Even if the physician does not provide compliant treatment, the patient
might experience a positive outcome. Likewise, in some cases in which the physician
compliantly treats, a bad outcome results. For example, imagine that the patient
experiences back pain and seeks medical care. After collecting information about the
patient’s symptoms, the physician must decide on a treatment option. Assume that
the physician considers two options: prescribing a low cost medication and prescribing
a more expensive diagnostic test which could lead to a costly surgical procedure. Even
though the physician knows that the low cost option does not meet the standard of
care, he might prescribe it to reduce his costs. In fact, he might be forced to prescribe
the low cost treatment because he is unable to pay the out-of-pocket cost for the
more expensive treatment if the MCO does not reimburse for treatment costs. The
model assumes that the patient is unable to judge the quality of care provided by
the physician and, upon realizing a negative outcome (e.g., a serious spinal injury
leading to partial paralysis), cannot be sure that the physician met the standard of
care without pursuing costly verification.
The MCO faces similar hurdles in observing and monitoring the physician’s ac-
tion. To observe the physician’s action, the MCO must evaluate every step in the
physician’s decision making process including symptom analysis, choice of diagnostic
tests, interpretation of diagnostic tests, etc. The model assumes the MCO is unable
to perform monitoring of this type in a cost effective manner. Therefore, the MCO
is unable to contract based on the physician’s action. The model assumes, however,
that the MCO is able to contract based on cost.
Providing treatment imposes on the physician a strictly positive cost, c. If the
28See Green [44] for additional justifications of this assumption.
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physician does not treat, he incurs no direct cost (i.e., c = 0).29 Providing treatment,
however, can benefit the physician as it affects the probability that the patient will
realize a positive outcome and the likelihood that the physician will be liable for
injuries suffered by the patient. Specifically, the relationship between the physician’s
action and the probability of a positive outcome is summarized in the following table:
Positive outcome Negative outcome
Compliant Treatment p (1− p)
Non-compliant Treatment q (1− q)
The parameter p ∈ [0, 1] measures the extent to which compliant treatment affects
the patient’s outcome. As p increases the importance of the physician’s action with
respect to the outcome increases. The parameter q ∈ [0, 1] represents the probability
that the patient enjoys a positive outcome after non-compliant treatment. The model
assumes that p > q. In other words, the patient has a better chance for a positive
outcome given compliant treatment than with non-compliant treatment.30 Once the
physician decides on an action, Nature determines the outcome according to this
29Note that, even though the cost incurred by the physician is monetary in nature, this does not
imply that the physician’s action is observable by the MCO or the patient. The model considers the
most severe case (c = 0 in the case the physician does not treat). One, however, might imagine a
case in which the physician incurs a large cost when providing treatment that meets the established
standard of care and a lower cost for providing a non-compliant treatment. Given the cost of
treatment, the patient cannot identify whether the physician chose the appropriate treatment for
the reasons previously discussed. Indeed, the physician has discretion during the diagnostic phase
to lean toward diagnoses that require low cost treatments. The model could include an additional
parameter for the lower cost of inappropriate treatment, but this would complicate the model without
adding any insight.
30The relationship between the physician’s action and the probability of a positive outcome clearly
is much more complex than the model assumes. This assumption, however, simply gets at the notion
that other factors in addition to the physician’s action contribute to the patient’s outcome. In addi-
tion, assuming that compliant treatment results in a higher probability of a positive outcome than
that resulting from non-compliant treatment seems reasonable given that compliant treatments ob-
tain that status because they result in positive outcomes more often than non-compliant treatments
(although this assumption is questionable in a regime characterized by managed care in which stan-
dards eventually might be set by MCOs as they encourage physicians to perform low cost treatments
in some cases).
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particular relationship between the physician’s action and the patient’s outcome.
When deciding whether to treat, the physician will consider the contract terms,
the cost of treatment and expected damages if compliant treatment is not provided.
Studies have shown that contractual arrangements such as capitation motivate physi-
cians to behave differently than similarly-situated physicians not facing such financial
incentives. Although some argue that medical ethics protect patients from the un-
desirable effects of contractual incentives, substantial evidence that contract terms
between MCOs and physicians significantly affect physician behavior proves other-
wise. For example, Stearns et al. [95] studied the changes in treatment rates when a
specific group of physicians was shifted from fee-for-service to capitation. The study
found large changes in utilization in response to the shift. In a second study, Green-
field et al. [45] compared patient hospitalization rates for physicians paid under a
fee-for-service arrangement and physicians of the same group paid by the same em-
ployer under capitation. The study controlled extensively for patient characteristics.
They concluded that hospitalization was significantly more likely for fee-for-service
patients. These studies suggest that physician behavior is motivated by factors other
than medical ethics. In some situations physicians simply might find it infeasible
to provide proper treatment given the compensation arrangement with the patient’s
MCO.31 Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the claim that physicians con-
sider expected damages when making treatment decisions.32 Finally, the model as-
31The effect of outcomes on the physician’s reputation might factor into his utility function. The
model, however, assumes that the physician’s utility function does not account for reputation effects.
The model can be altered to include this feature. The intuitions provided by the model, however,
would not change.
In addition, the model does not consider the effect of medical malpractice insurance on the physi-
cian’s treatment decision. Almost all physicians carry medical malpractice insurance so that, in
the event the physician is held liable for damages, the insurance carrier will cover some or all of
the damages owed to the injured patient. Naturally, insurance coverage will affect the physician’s
treatment decision. The effect, however, is limited. For example, most insurers specify a maximum
amount they will pay per incident. For comprehensive studies of how medical malpractice insurance
affects health care markets and physician behavior see Bhat [11], Danzon [28] and Schlesinger [86].
32See White [102] (concluding that the medical malpractice system clearly communicates to physi-
cians the risks of providing substandard care); Lawthers et al. [68] (finding that physicians respond
to the risk of lawsuits by taking actions to reduce the probability of patient injury); Blendon et
al. [12] (reporting that over sixty percent of physicians involved in the authors’ study sometimes
practiced defensive medicine). But see, Liang [69] (using survey data to show that physicians do not
know the judicial standard of care for medical malpractice and are not aware of the level of damages
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sumes that the physician gains no direct utility from the patient’s outcome. 33
3.4.3 Patient’s Litigation Decision
If the patient realizes a positive outcome after the physician administers treatment,
she receives a payoff of H,34 her value of health, and the game ends. On the other
hand, if the patient realizes a negative outcome, she must decide whether to file
a claim for medical malpractice. Although the patient knows the outcome, she is
unable to observe the physician’s action. Based on the outcome the patient must
form beliefs represented by a probability that the physician compliantly treated. In
addition, the patient considers expected damages and the expected cost of litigation,
L, when deciding whether to sue.35
3.4.4 Damages and Disclosure Laws
If the patient experiences a negative outcome and decides to file a claim, the court
hears the case and decides on the issue of liability. The model assumes that the court
uses a negligence standard with customary treatment as the standard of care.36 In
assessed against liable physicians).
33This assumption leads to predictions for the most extreme case. Other models assume that
physicians are imperfect agents, but derive some utility from patient outcomes. For example, see
Blumstein [15], Havighurst [49], Danzon [26], Pauly [78], Farley [35], Ellis and McGuire [32] and
Arlen and MacLeod [3]. Weakening the assumption that physicians are self-interested does not affect
the general intuitions the present model offers in terms of how legal rules affect behavior.
34The complications associated with measuring the value of a positive outcome to the patient are
outside the scope of this paper. The model assumes that the value of health, H, is measurable. For
interesting views on measuring the value of health, see Bloche [13], Korobkin [62] and Dolan [30].
Bhat [11] discusses how courts calculate damages to compensate an injured patient for the value of
lost health.
35The parameter, L, can be thought to capture all expected costs to be incurred by the patient to
bring a lawsuit against any number of defendants. In addition, the model does not include decisions
made by attorneys who work on a contingency fee basis. Danzon [26] claims that medical malpractice
attorneys accept cases on a contingency fee basis, typically charging one-third of the total award
won. Adding the attorney’s decision to the model, however, would complicate it without adding
additional insight. See Farber et al. [34] for an interesting analysis of the medical malpractice
litigation process.
36To succeed in a medical malpractice lawsuit, the plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the
defendant’s duty to the plaintiff to protect the plaintiff from injury; (2) the defendant’s failure
to exercise or perform that duty properly; (3) a legally sufficient causal relationship between the
defendant’s failure and the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) recoverable damages. See McKellips v. Saint
Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 470 (Okla. 1987). The element of causation is not addressed in
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addition, the model assumes that the court can verify perfectly whether the physician
provided compliant treatment.37 If the patient wins in court against the MCO, the
MCO must pay expected money damages, Dm, to the patient. Likewise, if the patient
wins in court against the physician, the physician must pay expected money damages,
Dp, to the patient. Recall that the patient incurs an expected cost, L, to file and
pursue a medical malpractice lawsuit. If litigation costs (L) exceed the total damage
award (Dm + Dp) then the patient will never sue. Knowing that the patient will
not sue, the physician does not provide compliant treatment and the MCO pays
nothing for physician services. When the total damage award exceeds litigation costs,
predicting behavior becomes more complicated. This case is the main focus of the
paper and is presented in Section 3.5.
Note that the analysis in Section 3.5 is performed assuming court-determined
damages are held constant. Section 3.6 considers how damage levels affect treatment
and litigation decisions. Section 3.7 evaluates the inefficiencies of commonly-used
damage rules as compared to efficient negligence and damage rules.
As mentioned, the model considers two cases. The first case assumes that the
patient can observe the contract terms before deciding whether to sue. The second
case assumes that the contract is unobservable. These cases correspond to state
legislative rules mandating MCOs to disclose to insured patients the terms of their
this analysis. The model implicitly assumes that if the physician did not meet the standard of care,
his action caused the patient’s injury.
The physician fails to perform his duty properly if his effort level falls below the standard of care.
The majority rule for the standard of care used by courts to determine liability is a locality rule.
Specifically, if a physician-defendant’s behavior conformed to established medical custom practiced
by minimally competent physicians in a given area (local or national), the court will not hold the
physician liable for damages suffered by the patient. See Furrow [38] for a detailed discussion of the
standard of care for medical malpractice. Also, Keeton et al. [58] provides a general discussion of the
theory of negligence as it relates to medical malpractice suits. The damage rule can be formulated
to adjust for the portion of the injury unrelated to the physician’s action. This is discussed infra in
Section 3.7.
37This assumption is not critical for the results provided in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. If the model
assumed imperfect verification, then sometimes physicians and MCOs would face liability after
meeting the standard of care or escape liability when in fact it should be imposed. From an ex
ante perspective, assuming perfect verification merely results in a variance of expected damages
different than the variance under the assumption of imperfect verification. This has little effect
on the comparative statics regarding contract, treatment and litigation decisions. The assumption,
however, will affect the structure of the efficient damage rule. This is discussed further infra in
Section 3.7.
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contracts with physicians. Some states require disclosure, while others do not.38
Therefore, the analysis is performed under both conditions to gain insight into the
effects of disclosure laws on behavior in health care markets.
3.4.5 The Payoffs
Recall that the MCO moves in the first stage, choosing a contract for the provision
of medical services to the patient. In the second stage, the physician decides whether
to provide compliant treatment. Next, Nature determines whether the patient expe-
riences a positive or negative outcome. If a positive outcome is realized, the game
ends. If the physician provided compliant treatment, the MCO receives a payoff of
I− f − r, the physician receives a payoff of f + r− c and the patient receives a payoff
of H − I, where I represents an insurance premium paid by the patient to the MCO
to obtain medical insurance prior to stage one of the game.39 If the physician did not
provide compliant treatment, then the payoffs to the MCO, physician and patient are
I − f , f and H − I, respectively.
38Note that states vary with respect to the specific information that must be disclosed and the
method that MCOs must use to disclose the information (Hellinger [50]). The model assumes that
the patient is able to observe the contract terms of her particular physician. This assumption,
however, might not hold true for all states requiring disclosure. For example, some states merely
require the MCO to provide general information about incentive arrangements, but do not force
MCOs to disclose the actual contract terms of the patient’s physician. Knowing some information
about the types of contracts employed generally, however, aids an injured patient in forming beliefs
about whether the physician met the standard of care.
Courts also have had a hand in formulating disclosure laws. Courts in some jurisdictions have
ruled that failure to disclose contract terms is a breach of fiduciary duty imposed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. §§1001–1461 (1994)), the federal statute regu-
lating employee benefits (e.g., see Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997)).
39Although, in this model, I is merely a transfer between the patient and the MCO and does
not affect efficiency, the transfer is important to note when considering the efficiencies related to
health care insurance, a topic not considered here. The model assumes that the expected benefits of
purchasing health insurance always outweigh the costs. The paper does not address the inefficiencies
created when the tort system sets damages such that the patient’s cost of purchasing health insurance
exceeds expected benefits. Inefficiencies of this sort are discussed in length in Sykes [98].
The results provided here, however, indirectly show that changes in expected damages will alter
the patient’s expected utility in the form of a change in premiums necessary to satisfy the MCO’s
individual rationality constraint. A model including efficiency gained from providing health care
insurance to risk averse patients would reveal a trade-off between the level of care provided and
the reduction of risk through health care insurance. Specifically, if the standard of care requires
more costly treatment, health care insurance costs increase, pricing some patients out of health care
insurance markets.
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If a negative outcome occurs, the patient chooses whether to file a claim against
the physician and/or the MCO. If the patient decides not to sue, the game ends. The
payoffs are the same as above with H = 0. If the patient decides to sue, the court
decides on the issue of liability and sets the damage award. Recall that the patient
incurs a strictly positive cost, L, to pursue litigation.
If the physician compliantly treated, the patient loses in court against both the
physician and the MCO. Payoffs to the MCO, physician and patient are I − f − r,
f + r − c and −L− I, respectively. Conversely, if the physician did not compliantly
treat, the patient wins against both the physician and the MCO, given that each
is named as a defendant. Damage awards of Dp and Dm are paid to the patient
by the physician and MCO, respectively. The patient will sue only if the expected
damage award covers the cost of filing and pursuing litigation. If the court finds
that the physician did not compliantly treat, payoffs are I − f − Dm, f − Dp, and
Dm + Dp − L− I for the MCO, physician and patient, respectively.
Section 3.5 provides results for the case in which contracts are observable and the
case in which they are not. The effects of observability on contract, treatment and
litigation decisions are analyzed.
3.5 Analysis of Equilibrium Behavior
Given the framework of the game, it is possible to search for an equilibrium arising
from non-cooperative play when contracts are observable and when they are not. The
analysis uses the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept.40 Denote the probability that
the patient sues given a negative outcome by γ and the probability that the physician
compliantly treats by β.
The propositions stated in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 assume that damages exceed
40For those not familiar with game theory, this equilibrium concept is used to analyze dynamic
games of incomplete information. It requires that (1) no player has an incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium strategy given his beliefs and the other players’ subsequent strategies, and (2) players
update their beliefs by considering equilibrium strategies and using a specific method called Bayes’
rule. See Fundenberg and Tirole [37] for a formal definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for a
broad class of dynamic games of incomplete information. Gibbons [40] provides an intuitive definition
of the equilibrium concept along with straightforward examples.
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litigation costs. The analysis of the case in which litigation costs exceed damages is
straightforward. In that case, patients have no incentive to sue. Knowing this, the
MCO will pay nothing to the physician in the form of reimbursement for costs or a
fixed payment and the physician will not provide compliant treatment. In addition,
all results and discussions assume that, given a negative outcome, patients are able
to sue both the physician and the MCO for medical malpractice. Variations of the
results under different tortfeasor rules are given in Section 3.8. All proofs appear in
the Appendix.
3.5.1 Equilibrium when Contracts Are Observable by the Pa-
tient
This section presents the equilibrium behavior of the MCO, physician and patient
assuming the patient is able to observe the contract terms.
Proposition 1 Fix treatment costs, probability of a positive outcome given compliant
treatment, probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment, expected
litigation costs and expected damages. Let m∗ equal the minimum probability of com-
pliant treatment that guarantees that the patient will never sue. Assume that total
expected damages exceed expected litigation costs (i.e., Dm + Dp > L). The following
specifies the equilibrium contracts and resulting equilibrium behavior of the patient
and the physician:
(1) If the ex ante expected cost of compliant treatment is low relative to expected
damages (i.e., m∗c < (1 − q)(Dm + Dp),
41 then the MCO chooses a fee-for-service
contract with full reimbursement for cost and no fixed payment. The physician com-
pliantly treats with a probability (m∗) high enough such that the patient never sues,
and the patient never sues.
(2) If the ex ante expected cost of compliant treatment is high relative to expected
41Note that m∗ represents the equilibrium probability of compliant treatment. Therefore, although
this condition is quite intuitive, it is not stated in terms of the model’s exogenous variables. The
discussion following the proposition analyzes the MCO’s decision in terms of the model’s exogenous
variables.
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damages (i.e., m∗c > (1− q)(Dm + Dp)), then the MCO chooses a capitated contract
with a fixed payment equal to the physician’s expected damages. The physician never
provides compliant treatment, and the patient sues with certainty.
The following discussion provides some intuition behind the results stated in
Proposition 1.
First, note that the MCO takes into account both its expected damages from
a suit against itself and the physician’s expected damages from a suit against the
physician. This results from the fact that the MCO must design a contract that the
physician will accept rather than seeking employment elsewhere. If the MCO finds
it in its best interest to induce the physician to avoid costly compliant treatment,
then the physician will be exposed to liability. If the contract does not compensate
the physician for his exposure to liability, he will reject it. Therefore, in the end, the
MCO ultimately will bear the expected damages it faces directly and those faced by
the physician.
Also, it is important to note that the physician never provides compliant treatment
with certainty in equilibrium (i.e., m∗ < 1).42 The only way to achieve certain
compliant treatment is for the MCO to reimburse the physician more than the cost
of compliant treatment. The MCO, however, would never do this in equilibrium
because it can set the reimbursement level equal to cost and ensure that the physician
compliantly treats with a high enough probability such that the patient will never
sue. Furthermore, the physician does not have an incentive of his own to compliantly
treat with certainty because he knows that the patient must pay litigation costs to file
a suit and that the patient is uncertain about the physician’s action. Suing is risky
for the patient because if the court verifies that the physician met the standard of
care, the patient’s investment in the costly verification process becomes fruitless. It
follows that the less the patient stands to gain from winning a lawsuit (i.e., damages
less litigation costs), the less effort the physician must exert to ensure that the patient
will not sue. Finally, note that the patient does not have to threaten to sue to compel
42This result is consistent with results obtained by others. For example, see Ordover [77] and
Hylton [52].
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the physician to compliantly treat with some positive probability. This follows directly
from the assumption that the patient is able to observe the contract. If the patient
observes a fee-for-service contract, she can be sure that it was optimal for the MCO
to encourage the physician to compliantly treat and that he will provide compliant
treatment with a probability high enough such that the patient will never sue. If she
observes a capitated contract, she sues for certain, knowing that the physician did
not meet the standard of care.
Next, consider the MCO’s contract choice. Its decision hinges on the level of ex
ante expected compliant treatment costs (m∗c) relative to expected damages given
non-compliant treatment ((1−q)(Dm+Dp)). Substituting m
∗ = (1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)+(1−p)L
into the condition, m∗c < (1 − q)(Dm + Dp), reveals that the MCO should employ
a fee-for-service contract if c < (Dm + Dp)(1 − q) +
L(1−p)
1− L
Dm+Dp
. Figure 3.1 provides
an example of a typical outcome when contracts are observable, the probability of
a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 60%, the probability of a positive
outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40% and litigation costs are $100.
As stated previously, when litigation costs ($100 in this example) exceed damages,
the patient will never sue. Therefore, the MCO will choose a capitated contract with
no fixed payment (i.e., the MCO will pay nothing to the physician) and the physician
will never compliantly treat. If damages exceed litigation costs, then the MCO must
compare the ex ante expected compliant treatment cost to total expected damages in
order to choose the optimal contract. The following discussion provides the intuition
for outcomes when damages exceed litigation costs.
If compliant treatment costs are sufficiently low (i.e., c < cˆ),43 the MCO maximizes
its payoff by choosing a fee-for-service contract to induce compliant treatment and
avoid exposure to liability. The MCO will reimburse the physician at least the full
cost of treatment so that the physician will compliantly treat with an adequately high
probability so that the patient never sues. This stems from the fact that the patient
can observe the contract terms and, from the terms, infer the physician’s strategy. The
43cˆ represents the value of c corresponding to the level of total expected damages that minimizes
the function used to find the MCO’s cutoff point (i.e., m∗c = (1− q)(Dm + Dp)).
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Figure 3.1: This graph illustrates MCO contract choices given observable contracts. The
example assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment
is 60%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40% and
litigation costs are $100. The graph presents the model’s prediction of the MCO’s contract
choice for all (total expected damages, treatment costs) pairs in the displayed range.
MCO, however, enjoys a higher payoff the lower the reimbursement amount; therefore,
the MCO will set reimbursement equal to the cost of treatment. Any amount over
cost that the MCO reimburses reduces its payoff because the physician will treat with
a higher probability even though the patient will never sue. In equilibrium the MCO
will employ a standard fee-for-service contract (i.e., reimbursement of full cost with
no fixed payment) and the physician will compliantly treat with a probability high
enough so that the patient never sues. As compliant treatment costs increase beyond
cˆ, the MCO will compare expected compliant treatment costs (m∗c) with expected
total damages given non-compliant treatment ((1 − q)(Dm + Dp)) when choosing a
contract.
When compliant treatment costs exceed cˆ and the patient’s expected gain from
winning a lawsuit (i.e., damages less litigation costs) is low (i.e., points in the region
of the graph near “1”), the physician is able to shield himself from damages by
providing a low level of compliant treatment. For this reason, ex ante expected
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compliant treatment costs are less than expected total damages and so the MCO will
choose a fee-for-service contract, the physician will provide compliant treatment with
a probability high enough such that the patient will not sue, and the patient will
never sue.
As damages increase (moving the (total expected damages, compliant treatment
costs) pair into the region labelled “2”), the MCO will find it optimal to face ex-
posure to liability rather than encourage the physician to compliantly treat and so
will choose a capitated contract. Even though damages increase, expected treatment
costs also rise as the physician finds it necessary to increase the probability of com-
pliant treatment given that patients have more to gain from suing. In other words,
the physician is forced to compliantly treat with a higher probability to ensure that
the patient never sues. This increase in probability of treatment will drive expected
treatment costs higher than expected damages given no treatment. Therefore, the
MCO will choose a contract such that the physician will not provide costly treatment
despite the fact that the patient will sue with certainty. The MCO simply sets the
reimbursement policy low enough so that the physician has no incentive to meet the
standard of care. In particular, the MCO is indifferent between any contract specify-
ing a relatively low reimbursement level (i.e., r ≤ c− (1− q)Dp), which ensures that
the physician will not provide compliant treatment. While any of these reimburse-
ment policies will satisfy the equilibrium conditions, it is natural to assume that the
MCO will employ a standard capitated contract with no reimbursement for cost and
a positive fixed payment equal to the physician’s expected damages.
If damages continue to increase relative to compliant treatment costs, then even-
tually expected damages will once again exceed the expected cost of compliant treat-
ment (indicated in the graph by region “3”) despite the fact that the physician must
provide compliant treatment with a higher probability to keep the patient from su-
ing. The MCO will revert back to choosing a fee-for-service contract to encourage
the physician to provide compliant treatment with a probability high enough so that
the patient never sues, and the patient never sues.
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This result clearly illustrates why policymakers must take care when they contem-
plate changes to damage rules, such as setting maximum damage awards.44 Not only
will litigation decisions adjust, but also MCOs and physicians will adjust their behav-
ior to take into account changes in expected damages. For these reasons, expected
changes in litigation rates might not obtain.
The following section presents results for the case in which the patient cannot
observe the contract terms.
3.5.2 Equilibrium when Contracts Are not Observable by the
Patient
This section presents the equilibrium behavior of the MCO, physician and patient
assuming the patient is not able to observe the contract terms. Proposition 2 re-
veals that observability of the contract terms matters. The critical difference in the
structure of the game with observable contracts and this case is that, here, the pa-
tient’s decision to sue is made without knowledge of how the MCO compensated the
physician. Therefore, the patient must resort to equilibrium reasoning to infer the
physician’s action. On the other hand, when the patient can observe the contract, the
patient’s decision to sue hinges on observation of the contract terms and the ability to
infer directly the physician’s strategy. Knowing this, the MCO is unable to deviate
and change contracts because the patient would observe the deviation and change
her behavior in response. Proposition 2 states the equilibrium of the model when the
patient cannot observe the contract terms.
Proposition 2 Fix treatment costs, probability of a positive outcome given compliant
treatment, probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment, expected
litigation costs and expected damages as given. Assume that total expected damages
44The medical malpractice insurance crisis led most states to set caps on damages allowable in
medical malpractice lawsuits (Kinney [60]). The theory presented in this study provides one possible
explanation as to why some states did not experience an expected decrease in claim rates. See Kinney
[60] for a critique of malpractice reforms attempted in the 1970s and 80s.
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exceed expected litigation costs (i.e., Dm + Dp > L). The following specifies the equi-
librium contracts and resulting equilibrium behavior of the patient and the physician:
(1) If the cost of compliant treatment is low relative to expected damages (i.e.,
c < (1− q)(Dm + Dp)), then the MCO chooses a fee-for-service contract with partial
reimbursement for cost and a positive fixed payment. The physician compliantly treats
with a probability high enough such that the patient will not always sue, and the patient
sues with some positive probability.
(2) If the cost of compliant treatment is high relative to expected damages (i.e.,
c > (1 − q)(Dm + Dp)), then the MCO chooses a capitated contract with a fixed
payment equal to the physician’s expected damages. The physician does not provide
compliant treatment, and the patient sues with certainty.
The formal proof appears in the Appendix. Also, the effects of the tortfeasor rule
on contract terms are specified in Section 3.8. The following discussion assumes that
the patient is allowed to sue both the MCO and the physician.
Notice that the results here substantially differ from the results given in the case of
observable contracts. First consider the MCO’s contract choice. Figure 3.2 provides
an example of a typical outcome when contracts are unobservable given the same
parameter values used in Figure 3.1 (i.e., the probability of a positive outcome given
compliant treatment is 60%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant
treatment is 40% and litigation costs are $100).
As in the observable contract case, when litigation costs exceed damages, the pa-
tient has no incentive to sue no matter how trivial the cost of compliant treatment.
Knowing this, regardless of the cost of compliant treatment the MCO employs a capi-
tated contract and the physician never provides compliant treatment. When damages
exceed litigation costs the MCO will choose a fee-for-service contract if expected to-
tal damages given non-compliant treatment ((1 − q)(Dm + Dp)) exceed the cost of
compliant treatment (c). The physician will compliantly treat with a high enough
probability such that the patient does not sue with certainty and the patient will sue
with a high enough probability such that, when the cost of compliant treatment is
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Figure 3.2: This graph illustrates outcomes given unobservable contracts. The example
assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 60%, the
probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40% and litigation
costs are $100. The graph presents the model’s prediction of the MCO’s contract choice
for all (total expected damages, compliant treatment costs) pairs in the displayed range.
low compared to expected damages given non-compliant treatment, the MCO will
induce compliant treatment. Alternatively, if the cost of compliant treatment ex-
ceeds expected total damages given non-compliant treatment, then the MCO choose
a capitated contract, the physician never compliantly treats and the patient sues with
certainty.
Note that no equilibrium exists such that the patient never sues. This result
directly relates to the unobservability of the contract terms. As stated previously,
when the patient is unable to observe the contract terms, she must threaten to sue
with some positive probability to provide an incentive for the MCO to encourage
compliant treatment with some positive probability when the cost of such treatment is
less than expected damages given no treatment. The equilibrium probability of suing
lies somewhere between suing with certainty and never suing. If the patient always
sued, the physician would always compliantly treat, which implies that the patient
would never choose to sue, a contradiction. Conversely, if the patient never sued, the
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physician would never compliantly treat, which implies that the patient would always
choose to sue, a contradiction. Therefore, the equilibrium probability of suing must
lie somewhere between these two extremes. When contracts are observable, on the
other hand, the patient need not threaten to sue because she is able to infer perfectly
the physician’s behavior from the contract terms. Knowing this, the MCO is unable
to deviate by switching to a contract inducing less compliant treatment.
Second, note that when deciding on a contract, the MCO compares expected
damages given non-compliant treatment to the full cost of compliant treatment (c)
rather than the expected cost of compliant treatment (m∗c). The fact that the pa-
tient is unable to observe the contract produces this result. As discussed previously,
when the patient is unable to observe the contract, she must sue with some positive
probability to encourage the MCO to induce compliant treatment. In an observable
contract regime, the cost of compliant treatment is merely the expected cost of com-
pliant treatment given the physician’s equilibrium probability of compliantly treating
(m∗c). In an unobservable contract regime, however, if the MCO induces compliant
treatment it incurs costs for actual treatment given the physician compliantly treats
(m∗c) plus expected damages from litigation given the physician does not compliantly
treat ((1 −m∗)γ∗(1 − q)(Dm + Dp)). The patient’s equilibrium probability of suing
(γ∗) ensures that these costs equate exactly to the cost of compliant treatment (c).45
By employing this strategy when contracts are unobservable, the patient is able to
ensure the highest level of compliant treatment possible when the cost of compliant
treatment is relatively low.
Third, given that the MCO wishes to induce complaint treatment and reimburses
some portion of the treatment cost, the likelihood that the physician will treat is
the same under both disclosure rules.46 The equilibrium probability of compliant
treatment adjusts for the assumptions that litigation is costly and that the patient is
45When the cost of compliant treatment is relatively low, the patient’s equilibrium probability of
suing is c(1−q)(Dm+Dp) . Therefore, if the MCO chooses a fee-for-service contract its total expected
cost is equal to m∗c + (1−m∗) c(1−q)(Dm+Dp) (1− q)(Dm + Dp) = c.
46Propositions 1 and 2 reveal that, if reimbursed for some portion of the treatment cost, the
physician will compliantly treat with a probability high enough such that the patient will not sue
with certainty.
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unable to observe the physician’s action. These assumptions remain unchanged re-
gardless of the observability of the contract. If the MCO induces compliant treatment,
the physician will always compliantly treat just often enough so that the patient does
not sue with certainty.
Finally, notice that when compliant treatment costs are relatively low, the MCO
employs a fee-for-service contract with partial reimbursement and some positive fixed
payment, whereas, when contracts are observable, the MCO fully reimburses for the
full cost of treatment and provides no fixed payment. This is expected given the role
of the contract and the patient’s behavior under both disclosure regimes. Consider
the MCO’s reasons for employing a reimbursement policy versus a fixed payment.
The MCO reimburses a portion of the treatment cost to encourage the physician to
compliantly treat with some positive probability. On the other hand, the MCO will
provide a fixed payment only when the physician is exposed to liability. If the MCO
does not compensate the physician for his exposure to liability, the physician has no
incentive to accept the contract. Next, consider the patient’s behavior under both
regimes. When patients are able to observe the contract and compliant treatment
costs are relatively low, no lawsuits occur. This implies that the MCO need not
provide any fixed payment to satisfy the physician’s individual rationality constraint
because the physician is never exposed to potential liability. On the other hand,
when patients are unable to observe the contract, litigation occurs with some positive
probability. Therefore, the MCO must pay the physician some fixed payment to
compensate for the fact that he always faces potential liability.
With respect to reimbursement for the cost of treatment, the MCO must reim-
burse the physician for the full cost of treatment when contracts are observable and
compliant treatment costs are relatively low. This result obtains because the patient
will never sue under these conditions. Therefore, the physician has no incentive of
his own (i.e., exposure to liability) that drives his willingness to satisfy the legal
standard of care. Knowing this, the MCO must fully compensate the physician for
the cost of treatment to encourage the physician to compliantly treat with a proba-
bility high enough such that an injured patient will never sue. When contracts are
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unobservable, however, the physician faces potential liability of his own because an
injured patient will always sue with some positive probability. Thus, the MCO can
partially reimburse the physician for treatment costs and still be sure that the physi-
cian will compliantly treat with a sufficiently high probability because he is partially
encouraged to provide compliant treatment when he considers his personal exposure
to liability.
By comparing Propositions 1 and 2 one might conclude that, under the assump-
tions of the model, MCOs receive a higher payoff in a regime in which contracts are
observable.47 Therefore, the model suggests that MCOs are better off if they vol-
untarily disclosure contract terms to insured members. Legislation forcing MCOs to
disclose, however, indicates that, in practice, MCOs are reluctant to disclosure volun-
tarily. Features of health care markets not taken into account by the model help to
explain this phenomenon. For example, contracts with physicians have a major in-
fluence on costs incurred by MCOs to insure its members. Therefore, an MCO might
keep contract terms private to remain competitive in health care insurance markets.
Moreover, by avoiding disclosure, an MCO might limit its liability in cases in which
injured plaintiffs argue that the contract terms, themselves, led to substandard care
which, in turn, caused injury to the plaintiff.48
47If c < (1− q)(Dm +Dp), then the MCO induces compliant treatment regardless of observability.
If contracts are observable, the MCO’s payoff is I −mc. If contracts are not observable, the MCO’s
payoff is I − c < I −mc. If (1− q)(Dm + Dp) < c <
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
m
, then if contracts are observable,
the MCO induces compliant treatment and earns a payoff of I −mc. If contracts are unobservable,
the MCO does not induce compliant treatment and earns a payoff of I − (1 − q)(Dm + Dp) <
I −mc. Finally, if c >
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
m
, the MCO does not induce compliant treatment regardless of
observability and earns a payoff of I − (1− q)(Dm + Dp).
48For example, see Bush v. Dake No. 86-2576NM-2, slip op. (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 1989)
(holding that whether the MCO’s incentive structure had proximately contributed to the injury was
a genuine issue of material fact) and Ching v. Gaines No. CV-137656 (Ventura County Super. Ct.
Nov. 15, 1995) (awarding $2.9 million for failure to refer for diagnosis of colon cancer based in part
on evidence of financial incentives to deny care).
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3.5.3 Effect of the Disclosure Rule on the Likelihood of Law-
suits
Propositions 1 and 2, taken together, predict the likelihood of lawsuits under different
disclosure laws. The following proposition specifies the relationship between disclosure
laws and the likelihood that the patient will file a lawsuit following a negative outcome.
The proof appears in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 For any feasible set of treatment costs (c), probability of a positive
outcome given compliant treatment (p), probability of a positive outcome given non-
compliant treatment (q), expected litigation costs (L) and expected damages (Dm+Dp),
the probability that an injured patient will file a medical malpractice lawsuit in a regime
with observable contracts is less than or equal to the probability under a regime with
unobservable contracts.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When expected litigation costs exceed
expected damages, the comparison is simple. Regardless of the disclosure rule, the
patient will not sue. Therefore, it must be that, when expected damages exceed
expected litigation costs, the probability of suing is lower (in some cases) under a
mandatory disclosure rule. Figure 3.3 illustrates the differences in litigation rates
caused by different disclosure rules.
The increase in expected litigation rates that results from shifting from an ob-
servable contract regime to an unobservable contract regime arises from two sources.
First, unobservability of the contract forces patients to sue to encourage MCOs to
induce compliant treatment when treatment costs are relatively low. Therefore, even
if compliant treatment costs and damage levels are such that the MCO chooses a fee-
for-service contract in both regimes (represented by the lower portion of the graph),
more lawsuits occur when the contract is unobservable.
Second, as discussed previously, the total cost of treatment is higher in an unob-
servable regime because the MCO must pay not only the expected cost of treatment
but also expected damages. Therefore, the MCO finds it optimal to induce compliant
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Figure 3.3: This graph illustrates the differences in claim rates caused by different dis-
closure rules. This figure simply combines Figures 3.1 and 3.2 using the same parameters
(i.e., the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 60%, the proba-
bility of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40% and litigation costs are
$100). Recall that the patient’s equilibrium probability of suing is represented by γ∗.
treatment less often when patients are unable to observe the contract. The hatched
area of Figure 3.3 represents the set of (expected total damages, compliant treatment
costs) pairs for which the MCO will induce compliant treatment only in an observable
regime. For these pairs, patients will never sue if they are able to observe the con-
tract, but will always sue if they cannot observe the contract. This results in higher
claim rates in unobservable contract regimes.
The following section performs a similar analysis for the rate of compliant treat-
ment under each legal regime.
3.5.4 Effect of the Disclosure Rule on the Likelihood of Com-
pliant Treatment
Propositions 1 and 2 also jointly lead to a prediction regarding the likelihood of
compliant treatment under different disclosure laws. The following proposition spec-
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ifies the relationship between disclosure laws and the likelihood that the physician’s
treatment choice will satisfy the legal standard of care. The proof appears in the
Appendix.
Proposition 4 For any feasible set of compliant treatment costs (c), probability of
a positive outcome given compliant treatment (p), probability of a positive outcome
given non-compliant treatment (q), expected litigation costs (L) and expected damages
(Dm + Dp), the probability that a physician will compliantly treat an injured patient
is higher under a regime in which the patient can observe contract terms between
the MCO and physician relative to a regime in which the patient cannot observe the
contract terms.
The intuition behind this result is very similar to that provided for the result
regarding the effect of disclosure rules on the likelihood of litigation. Note first that,
as explained supra in Section 3.5.2, the physician’s probability of compliantly treating
given reimbursement does not depend on observability of the contract terms. Indeed,
the result here is linked solely to the MCO’s contract choice under each disclosure
regime. Figure 3.4 illustrates the differences in compliant treatment rates caused by
different disclosure rules.
Unlike the comparison of litigation rates, the difference in compliant treatment
rates emerges from just one source. That is, for the set of (total expected damages,
compliant treatment costs) pairs for which the MCO will employ a fee-for-service
contract regardless of the observability of the contract (represented by the lower
portion of the graph), compliant treatment levels are identical in each legal regime.
The physician will compliantly treat just often enough so that the patient will not
sue with certainty. This probability does not depend on the observability of the
contract. Compliant treatment rates, however, do differ in the region representing
the set of (expected total damages, compliant treatment costs) pairs for which the
MCO will induce compliant treatment only in an observable regime (represented by
the hatched region of Figure 3.4). When the contract is observable, the costs of
compliantly treating the patient are lower than in an unobservable contract regime.
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Figure 3.4: This graph illustrates the differences in compliant treatment rates caused by
different disclosure rules by combining Figures 3.1 and 3.2 using the same parameters (i.e.,
the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 60%, the probability of
a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40% and litigation costs are $100).
Recall that the physician’s equilibrium probability of compliantly treating is represented
by β∗.
The MCO is more likely, therefore, to employ a capitated contract to discourage
compliant treatment when contracts are unobservable. This leads to the result that
compliant treatment rates are higher in observable contract regimes.
The next section characterizes how physician treatment decisions and patient lit-
igation decisions vary with changes in damages.
3.6 Effect of Damages on the Likelihood of Treat-
ment and Litigation
Propositions 1 and 2 predict treatment and litigation decisions when total damages
exceed litigation costs. From this analysis we can characterize the relationship be-
tween damages and physician treatment choices and between damages and patient
litigation decisions. Analyses are provided for the case in which contracts are observ-
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able and for the case in which they are not.
3.6.1 Damages and Litigation
First consider how the patient’s litigation decision reacts to a change in total expected
damages. The relationship between damages and litigation depends on observability
of the contract. Recall that the patient will never sue if total expected damages are
less than the patient’s litigation costs. The following discussion considers patient
behavior when damages exceed litigation costs.
Observable Contract Regime
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Figure 3.5: This graph illustrates how the patient’s litigation decision varies with changes
in the damage level when contracts are observable and compliant treatment costs exceed cˆ.
The graph assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is
80%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40%, litigation
costs are $100 and the cost of compliant treatment is $200.
When contracts are observable (see Figure 3.1), the patient’s behavior will depend
on whether the cost of compliant treatment is high (i.e., c > cˆ) or low (i.e., c < cˆ).
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Figure 3.5 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that the
patient sues when compliant treatment costs exceed cˆ. The patient will never sue
if the physician provides compliant treatment with some positive probability. This
occurs when total expected damages are just above litigation costs and when they are
sufficiently high such that expected damages given non-compliant treatment exceed
the cost of compliant treatment. When total expected damages lie somewhere between
these two regions, the MCO chooses a capitated contract, the physician never provides
compliant treatment and the patient sues with certainty.
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Figure 3.6: This graph illustrates how the patient’s litigation decision varies with changes
in the damage level when contracts are observable and compliant treatment costs are less
than cˆ. The graph assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant
treatment is 80%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is
40%, litigation costs are $100 and the cost of compliant treatment is $100.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that
the patient sues when compliant treatment costs are less than cˆ. Recall that when
compliant treatment costs are less than cˆ, the MCO finds inducing compliant treat-
ment to be optimal in all cases. Therefore, the physician always provides compliant
treatment often enough such that the patient never sues, and the patient never sues.
Under these conditions, no litigation occurs.
71
200 400 600 800 1000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Equilibrium 
probability that 
patient sues
(γ*)
Expected 
Damages 
(Dm+Dp)
Figure 3.7: This graph illustrates how the patient’s filing decision varies with changes in
the damage level when contracts are unobservable. The graph assumes that the probability
of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 80%, the probability of a positive
outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40%, litigation costs are $100 and the cost of
compliant treatment is $100.
Unobservable Contract Regime
Figure 3.7 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that the
patient sues when contracts are unobservable. In this case, the MCO will not induce
compliant treatment until expected damages given non-compliant treatment, (1 −
q)(Dm + Dp), exceed the cost of compliant treatment, c. Once this condition is met,
the MCO will induce compliant treatment and the physician will compliantly treat
with some positive probability. The patient will sue with certainty when the MCO
chooses not to induce compliant treatment. Once the physician begins compliantly
treating with an increasing probability, the patient sues with some probability less
than one. As damages increase, the probability of compliant treatment increases;
therefore, the patient finds it optimal to decrease the probability of filing suit until
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the probability of filing nears zero.
3.6.2 Damages and Treatment
Next consider how the physician’s treatment decision reacts to a change in total
expected damages. Just as in the case of litigation levels, the relationship between
treatment and damages depends on whether patients are able to observe the contract.
Recall that the physician will never compliantly treat if total expected damages are
less than the patient’s litigation costs. The following discussion considers physician
behavior when damages exceed litigation costs.
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Figure 3.8: This graph illustrates how the physician’s treatment decision varies with
changes in the damage level when contracts are observable and compliant treatment costs
exceed cˆ. The graph assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant
treatment is 80%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is
40%, litigation costs are $100 and the cost of compliant treatment is $200.
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Observable Contract Regime
When contracts are observable (see Figure 3.1), the physician’s behavior will depend
on whether the cost of compliant treatment is high (i.e., c > cˆ) or low (i.e., c < cˆ).
Figure 3.8 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that the
physician compliantly treats when compliant treatment costs exceed cˆ. The physician
will never compliantly treat when litigation costs exceed damages. Once the patient
expects a positive gain from winning a lawsuit, then the MCO induces compliant
treatment which is provided with an increasing probability until damages increase
to the point at which expected compliant treatment costs, m∗c, exceed expected
damages given non-compliant treatment, (1− q)(Dm + Dp). At this point, the MCO
chooses a capitated contract and the physician never provides compliant treatment.
This continues until damages increase enough such that the expected damages given
non-compliant treatment exceed the expected cost of compliant treatment. At this
point, damages are relatively high and so the patient will gain significantly from a
successful lawsuit. This results in a high level of compliant treatment which continues
to increase as damages increase until the probability of compliant treatment is nearly
certain.
Figure 3.9 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that
the physician compliantly treats when compliant treatment costs are less than cˆ. Note
from Figure 3.1 that when compliant treatment costs are less than cˆ, the MCO finds
inducing compliant treatment to be optimal in all cases. Even when the patient’s
expected gain from a successful lawsuit is relatively low, the expected cost of compli-
ant treatment is low enough such that compliant treatment at some level is always
optimal. This results in a positive level of compliant treatment once expected dam-
ages exceed litigation costs, which continues to increase as damages increase until the
probability of compliant treatment is nearly certain.
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Figure 3.9: This graph illustrates how the physician’s treatment decision varies with
changes in the damage level when contracts are observable and compliant treatment costs
are less than cˆ. The graph assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given
compliant treatment is 80%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant
treatment is 40%, litigation costs are $100 and the cost of compliant treatment is $100.
Unobservable Contract Regime
Figure 3.10 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that
the physician compliantly treats when contracts are unobservable (see Figure 3.2). In
this case, the MCO will not induce compliant treatment until expected damages given
non-compliant treatment, (1− q)(Dm + Dp), exceed the cost of compliant treatment,
c. Once this condition is met, the MCO will induce compliant treatment and the
physician will provide compliant treatment with some positive probability. As dam-
ages increase, this probability increases until the physician is compliantly treating
with near certainty.
Section 3.7 constructs an efficient damage rule to analyze the inefficiencies of two
damage rules courts use to compensate injured patients for their losses.
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Figure 3.10: This graph illustrates how the physician’s treatment decision varies with
changes in the damage level when contracts are unobservable. The graph assumes that
the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 80%, the probability
of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40%, litigation costs are $100 and
the cost of compliant treatment is $200.
3.7 Analysis of Damage Rule Efficiency
The purpose of this section is to identify the inefficiencies of damage rules courts use to
compensate negligently injured patients. The inefficiencies depend on the disclosure
rule. Section 3.7.1 begins by suggesting an efficient damage rule based on the results
of Section 3.5. Section 3.7.2 analyzes the efficiency of two commonly used damage
rules: the all-or-nothing rule and the loss-of-a-chance rule.
3.7.1 An Efficient Damage Rule
The analysis begins with a calculation of the first-best solution. Given perfect infor-
mation, a social planner would compare total social welfare if the physician provides
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treatment,49 pH − c, with the total social welfare given the physician does not treat,
qH. If the net benefit from treatment is greater than the cost of such treatment
((p−q)H > c), the social planner would dictate that the physician treat the patient’s
ailment. On the other hand, if the net benefit from treatment is less than the cost,
the social planner would require that no treatment be provided.50
This first-best solution is attainable with perfect information. In health care mar-
kets, however, information is not perfect. Neither the patient nor the MCO can
observe whether the physician treated. To mitigate the negative effects of incomplete
information, efficiency-minded courts can set damages to create incentives for indus-
try actors that lead to (or at least approximate) first-best outcomes despite market
imperfections. To achieve an efficient outcome, the court must set damages such that
the actors are faced with the proper ex ante incentives. The following proposition
provides the efficient damage rule and resulting equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 5 Regardless of the observability of the contract terms, the following
specifies the efficient damage rule:
If the net benefit from treatment is greater than the cost, the court can approx-
imate arbitrarily the first-best solution by increasing damages. This results in the
MCO employing a fee-for-service contract with almost full reimbursement for cost,
the physician treating with near certainty and the patient almost never suing.
If the net benefit from treatment is less than the cost, the court can achieve the
first-best solution by setting damages equal to zero. This results in the MCO paying
nothing to the physician, the physician never treating and the patient never suing.
The Appendix provides a proof for this proposition. The intuition for this result
is as follows.51
49For purposes of this section, read “treatment” as the treatment choice that the social planner
would prefer (i.e., the efficient treatment choice).
50This cost/benefit framework is akin to that articulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) and years earlier by Terry [99].
51Grady [43] argues for a cost-benefit standard of care to replace the threshold level of care
standard. He also claims that “this new negligence rule is more consistent with the actual decision
rules used by courts than the formal rules posited by the conventional theory.” The present study
takes no stand regarding the superiority of the cost-benefit standard, but merely employs it to
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Consider the case in which the patient can observe the contract terms (see Propo-
sition 1). Recall that the patient will not sue if the physician treats with a sufficiently
high probability (m∗). If treatment is socially desirable, setting damages high52 forces
the physician to treat with near certainty to ensure no litigation. Therefore, the
physician maximizes his expected payoff by treating with near certainty. In addition,
Proposition 1 reveals that the MCO uses a fee-for-service contract when expected
damages given no treatment are high relative to the expected cost of treatment. By
setting damages high, the court provides an incentive for the MCO to fully reimburse
the physician for the cost of treatment. Knowing that the physician (almost) always
treats, the patient (almost) never sues.53
When the patient cannot observe the contract terms, the reasoning works in much
the same way (see Proposition 2). Just as in the previous case, when damages are
high the physician maximizes his payoff by treating with near certainty. In addition,
construct a simple and efficient damage rule.
It is important to note that constructing the efficient damage rule is not meant for normative
purposes. Clearly important considerations in addition to efficiency drive our search for the “perfect”
damage rule. In addition, the model assumes perfect verification by the court. Assuming otherwise
significantly changes the construction of the efficient damage rule. The purpose for articulating an
efficient damage rule in this section merely is to create a benchmark against which commonly used
damage rules can be compared to study their effects on efficiency. Polinsky and Shavell [82], Hylton
[53] and Calfee and Craswell [21] study the effects of legal error on incentives.
52Even though the efficient rule technically requires infinitely high damages to achieve approximate
efficiency, the level of damages necessary to obtain a reasonable outcome is significantly lower.
Consider the following example. Assume that treatment is efficient. This implies that the court
wishes to set damages such that treatment occurs. If the probability of a positive outcome given
treatment is 60%, the probability of a positive outcome given no treatment is 40%, litigation costs
equal $10,000 and the cost of treatment is $4,000, then, by setting damages at $5,000,000, the court
can ensure (under the assumptions of the model) that the physician will treat in nearly 999 out of
1000 cases and injured patients will sue in approximately 1.3 out of 1000 cases.
53Becker [9] shows that, in criminal cases, an optimal level of punishment exists to balance the
goals of maintaining low crime levels and minimizing enforcement costs (e.g., costs necessary to
investigate crimes and punish offenders). Becker’s analysis differs substantially from the analysis of
the efficient damage rule in the case of medical malpractice. Tort law, in effect, is “enforced” by
injured parties who internalize the costs of suing. The administrative costs of the court system are
ignored in this study.
In medical malpractice cases, one must be concerned with balancing good outcomes with the
cost to physicians of taking care. These costs imposed on physicians include not only the cost of
treatment in each particular case, but also costs incurred to become a specialist in a particular area,
to fulfill continuing education requirements, etc. The efficient rule constructed in Proposition 5,
however, is designed to take these costs into account. To be efficient, the rule must specify that the
cost of treatment, c, accounts for all costs necessary to perform a particular treatment, including
training, research, etc.
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even though the patient will always sue with some positive probability, when damages
are set high, the probability that the patient sues is approximately zero because the
probability of winning a lawsuit is approximately zero. Finally, when damages are
high relative to treatment costs, the MCO will employ a fee-for-service arrangement
with partial (but almost full) reimbursement for cost.54 Therefore, in terms of physi-
cian and patient behavior, the same results obtain (approximately) regardless of the
observability of the contract terms.
When the cost of treatment exceeds the net benefits it provides, an efficiency-
minded court discourages treatment by setting damages equal to zero. When damages
are zero, litigation costs exceed expected damages. Therefore, the patient never sues.
Knowing the patient will never sue, the physician never treats and the MCO pays
the physician nothing. The court achieves the first best outcome. This result is
independent of the observability of the contract.
Many studies investigate the effects of defensive medicine: precautions taken by
physicians that surpass the standard of care set by custom in order to avoid liability
for medical malpractice.55 The efficient rule proposed might not help to prevent the
practice of defensive medicine unless the costs and benefits of treatment are known
with certainty. If physicians are uncertain about how costs relate to net benefits,
they might provide treatment in cases in which the costs of treatment exceed its net
benefits. In addition, if the court is unable to perfectly verify the physician’s action,
physicians might find it optimal to practice defensive medicine.
3.7.2 Analysis of Commonly Used Damage Rules
Courts in different jurisdictions use different rules to calculate damages when the
court determines that the physician acted negligently (i.e., did not provide customary
treatment, according to this model). Most states use one of two calculations: (1) the
54See the discussion in the appendix for a more detailed explanation of the contract terms under
these circumstances.
55For a review of studies related to the practice of defensive medicine, see McGuire [72].
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all-or-nothing rule or (2) the loss-of-a-chance rule.56 The all-or-nothing rule allows full
compensation (i.e., H) for an injury only if the patient would have had a better than
fifty percent chance of recovery given treatment (i.e., p > .5). Some states that have
adopted the loss-of-a-chance rule determine damages using a single outcome approach
suggested by King [59]. Under this approach, the plaintiff is awarded damages equal
to a portion of the full value of lost health. The portion is the percentage by which
the defendant’s tortious conduct reduced the plaintiff’s chance of obtaining a more
favorable outcome given treatment. For example, assume that given treatment, the
patient would have had a percent chance, p, of recovery (with a value of H). Without
treatment, however, the patient has a percent chance, q, of recovery with q strictly
less than p. Under this scenario, the plaintiff would be awarded damages of (p− q)H,
the portion of recovery lost due to the physician’s failure to provide proper treatment.
The All-or-Nothing Damage Rule
The purpose of this section is to analyze the effect of imposing the all-or-nothing
damage rule on physicians and MCOs that are found liable for medical malpractice.
First consider the case in which litigation costs exceed damages. In this case, the
patient will never sue. Knowing that the patient will not sue, the physician never
treats. If the net expected benefit of treatment exceeds its cost, inefficiency arises in
the form of undertreatment. The same result obtains when damages exceed litigation
costs but the probability of a positive outcome given treatment, p, is at most one-half.
If damages exceed litigation costs and the probability of a positive outcome given
treatment is more than one-half, then inefficiencies resulting from the all-or-nothing
damage rule depend on whether the patient can observe the contract terms. Under
these conditions, the all-or-nothing damage rule requires the court to set damages
equal to the value of health (i.e., Dm + Dp = H).
First consider the case in which the patient can observe the contract terms. In this
56Note that some jurisdictions apply a hybrid, using the all-or-nothing rule when the patient’s
chance of recovery with treatment exceeds one-half and the loss-of-a-chance rule otherwise. E.g., see
Donnini v. Ouano, 810 P.2d 1163 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). Variations of the two main damage rules
are not studied here.
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case inefficiencies of some sort result regardless of the relationship between costs and
the expected net benefit of treatment. Table 3.1 lists all cases that could arise under
the all-or-nothing damage rule and the resulting inefficiencies given that contracts are
observable by the patient, the probability of a positive outcome given treatment is
more than one-half and total damages exceed litigation costs. Note that the expected
cost of treatment under the all-or-nothing rule (m∗ac) is always less than or equal to
the cost of treatment (c). Also, the net benefit of treatment ((p − q)H) is always
less than or equal to expected damages given no treatment and a lawsuit ((1− q)H).
Following is a summary of all possible cases assuming that damages exceed litigation
costs.
Efficient Damage Rule Outcomes
Treatment is
efficient
(c < (p− q)H)
Treatment is
inefficient
(c > (p− q)H)
All-
or-
Treatment cost
relatively low
(m∗ac < (1− q)H)
undertreatment overtreatment
Nothing
Damage
Rule
Outcomes
Treatment cost
relatively high
(m∗ac > (1− q)H)
inconsistent conditions litigation costs
Table 3.1: Inefficiencies resulting from the all-or-nothing damage rule as compared to
the efficient damage rule when contracts are observable by the patient, the probability
of a positive outcome given treatment is greater than one-half and total damages exceed
litigation costs.
If the expected cost of treatment (m∗ac) is low relative to total expected dam-
ages under the all-or-nothing rule ((1 − q)H) and the level of treatment is efficient,
then the physician will treat with a lower probability than that resulting under the
81
efficient rule. Under these conditions, the efficient damage rule results in (near) cer-
tain treatment, whereas the all-or-nothing rule leads to treatment less often. On the
other hand, if treatment is not efficient, then the efficient damage rule calls for no
treatment while the all-or-nothing rule leads to treatment with some positive prob-
ability. Therefore, overtreatment occurs. Note that litigation occurs neither under
the efficient rule nor under the all-or-nothing damage rule when treatment cost is low
relative to total expected damages.
If the expected cost of treatment is high relative to total expected damages under
the all-or-nothing rule, then treatment must be inefficient.57 Treatment does not
occur under either rule. The efficient outcome, however, calls for no lawsuits while
the actual outcome under the all-or-nothing damage rule results in the patient suing
with certainty. Therefore, inefficiencies arise due to litigation costs.
When contracts are not observable by the patient, the same inefficiencies obtain.
The MCO’s decision rule, however, differs from the observable contract case.58 Ta-
ble 3.2 lists all cases that could arise under the all-or-nothing damage rule and the
resulting inefficiencies given that contracts are not observable by the patient, the
probability of a positive outcome given treatment is more than one-half and total
damages exceed litigation costs.
If the cost of treatment (c) is low relative to total expected damages ((1−q)H) and
treatment is efficient, the efficient rule calls for certain treatment and no lawsuit. The
all-or-nothing rule, on the other hand, results in treatment less often and a positive
probability of litigation. Therefore, the physician undertreats and the patient will
incur inefficient litigation costs. If treatment is inefficient, then the efficient rule calls
for no treatment and no lawsuit. The all-or-nothing rule results in some positive
probability of treatment and some positive probability of a lawsuit. Therefore, the
patient incurs inefficient litigation costs and the physician overtreats.
If the cost of treatment exceeds total expected damages, then treatment is inef-
ficient for the same reason given in the observable contract case. Neither the all-or-
57If m∗ac > (1− q)H ⇒ c > (1− q)H ⇒ c > (p− q)H.
58Specifically, the MCO compares the cost of treatment (rather than the expected cost of treat-
ment) to total expected damages when deciding on a contract type.
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Efficient Damage Rule Outcomes
Treatment is
efficient
(c < (p− q)H)
Treatment is
inefficient
(c > (p− q)H)
Treatment cost
relatively low
undertreatment; overtreatment;
All-
or-
(c < (1− q)H) litigation costs litigation costs
Nothing
Damage
Rule
Outcomes
Treatment cost
relatively high
(c > (1− q)H)
inconsistent conditions litigation costs
Table 3.2: Inefficiencies resulting from the all-or-nothing damage rule as compared to the
efficient damage rule when contracts are not observable by the patient, the probability
of a positive outcome given treatment is greater than one-half and total damages exceed
litigation costs.
nothing rule nor the efficient rule results in treatment. The efficient outcome, however,
calls for no lawsuits while the actual outcome under this damage rule results in the
patient suing with certainty. Therefore, inefficiencies arise due to litigation costs.
The next section discusses inefficiencies that arise when courts use the loss-of-a-
chance rule to compensate injured patients for their losses.
The Loss-of-a-Chance Damage Rule
The purpose of this section is to analyze the effect of imposing the loss-of-a-chance
damage rule on physicians and MCOs that are found liable for medical malpractice.
Recall that, under this damage rule, if the injured patient proves medical malpractice,
the court awards the patient the value of the lost chance of recovery attributable to
the physician’s action (i.e., (p− q)H). Just as under the all-or-nothing damage rule,
if litigation costs exceed damages and the net expected benefit of treatment exceeds
its cost, inefficiency in the form of undertreatment occurs.
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When damages exceed litigation costs, regardless of whether the patient is able to
observe the contract, inefficiencies arise under all possible circumstances when courts
use the loss-of-a-chance rule to compensate the injured patient. First consider the case
in which the patient is able to observe the contract. Table 3.3 lists all cases that could
arise under the loss-of-a-chance damage rule and the resulting inefficiencies given that
contracts are observable by the patient and damages exceed litigation costs. Let m∗l c
represent the expected cost of treatment under the loss-of-a-chance damage rule.
If the expected cost of treatment (m∗l c) is less than the MCO’s expected damages
((1−q)(p−q)H) and treatment is efficient, the loss-of-a-chance rule results in a lower
probability of treatment than that resulting under the efficient damage rule. Con-
versely, if treatment is inefficient, then the loss-of-a-chance rule results in a higher
probability of treatment than the efficient damage rule produces. Note that these
results are similar to those in an observable contract regime. The unobservability of
contracts and the loss-of-a-chance damage rule, however, change the MCO’s contract
choice and the equilibrium probability of treatment. Specifically, decreasing dam-
ages lowers the likelihood that the MCO will employ a fee-for-service contract and,
therefore, lowers the probability of treatment.
Next, consider the case in which the expected cost of treatment is high relative
to total expected damages. Unlike the observable contract case, it is possible for
treatment to be efficient. The efficient treatment rule calls for certain treatment and
no lawsuit. The loss-of-a-chance rule, on the other hand, results in no treatment
and a certain lawsuit. Therefore, the physician undertreats and the patient incurs
inefficient litigation costs. If treatment is inefficient, then the efficient outcome calls
for no lawsuits while the actual outcome under this damage rule results in the patient
suing with certainty. Therefore, inefficiencies arise due to litigation costs. Neither
rule results in treatment; therefore, no inefficiencies due to treatment emerge.
When contracts are not observable by the patient, the same inefficiencies obtain.
The MCO’s decision rule, however, differs from the cases considered previously. Table
3.4 lists all cases that could arise under the loss-of-a-chance damage rule and the
resulting inefficiencies given that contracts are not observable by the patient and
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Efficient Damage Rule Outcomes
Treatment is
efficient
(c < (p− q)H)
Treatment is
inefficient
(c > (p− q)H)
Loss-
of-a-
Treatment cost
relatively low
(m∗l c < (1− q)(p− q)H)
undertreatment overtreatment
Chance
Damage
Treatment cost
relatively high
undertreatment; litigation costs
Rule
Outcomes
(m∗l c > (1− q)(p− q)H)
litigation costs
Table 3.3: Inefficiencies resulting from the loss-of-a-chance damage rule as compared to
the efficient damage rule when contracts are observable by the patient and total damages
exceed litigation costs.
damages exceed litigation costs.
If the cost of treatment (c) is less than the MCO’s expected damages ((1− q)(p−
q)H), it must be that treatment is efficient.59 The efficient rule calls for treatment
with certainty and no lawsuit. The loss-of-a-chance rule, however, leads to a lower
probability of treatment and a positive probability of a lawsuit. Therefore, inefficien-
cies in the form of undertreatment and litigation costs occur.
If the cost of treatment exceeds total expected damages and treatment is efficient,
then inefficiencies arise from both litigation and treatment choices. The efficient rule
leads to certain treatment and no lawsuit. The loss-of-a-chance rule, however, results
in no treatment and a certain lawsuit. Finally, if treatment is inefficient, the efficient
outcome calls for no treatment and no lawsuits. While under the loss-of-a-chance rule
no treatment results, the patient sues with certainty. Therefore, inefficiencies arise
due to litigation costs.
The next section presents an analysis of how outcomes are affected when the court
specifies which parties an injured patient is allowed to sue for medical malpractice.
59c < (1− q)(p− q)H ⇒ c < (p− q)H
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Efficient Damage Rule Outcomes
Treatment is
efficient
(c < (p− q)H)
Treatment is
inefficient
(c > (p− q)H)
Loss-
Treatment cost
relatively low
undertreatment; inconsistent
of-a- (c < (1− q)(p− q)H)
litigation costs conditions
Chance
Damage
Treatment cost
relatively high
undertreatment; litigation costs
Rule
Outcomes
(c > (1− q)(p− q)H) litigation costs
Table 3.4: Inefficiencies resulting from the loss-of-a-chance damage rule as compared
to the efficient damage rule when contracts are not observable by the patient and total
damages exceed litigation costs.
3.8 Analysis of Tortfeasor Rules
Tortfeasor rules specify the parties that an injured patient can sue to recover for
damages resulting from non-compliant treatment. If the court allows the patient to
bring a claim against both the physician and the MCO, the patient may sue both.
On the other hand, if the court allows suits against only the physician or only the
MCO, the patient is restricted to filing a suit against only one party.60
The following proposition states the relationship between tortfeasor rules and
treatment and litigation decisions.
60Traditionally, patients were allowed to bring medical malpractice lawsuits against physicians
only. MCOs, upon being sued, would use the “corporate practice of medicine” doctrine as an
affirmative defense against claims of medical malpractice. States such as Texas, however, have
eliminated the corporate practice of medicine law as a defense for plans. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(h). Therefore, in recent years, patients have successfully sued both
physicians and MCOs for medical malpractice (e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 222 Cal. App.
3d 660 (1990)). An “MCO only” tortfeasor rule has not been used by any court, but has been
analyzed in the literature. See, for example, Polinsky and Shavell [81].
86
Proposition 6 Neutrality Result: Given any damage rule and any disclosure rule,
the probability that the physician will provide compliant treatment and the probability
that an injured patient will sue do not depend on the tortfeasor rule.
The proof of this neutrality result follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2.61
The result stems from the fact that, regardless of which parties face actual liability,
the MCO must absorb total expected damages to satisfy the physician’s individual
rationality constraint. The model also implicitly assumes that both the MCO and
physician are risk neutral and face no wealth constraints. If these assumptions are
relaxed, however, the result will not hold. For example, if damages imposed on the
physician exceed his total wealth, then the deterrence effects of a negligence regime
are reduced because the physician will not find it in his best interest to treat at the
socially optimal level.62
Contracts between MCOs and physicians might contain agreements that grant
indemnification to the MCO, holding it harmless for liability related to patient treat-
ment decisions.63 These clauses, however, do not affect the neutrality result. Even if
an MCO secures indemnification protection, ex ante it must compensate the physi-
cian for expected damages to satisfy the physician’s individual rationality constraint.
As the following proposition shows, however, these clauses might affect the MCO’s
contract choice.
The final result states the relationship between the tortfeasor rule and the types of
physician contracts employed by MCOs to obtain medical services for their enrollees.
Proposition 7 Given any damage rule, the MCO’s choice over contracts depends on
the disclosure rule and the tortfeasor rule in the following way:
If contracts are observable and the expected cost of treatment is less than total
expected damages, the MCO will employ a fee-for-service contract with full reim-
61This result is consistent with the neutrality results formulated by Kornhauser [61] and Sykes
[98]. The result here, however, generalizes Kornhauser’s claim that neutrality will result only if
certain instruments are available to the MCO (i.e., indemnification and/or insurance).
62See Kornhauser [61] and Sykes [98] for detailed discussions of circumstances under which the
neutrality result does not hold.
63Morgan and Levy [75] summarize legislative rules regarding “hold harmless” clauses on a state-
by-state basis.
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bursement for cost regardless of the tortfeasor rule. If the expected cost of treatment
exceeds total expected damages, then the MCO will employ a capitated contract. The
fixed payment, however, will depend on the tortfeasor rule. If the patient is allowed to
sue the physician, then the MCO will pay the physician a strictly positive fixed pay-
ment. Under an MCO-only tortfeasor rule, however, the physician receives no fixed
payment.
If contracts are unobservable and the cost of treatment is less than total expected
damages, the tortfeasor rule affects contract types as follows. If the patient is able to
sue both the physician and the MCO, the MCO will employ a fee-for-service contract
with partial reimbursement and a strictly positive fixed payment. If the patient is able
to sue the physician only, the MCO will employ a capitated contract with a positive
fixed payment equal to the cost of treatment. If the patient is able to sue the MCO
only, the MCO will employ a fee-for-service contract with full reimbursement and no
fixed payment. If the cost of treatment exceeds total expected damages, the result is
identical to the observable contract case. That is, the MCO will employ a capitated
contract with the fixed payment depending on the tortfeasor rule. If the patient is
allowed to sue the physician, then the MCO must pay a strictly positive fixed payment
to the physician. Under an MCO-only tortfeasor rule, however, the physician receives
no fixed payment.
This result also follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2. It shows that, even
though the tortfeasor rule does not affect treatment and litigation outcomes, it will
affect how the MCO structures its contract with the physician to influence treatment
decisions and maximize its payoff.
The intuition behind the case in which contracts are observable is fairly straightfor-
ward. When treatment costs are relatively low, the MCO will employ a fee-for-service
contract with full reimbursement for cost regardless of the tortfeasor rule. This is the
case because lawsuits never occur. Therefore, the physician is not exposed to dam-
ages, and the MCO must pay him the full cost of treatment to guarantee treatment
at a level such that the patient never sues. When treatment costs are relatively high,
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the MCO employs a capitated contract with a fixed payment to cover the physician’s
exposure to liability. If the tortfeasor rule exposes the physician to potential liability,
then the fixed payment will be strictly positive. On the other hand, if the tortfeasor
rule allows suits against only the MCO, the fixed payment to the physician will be
zero.
Next, consider the case in which contracts are not observable. If the cost of treat-
ment is relatively low and the tortfeasor rule allows suits against both the MCO and
the physician, the MCO employs a fee-for-service contract with partial reimbursement
for treatment costs and a fixed payment to cover the physician’s exposure to liability
given no treatment. Recall that the MCO can reduce the reimbursement amount be-
cause the physician has some incentive to treat resulting from his exposure to liability.
The MCO, however, will partially reimburse for treatment costs to encourage the op-
timal level of care (from the MCO’s perspective) to reduce its exposure to liability. If
an injured patient is allowed to sue the physician only, the MCO will not reimburse
for treatment, but will pay a fixed payment equal to the cost of treatment, which, in
this case, is exactly equal to the physician’s liability exposure given no treatment. If,
on the other hand, an injured patient is allowed to sue only the MCO, the physician
has no incentive to treat based on liability exposure. The MCO must fully reimburse
treatment costs but is not required to pay any fixed payment. If the cost of treatment
is relatively high, contracts under an unobservable contract regime look identical to
those under an observable contract regime.
3.9 Conclusion and Extensions
The model and its results provide insights with respect to policy surrounding medical
malpractice. First, the observability of contracts matters. Although the motivation
for forcing disclosure of contracts to potential or present MCO enrollees is to provide
information during the MCO selection process, policy makers should weigh the poten-
tial effects of disclosure on contract, treatment and litigation decisions. In addition,
judges and legislators should consider carefully the deterrence effects of medical mal-
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practice damage rules and judiciously contemplate how changes in these rules affect
behavior in health care markets. Finally, market conditions influence the effects of
tortfeasor rules on behavior. These rules might help to explain the configuration of
contracts used in the market and the variations across jurisdictions.
The model leads to several testable predictions. First, given that reliable measure-
ments of physician treatment choices and patient filing rates are available, empirical
tests of the effects of disclosure and damage rules on contracts, treatment and liti-
gation decisions are possible.64 In addition, testing whether treatment and litigation
decisions are affected by tortfeasor rules might lead to the discovery of other market
conditions that give tortfeasor rules some bite. Finally, one could test whether vari-
ations in tortfeasor rules explain variations in the portfolio of contracts employed in
different jurisdictions.
Strong caveats apply. The practical use of the model’s results to create policy
is severely limited by many of its assumptions. First, relaxing the assumption that
courts can verify perfectly the physician’s action will change the construction of the
efficient damage rule. If courts sometimes err, imposing heavy penalties on physicians
and MCOs might encourage injured patients to sue when a lawsuit is not socially
optimal. Even if damages are set high so that the physician treats with near certainty,
the patient might sue to take advantage of the small chance that the court mistakenly
finds the physician liable. Extending the model to account for the effect of court error
on the efficient damage rule might be a useful exercise.
Second, the model does not account for the effects of competition among MCOs for
enrollees. In addition, the fact that enrollees might voluntarily separate themselves
into various types of plans is not considered here.65 Although these assumptions do
not affect the general intuitions of the model, considering competition and enrollee
choice could offer additional insights.
Finally, the model focuses on behavior given that one patient in need of treatment
64See infra Chapter 4 for an empirical investigation of how disclosure laws and damage caps affect
expected damages due to medical malpractice.
65See, e.g., Jackson-Beeck and Kleinman [54], Lairson and Herd [65] and Scotti et al. [89], all
analyzing how patients separate themselves among types of managed care plans.
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seeks medical care. Therefore, the use of contracts by MCOs to share risk with
physicians is not considered here. MCO-physician contracts, however, do play a role
in the sharing of risk among actors in health care markets. The explanation behind
contract composition within a particular jurisdiction must take this motivation into
account.
In sum, policy makers should be wary about using the results provided here to
construct remedies for the imperfections of health care markets. The analysis is
just one step toward understanding the very complex nature of health care markets.
Until the basic elements of behavior are well understood, however, we run the risk of
designing policies leading to perverse behavior by market actors.
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Chapter 4 Some Empirical Tests
4.1 Introduction
Almost every state in the U.S. has implemented some sort of tort reform geared
directly toward medical malpractice litigation.1 Many state legislatures were driven
to act by perceived medical malpractice insurance crises during the 1970s and 80s.2
Conventional theories regarding tort reform suggest that reducing the spoils from
litigation will reduce the tendency of injured patients to file claims against health
care providers. This, in turn, will reduce the amount insurance companies pay out to
cover claims, leading to a reduction in medical malpractice insurance premiums.
The theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 suggests that conventional theories
might not account fully for how tort reforms influence behavior in health care markets.
For example, statutory damage caps3 affect not only injured patients’ filing decisions
but also physician treatment decisions. When deciding whether to provide compli-
ant treatment, physicians consider the cost of compliant treatment versus ex ante
expected damages given non-compliant treatment. Under certain conditions, when
damages are reduced the level of compliant treatment provided decreases. When
physicians (or MCOs) lower the level of care, the number of injuries resulting from
negligent medical care will likely increase. In addition, injured patients will consider
the physicians’ incentives when deciding whether to expend resources to file a claim.
An injured patient’s decision to file depends, in part, on her belief that the physician
was negligent. Although the patient is unable to observe the physician’s action, she
1See Kinney [60] for a summary of state statutes addressing medical malpractice litigation.
2Many argue that the country was, indeed, experiencing true medical malpractice insurance
crises. Others argued that the changes were merely adjustments toward an equilibrium arising from
the changing characteristics of health care markets. See Bhat [11] for a discussion of the debate over
whether actual crises occurred.
3Statutory damage caps limit the total damages an injured patient can recover by filing a claim
against a health care provider.
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forms beliefs about “guilt” by considering the physician’s incentives. Knowing that
the physician expects to pay less in damages if found liable by the court, an injured
patient is more likely to believe that the physician failed to meet the standard of care.
For these reasons, the model predicts that, under certain conditions, damage caps will
cause an increase in claim rates and, in some cases, ex ante expected damages.
The theoretical model also considers the effects of another, quite different, le-
gal rule designed not to address medical malpractice, but to provide information to
prospective enrollees during the health care insurance plan selection process. Cur-
rently, roughly 20 states require MCOs to disclose to current (and/or prospective)
enrollees the types of contracts they use to obtain medical services from health care
providers.4 Nothing indicates that legislators considered the effects of mandatory dis-
closure laws on litigation and treatment decisions. The theoretical model presented in
Chapter 3 suggests that disclosure laws, indeed, do affect the behavior of health care
providers and injured patients. In particular, the model predicts that states forcing
the disclosure of contract terms will experience fewer claims filed against health care
providers and more compliant treatment. When contracts are unobservable, injured
patients must file claims to encourage MCOs/physicians to compliantly treat. On
the other hand, when contracts are observable, injured patients can infer from the
contract terms whether the physician provided negligent care; thus, lawsuits become
unnecessary in some cases and the filing rate decreases. With respect to treatment,
when contracts are unobservable the cost of compliant treatment always includes
damages (i.e., some injured patients will sue in all cases). More compliant care is
provided when contracts are observable because it is less costly for the MCO than
when contracts are unobservable. When injured patients are able to observe the con-
tract they never sue when the contract encourages compliant treatment. Therefore,
the cost of compliant treatment includes only the costs related to the treatment.5
The purpose of this empirical study is to test the model’s predictions regarding the
effects of damage caps and disclosure laws on total ex ante expected damages result-
4See infra Section 4.2.
5See supra Chapter 3, Section 5 for a more detailed explanation of the intuitions behind these
results.
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ing from medical malpractice lawsuit verdicts and settlements. Data on aggregated
medical malpractice premiums and incurred losses were collected for all 50 states
for the years 1991–2001. These measures are used as proxies for ex ante expected
damages.
It is important to keep in mind that this study does not tackle the issue of whether
these legal rules are socially desirable. An evaluation of this magnitude would require
a much broader study of the impacts of each legal rule and the costs and benefits
of changes in legal environments. For example, mandatory disclosure laws provide
benefits to enrollees in the form of increased information during the managed care
plan selection process. In addition, disclosure rules might interfere with the pa-
tient/physician relationship in a negative way. The formal model does not account
for these benefits and costs. Without considering these effects (and others), normative
judgments regarding changes in legal rules are limited.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides background informa-
tion regarding the origination and implementation of mandatory disclosure law and
damage caps. Section 4.3 uses the theoretical results from Chapter 3 to formulate pre-
dictions about how changes in legal rules (i.e., mandatory disclosure laws and damage
caps) affect ex ante expected damages. First, the model predicts that states forcing
disclosure of contract terms will experience (weakly) lower ex ante expected damages
than states without disclosure laws in effect. Second, the model shows that the effect
of damage caps on ex ante expected damages depends on several parameters. It is
possible that a cap could increase or decrease ex ante expected damages. The effect
also depends on whether contracts are observable by injured patients. These results
differ from conventional theory, which predicts that damage caps will lead to a de-
crease in ex ante expected damages. Therefore, the theoretical model presented in
Chapter 3 offers an explanation in the case that the empirical results do not support
conventional theory.
Section 4.4 provides the empirical analysis with details regarding the data em-
ployed, model specification and empirical estimations. The empirical results support
the prediction that disclosure laws (weakly) decrease ex ante expected damages. The
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results are mixed when it comes to the implementation of damage caps. Section 4.5
offers conclusions and discussion.
4.2 Background
This section provides some background into the genesis of mandatory disclosure laws
and damage caps.
4.2.1 Mandatory Disclosure Laws
As of 2001, 21 states require MCOs to disclose information regarding physician com-
pensation methods to enrollees.6 In 1996, Arizona became the first to implement
a mandatory disclosure law and, in that year, Vermont, Virginia and Washington
followed Arizona’s lead. In 1997, four additional states (Maine, New York, North
Carolina and Rhode Island) implemented similar rules. Connecticut, Kentucky and
New Jersey followed suit in 1998. Several states (Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania and South Dakota) jumped on the band wagon in 1999. California,
Illinois and New Hampshire passed mandatory disclosure laws that went into effect in
2000. Finally, Massachusetts most recently passed a mandatory disclosure law, which
went into effect in 2001.
Disclosure rules vary by content and timing requirements. In terms of content,
some states require very little detail. For example, Iowa’s statute mandates dis-
closure of “methodologies used to compensate physicians.” Hawaii mandates that
“managed care plan[s] shall provide generic participating provider contracts to en-
rollees....” Connecticut requires MCOs to issue a “written statement of the types of
financial arrangements or contractual provisions that the managed care organization
has with...physicians...including, but not limited to, compensation based on a fee-for-
service arrangement, a risk-sharing arrangement or a capitated risk arrangement.”
These statutes do not provide any other detail regarding content of the disclosure.
6See Table A.1 in the Appendix for cites to each state’s statute.
95
Other states require substantial detail. For instance, Illinois requires MCOs to
disclose “the percentage of copayments, deductibles, and total premiums spent on
health care related expenses and the percentage of copayments, deductibles, and
total premiums spent on other expenses, including administrative expenses....” Maine
requires MCOs to disclose “a general description of the methods used to compensate
providers, including capitation and methods in which providers receive compensation
based upon referrals, utilization or cost criteria.”
A small number of states require disclosure of information regarding the con-
tracts of particular physicians or physician groups, or for the provision of particular
medical services (e.g., referrals). For instance, New York requires MCOs to disclose
“a description prepared annually of the types of methodologies the insurer uses to
reimburse providers specifying the type of methodology that is used to reimburse
particular types of providers or reimburse for the provision of particular types of ser-
vices....” California requires disclosure of a “description regarding whether, and in
what manner, the bonuses and any other incentives are related to a provider’s use
of referral services.” Georgia mandates the disclosure of a “summary of any agree-
ments or contracts between the managed care plan and any health care provider or
hospital.” Georgia’s statute, however, does not require the summary to include finan-
cial agreements as to actual rates, reimbursements, charges or fees negotiated by the
managed care plan and any health care provider or hospital. Illinois requires health
care plans to “provide to enrollees a description of the financial relationships between
the health care plan and any health care provider....” Similar to Georgia, however,
MCOs do not have to disclose specific provider reimbursement.
The disclosure statutes also vary according to the timing of disclosure. New
Hampshire health carriers must provide information regarding provider contracts to
covered persons in the evidence of coverage (i.e., in the contract between the MCO
and the enrollee). Some states (e.g., Arizona) require disclosure to be made prior
to the execution of a contract between the MCO and an enrollee. Other states,
including Connecticut, also require disclosure during open enrollment periods. Min-
nesota requires disclosure “during open enrollment, upon enrollment, and annually
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thereafter....” Vermont requires disclosure only to members (presumably after they
contract with the carrier for health coverage).
Other states mandate enrollment in some cases only upon request. Hawaii and Illi-
nois mandate disclosure to enrollees upon request. Georgia and Pennsylvania require
disclosure to both enrollees and prospective enrollees upon request. Massachusetts
requires disclosure to “at least one adult insured in each household upon enrollment,
and to a prospective insured upon request....” New York and North Carolina also re-
quire disclosure to each enrollee and, upon request, to each prospective enrollee prior
to enrollment.
Although timing and content of disclosures vary by state, the reasons for passing
disclosure laws are similar. Rather than actually regulating the types of contracts
MCOs may use to obtain medical services for their enrollees, states use disclosure
laws to force MCOs to provide information to enrollees (or prospective enrollees) so
that they can make informed decisions during the plan selection process (Hellinger
[50]). If a consumer does not favor the general structure of provider contracts an
MCO employs, the consumer can either choose not to enroll in the plan. In addition,
disclosure serves important policy goals. Miller and Horowitz [73] point out that
“[d]isclosure of a conflict of interest between physicians and their patients could satisfy
the fiduciary duty owed by physicians, promote patient autonomy and preserve the
integrity of the physician/patient relationship.”
Although mandatory contract disclosure is intended to provide prospective en-
rollees with information when choosing health plans (among other reasons), it also
affects MCO contract choices, physician treatment decisions and litigation decisions
by injured patients. Section 4.3 outlines the theory behind these claims.
4.2.2 Damage Caps
During the 1970s and 80s many states were experiencing medical malpractice insur-
ance crises. Several insurers pulled out of the medical malpractice insurance business,
resulting in a shortage of medical malpractice insurance. In addition, many physicians
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stopped practicing in high risk fields such as obstetrics because the cost of practic-
ing in such areas was prohibitively expensive as medical malpractice insurance rates
skyrocketed.
This led state legislators to implement tort reforms related to medical malpractice
litigation. The idea was that if the spoils from litigation were reduced, injured patients
would find it less rewarding to file claims against physicians. This would result in
fewer claims and a resulting decrease in medical malpractice insurance premiums.
In 1975, California legislators passed the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act (commonly known as “MIRCA”) to address the medical malpractice insurance
crisis in their state.7 In addition to other sorts of tort reforms, MICRA includes a
$250,000 cap on non-economic damages.8
MICRA became a model law that several states implemented thereafter. In addi-
tion to limiting recovery of non-economic damages, some state legislators capped the
amount of economic and punitive damages an injured patient could recover by filing
a claim against a physician or MCO. Table A.2 in the Appendix provides information
regarding the implementation of damage caps by state.
The following section fleshes out a theory that challenges the conventional conjec-
ture that damage caps necessarily lead to a decrease in ex ante expected damages.
4.3 Theory and Predictions
This section summarizes the theoretical results from Chapter 3 regarding how manda-
tory disclosure laws and damage caps affect claim rates and compliant treatment
rates.
7Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, ch. 1, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, Cal. Civ. Code, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, Cal. Ins.
Code).
8Cal. Civ. Code §3333.2(b) (West 1997). Non-economic damages include losses from pain and
suffering.
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4.3.1 Mandatory Disclosure Laws
Recall from Chapter 3 that mandatory disclosure laws directly impact claim rates
(i.e., the likelihood that an injured patient will file a claim with a court to recover
damages) and compliant treatment rates. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 summarize exactly how
mandatory disclosure laws affect these actions given particular treatment costs and
total damages.
Treatment
Costs
If disclosure,
γ*=0.
If no disclosure, 
γ*=1.
Total Damages
Litigation
Costs
(fixed)
γ*=1
γ*=0
If disclosure, γ*=0.
If no disclosure, γ*>0.
Figure 4.1: This graph illustrates the differences in claim rates related to different dis-
closure rules. It employs the same parameters as Figure 3.3. Recall that the patient’s
equilibrium probability of suing is represented by γ∗.
This chapter focuses on the claim rate prediction. Proposition 3 of Chapter 3
states that, given (1) the cost of compliant treatment, (2) the probability of a positive
outcome given compliant treatment, (3) the probability of a positive outcome given
non-compliant treatment, (4) expected litigation costs and (5) expected damages,
claim rates in a regime with observable contracts (i.e., mandatory disclosure regimes)
will be less than (or equal to) claim rates in regimes with unobservable contracts (i.e.,
regimes not requiring disclosure). This result can be extended to reveal predictions
regarding how ex ante expected damages react to changes in total damages.
The empirical analysis presented in the following section attempts to study the
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Treatment
Costs
If disclosure,
β*=m.
If no disclosure,
β*=0.
Total DamagesLitigation
Costs
(fixed)
β*=0
β*=0
β*=m
Figure 4.2: This graph illustrates the differences in compliant treatment rates related to
different disclosure rules. It employs the same parameters as Figure 3.4. Recall that β∗
represents the physician’s equilibrium probability of compliantly treating and m represents
the physician’s cut-off point (i.e., the probability of compliantly treating such that the
patient is indifferent between suing and not suing). See supra Section 3.5 for details
regarding the equilibrium of the model.
relationship between disclosure laws and ex ante expected damages. The study uses
average medical malpractice insurance premiums per non-federal physician as a proxy
for ex ante expected damages (assuming that other factors influencing premiums are
held constant). Premiums are, in large part, determined by ex ante expected dam-
ages calculated using both the likelihood of claims filed by injured patients and total
damages incurred from settlements and lost court cases (Bhat [11]). Therefore, the
study, in effect, tests for whether disclosure laws reduce ex ante expected damages.
According to the model presented in Chapter 3, ex ante expected damages (repre-
sented here by A) are equal to the probability that the physician negligently treated
(1−β∗) multiplied by the probability of a negative outcome given negligent treatment
(1− q) multiplied by the probability the injured patient files a claim given an injury
(γ∗) multiplied by the damage award received during settlement or awarded by the
court (D). In other words, A = (1− β∗)(1− q)γ∗D.
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Treatment
Costs
If disclosure,
A = 0.
If no disclosure,
A= (1-q)D > 0.
Total Damages
(D)
Litigation
Costs
(fixed)
A = 0
If disclosure, 
A = 0.
If no disclosure, 
A= (1-β*)(1-q)γ*D > 0.
A= (1-q)D > 0
Figure 4.3: This graph illustrates the differences in ex ante expected damages caused by
different disclosure rules. The figure combines Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The patient’s equi-
librium probability of filing a claim is represented by γ∗ and the physician’s equilibrium
probability of providing treatment that complies with the legal standard of care is repre-
sented by β∗. According to the theoretical model, ex ante expected damages generally are
given by A = (1− β∗)(1− q)γ∗D.
The theory presented in Chapter 3 supports the claim that regimes requiring dis-
closure will experience not only lower claim rates, but also lower ex ante expected
damages. The claim that disclosure regimes observe lower ex ante expected dam-
ages is shown by examining Figures 4.1 and 4.2 simultaneously. Figure 4.3 provides
predictions regarding ex ante expected damages (A) for each region of the graph by
considering the patient’s equilibrium probability of filing a claim and the physician’s
equilibrium probability of providing compliant treatment.
Consider each region of the graph.9 When litigation costs (L) exceed total damages
(D), the patient will never sue, regardless of the disclosure rule. In addition, if the
(total damages, treatment costs) pair lies in the region above the shaded region, then
the physician will not provide compliant treatment (i.e., β∗ = 0). In this case, the
patient sues with certainty (i.e., γ∗ = 1), regardless of the disclosure law. Therefore,
for (total damages, treatment costs) pairs in these regions, ex ante expected damages
9See Chapter 3 for detailed explanations of the model’s theoretical predictions.
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given observable contracts are equal to ex ante expected damages given unobservable
contracts.
Next, consider (total damages, treatment costs) pairs lying in the shaded region.
In regimes mandating disclosure, the physician will provide compliant treatment at
a level such that injured patients will never sue. Therefore, if disclosure is required,
ex ante expected damages are equal to zero. If, on the other hand, disclosure is not
required, then the physician will not provide compliant care (i.e., β∗ = 0) and the
patient will sue with certainty (i.e., γ∗ = 1). Thus, in regimes without disclosure
laws, ex ante expected damages are equal to (1− q)D, which is greater than zero. So,
for all (total damages, treatment costs) pairs in the shaded region, ex ante expected
damages in regimes that force disclosure are less than ex ante expected damages in
regime that do not.
Finally, consider (total damages, treatment costs) pairs lying below the shaded
region. Again, ex ante expected damages will be greater if contract disclosure is
not required. In regimes mandating disclosure, the physician will provide compliant
treatment at a level such that injured patients never sue. Therefore, when contracts
are observable, ex ante expected damages are equal to zero. On the other hand,
in regimes without mandatory disclosure laws, injured patients will sue with some
positive probability and physicians will treat with some probability. Therefore, in
these regimes, ex ante expected damages are equal to (1 − β∗)(1 − q)γ∗D, which is
strictly greater than zero.
Individual analysis of each region of the graph demonstrates that regimes requiring
disclosure will experience lower ex ante expected damages than regimes not requir-
ing disclosure. Therefore, the model presented in Chapter 3 predicts that medical
malpractice insurance premiums should be lower in regimes requiring disclosure.10
Recall from the previous section that disclosure laws vary substantially in terms
of timing and content requirements. These differences, however, do not alter the
predictions of the model with respect to ex ante expected damages. First, differences
in timing requirements are irrelevant as long as the injured patient is able to obtain
10Note that this prediction is true regardless of whether a damage cap is in effect.
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information about contracts at the time she is considering filing a claim. In all states
mandating disclosure, enrollees are able to obtain this information after an injury has
occurred. Second, differences in content requirements will not alter the prediction
because even states with very limited content requirements force general disclosure of
the types of provider contracts used by MCOs. Any information regarding the types
of provider contracts employed will alter injured patients’ beliefs about whether the
MCO encouraged, and the physician provided, compliant medical care.11
4.3.2 Damage Caps
The effect of damage caps on ex ante expected damages can be analyzed similarly. The
results, however, are not as clear-cut. Examining Figures 4.1 and 4.2 simultaneously
leads to the conclusion that imposing damage caps might lead to an increase or
decrease in ex ante expected damages. In addition, the prediction will differ depending
on whether a disclosure rule is in effect.
Consider the case in which contracts are observable. Two cases must be analyzed
separately. First, assume that the cost of treatment (c) is less than the cost of treat-
ment (cˆ) corresponding to the level of total expected damages that minimizes the
function used to find the MCO’s cutoff point (i.e., the point at which the MCO is in-
different between encouraging compliant treatment and encouraging no treatment).12
Figure 3.6 shows that under this condition, the patient never sues. Therefore, a
change in damages will not affect ex ante expected damages.
Second, assume that c > cˆ. Recall Figure 3.5, which demonstrates how an in-
jured patient’s probability of suing responds to changes in total damages. Figure 4.4
demonstrates how ex ante expected damages react to changes in total damages when
c > cˆ. The figure reveals that ex ante expected damages could increase, decrease
or remain unchanged after the imposition of a damage cap. When total damages
are low relative to treatment costs, injured patients never sue. Therefore, ex ante
11Note also that the theoretical model assumes that (total damages, treatment costs) pairs are
similarly distributed in regimes that force disclosure and in those that do not. There is no reason
to believe that this is not the case.
12See Section 3.5.1 for a derivation and discussion of cˆ.
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Ex Ante 
Expected 
Damages
Total DamagesLitigation
Costs
(fixed)
Figure 4.4: This graph illustrates how ex ante expected damages adjust to changes in
damage levels in regimes mandating disclosure of physician contracts. The graph assumes
that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 80%, the prob-
ability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40%, litigation costs are
$100 and the cost of compliant treatment is $200.
expected damages are equal to zero. As total damages increase, the MCO switches to
a capitated contract and the physician never treats. In equilibrium, injured patients
always sue, and ex ante expected damages are equal to the probability of a negative
outcome given non-compliant treatment (1 − q) times total damages (D). As total
damages increase in this range, ex ante expected damages increase linearly. When
total damages increase so much that the MCO finds it in its best interest to encourage
treatment, then physicians compliantly treat at a high enough rate such that injured
patients never sue. Therefore, ex ante expected damages drop to, and remain at,
zero.
Similar conclusions are drawn with respect to changes in ex ante expected damages
given the imposition of a damage cap when contracts are unobservable. Figure 4.5
demonstrates specifically how ex ante expected damages react to changes in damages
in regimes that do not force disclosure of physician contracts. The figure illustrates
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the ambiguity of the theoretical prediction. When total damages are low, the patient
never sues; therefore, ex ante expected damages are equal to zero. As total damages
increase, the MCO finds it optimal to discourage the physician from treating. In equi-
librium, the patient will sue with certainty, and ex ante expected damages are equal to
(1− q)D, which will increase linearly as total damages increase. This continues until
damages reach a high enough level such that the MCO finds it optimal to encourage
some level of compliant treatment. Unlike the observable contract case, however, ex
ante expected damages do not drop to zero. When contracts are unobservable, in-
jured patients will sue with some positive probability less than certainty. Therefore,
ex ante expected damages will fall and will decrease as total damages increase.
Ex Ante 
Expected 
Damages
Total   
Damages
Litigation
Costs
(fixed)
Figure 4.5: This graph illustrates how ex ante expected damages adjust to changes in
damage levels in regimes that do not mandate disclosure of physician contracts. The graph
assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 80%, the
probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40%, litigation costs
are $100 and the cost of compliant treatment is $100.
Given these results, it is impossible to make a clear prediction regarding how ex
ante expected damages will shift as total damages are reduced. It could be that ex
ante expected damages decrease. It is also possible that ex ante expected damages
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might increase. Given the relationship between total damages and ex ante expected
damages illustrated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, the imposition of a damage cap is most
likely to result in an increase (or no change) in ex ante expected damages because
caps most likely affect only cases that would have resulted in higher total damages
than the amount specified by the cap. Therefore, unless the cap is so restrictive that
total damages fall below litigation costs, caps most likely will cause an increase in ex
ante expected damages.
In addition, while it is impossible to make a definite prediction regarding the
effect of damage caps, the empirical results are still of interest. Previous conjectures
suggest that damage caps lead to a decrease in ex ante expected damages.13 These
conjectures consider only part of the story, however. Therefore, if the empirical results
reveal that ex ante expected damages actually increase (or remain the same) with the
implementation of a damage cap, then the theory presented in Chapter 3 would offer
an explanation for such a result.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
This section describes the data used to calculate empirical estimates and the specifica-
tion of the empirical model. In addition, empirical estimations of the test equation are
provided. Finally, empirical estimations of alternative specifications are presented.
4.4.1 Data Description
The goal of this empirical analysis is to test whether disclosure laws and damage caps
are significantly related to ex ante expected damages. The analysis uses a data set
containing information from all 50 states for each year during the period 1991–2001.
Medical malpractice insurance premiums aggregated by state and normalized by the
number of non-federal physicians in patient care are used as a proxy for ex ante
13See, e.g., Danzon [29], Sloan [94] and Zuckerman et al. [103] (discussing conjectures that capping
damages will lead to a decrease in the number of lawsuits).
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expected damages.14 Presumably, if total ex ante expected damages increase, then
medical malpractice insurance premiums likely will increase to cover the increase in
claims (all else held constant).
Using premiums as a proxy for ex ante expected damages has some limitations.
First, the average lag from the filing of a claim to disposition ranges from 3.5 years
to 6.5 years depending on the type of claim (Bhat [11]). The procedure for setting
premiums might account for this lag. Sloan [94] reports, however, that around 90
percent of the response of premiums to a change in a particular legal rule takes place
in the year following the change.
Second, it is likely that losses paid by medical malpractice insurers to cover dam-
ages won by injured patients through litigation or settlement would be a better proxy
for ex ante expected damages than premiums. Data on this variable by state, however,
are not available.15
Finally, the theory developed in Chapter 3 applies only to those insured by man-
aged care plans. In 1991, roughly 36% of the U.S. population was enrolled in some
form of managed care plan. By 2001, managed care plans insured approximately 67%
of the U.S. population.16 The vast majority not covered by managed care plans are
enrolled in traditional indemnity plans, under which the health insurer has virtually
no control over the physician’s treatment choices. The incentives of physicians treat-
ing patients covered by indemnity insurance plans most likely are more aligned with
the patient’s interests than those of physicians treating patients covered by managed
care plans because the physician does not bear the cost of treatment when the pa-
tient is covered by indemnity insurance. Therefore, treatment and litigation decisions
differ greatly from those made when the patient is enrolled in a managed care plan.
For purposes of the empirical study, data on medical malpractice insurance premiums
14Bhat [11] states that “premiums are calculated using the probabilities of claims and payment
amounts and attorney fees.” See also Sloan [94].
15Results are provided using losses incurred as a proxy for ex ante expected damages. Losses are
a measure of the amount paid out by insurance companies for claims against insured physicians won
by injured patients though settlements or judgments. See infra Section 4.4.3.
16These figures were calculated using annual MCO enrollment data published by the American
Association of Health Plans and annual U.S. population data published by the U.S. Census Bureau.
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will capture changes to behavior related to both types of health insurance. As more
of the U.S. population participates in managed care, however, the empirical results
should gravitate toward the theoretical predictions.
Aggregated medical malpractice premiums were obtained from the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”). The data were taken from the NAIC’s
“Report on Profitability by Line and by State” for each year during the period 1991
through 2001. The NAIC obtains the data from annual statements filed with the or-
ganization by a large portion of the property/casualty insurers in the U.S. The NAIC
reports that the data comprise well in excess of 95 percent of the premiums written
in the U.S.17 The insurers not filing with the NAIC tend to be small, single-state
companies. Data from joint underwriting associations, state funds and nonadmitted
insurers are included in the report only if they file with the NAIC.18
Information on disclosure laws and damage caps was collected using actual state
statutes. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix contain details on the statutes by
state, including the year each statute went into effect and cites to individual state
mandatory disclosure statutes. The legal rules are coded as dummy variables, taking
on a value of 1 if the legal rule was in effect in state i and in year t, and 0 otherwise.
The variables are summarized in Table 4.1. All dollar-dependent variables have
been deflated to 1990 dollars.
It should be noted that the theoretical model makes predictions regarding ex ante
expected damages based on total damages paid by MCOs and physicians. The data,
however, capture only claims paid by physicians. Regardless, this measure closely
approximates total damages given that only seven states allowed medical malpractice
suits against MCOs during the period under consideration.19 In addition, most of
17Physician-owned and directed professional liability companies insure a large portion of physicians
against medical malpractice claims (Johnson, [56]). These insurers report to the NAIC; therefore,
premiums written by these insurers are included in the data analyzed here.
18In 1996, less than 10 percent of medical malpractice insurance was written by joint underwriting
associations (Maxwell [71]).
19Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §88 (West 1997) (effective September 1, 1997); Ga.
Code Ann. §51-1-48 (effective July 1, 1999); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, §6593 (West 2002)
(effective July 1, 2000); Ariz.Rev. Stat. Ann. §20-3153 (West 2002) (effective January 1, 2001);
Cal. Civ. Code §3428 (West 2003) (effective January 1, 2001); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
24-A, §4313 (West 2002) (effective January 1, 2001); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §48.43.545 (West
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Variable Descriptions
Variable Mnemonic Mean Standard Definition Source
Deviation
Dependent Variables:
Medical Malpractice PREM $8,472 $3,060 Medical malpractice insurance National Association
Premiums Earned premiums per non-federal of Insurance
physician in patient care Commissioners
Medical Malpractice LOSS $5,428 $3,987 Medical Malpractice insurance National Association
Losses Incurred losses per non-federal of Insurance
physician in patient care Commissioners
Independent Variables:
Disclosure Law DISCL 0.15 0.35 Disclosure Law Statutes
dummy variables
Damage Cap CAP 0.68 0.47 Damage Cap Statutes
dummy variables
Table 4.1: This table provides a summary of the variables employed in the empirical
analysis along with summary statistics, descriptions and the source of each variable.
these states did not allow suits against MCOs until late in the period.
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics on trends of normalized medical malprac-
tice insurance premiums by year. The unit of observation is aggregated premiums
normalized by the number of non-federal physicians in patient care.20 All dollar values
are adjusted to 1990 dollars.
4.4.2 Model Specification
To test whether disclosure laws and damage caps are significantly related to ex ante
expected damages, the following random effects linear model with an AR(1) distur-
bance was estimated:
ln(PREMit)=α+φ1DISCLit+φ2CAPit+φ3(DISCLit∗CAPit)+λY EARit+νi+it
i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., Ti
where
2003) (effective July 1, 2001)
20Data on the number of physicians in patient care by state and by year were collected from the
American Medical Association [2]. Data from 1991 were not available, however. An estimate for
each state was formed by taking the average of the number of physicians in patient care in 1990 and
the number of physicians in patient care in 1992.
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Trends in Insurance Premiums
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
1991 $9,503 $9,471 $1,513 $18,918
1992 $9,314 $9,610 $1,567 $17,708
1993 $9,018 $8,636 $1,329 $17,295
1994 $9,462 $9,089 $2,429 $15,904
1995 $9,075 $8,659 $1,391 $15,580
1996 $8,489 $7,938 $1,294 $15,194
1997 $7,785 $7,274 $1,304 $13,786
1998 $7,941 $7,868 $1,524 $13,284
1999 $7,651 $7,549 $1,733 $12,924
2000 $7,360 $7,116 $1,840 $13,519
2001 $7,595 $7,316 $2,142 $15,727
Table 4.2: This table provides descriptive statistics on trends for medical malprac-
tice insurance premiums per non-federal physician in patient care. Premiums are
reported in 1990 dollars.
PREMit = aggregated medical malpractice insurance premiums earned (in 1990
dollars) normalized by the number of non-federal physicians in patient care in state
i during year t,
α = the intercept,
φ1, φ2, φ3 and λ represent estimated coefficients of the model,
DISCLit = 1 if state i had a disclosure law in effect during year t and 0 otherwise,
CAPit = 1 if state i had a damage cap of any sort in effect during year t and 0
otherwise,
YEARit represents each observation’s year (i.e., YEARit = 1 for 1991 observations,
2 for 1992 observations, etc.),
νi = state-specific disturbances,
21
it = ρi,t−1 + ηit = non-state-specific disturbances, where ρ = the autocorrelation
21The random-effects model assumes that νi are realizations of an independent and identically
distributed process with mean 0 and variance σ2ν .
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parameter22 and ηit is distributed as N(0, σ
2
η) and is independent of other errors over
time (as well as being independent of ).
Functional Form. Logarithmic transformations of the dollar-dependent variables,
PREM and LOSS, are used to correct for their skewed distributions. This transfor-
mation also decreases the effect that outliers might have on the estimation results
and accounts for the fact that the distribution of premiums is naturally truncated
(i.e., all observations on premiums are strictly positive).
Dynamic Nature of Premiums. A particular state’s prior year premiums per physi-
cian is likely a good predictor of the current year’s premiums per physician. Events
affecting premiums, such as changes in the law and the competitive environment of
the insurance industry, tend to occur slowly over time. Therefore, the set of condi-
tions in a particular state affecting premiums are likely to be very similar from one
year to the next. Typically a lagged dependent variable is used to control for this
feature when time-series data are used. With panel-data sets, however, the inclusion
of a lagged dependent variable can be quite problematic.23 Therefore, to account
for the dynamic nature of premiums, a variable for the year, YEARit, is included as
an independent variable. The coefficient on this variable (λ) represents the general
time trend in the data. Specifically it will capture the average percentage change in
premiums from year to year.
Heterogeneity Across States. When using panel data, it is possible that the distur-
bances include a component common to all states (which is time-invariant and orthog-
onal to the regressors). Using a random effects estimator controls for these effects.24
22This parameter measure the correlation between it and i,t−1.
23See Hsiao [51] for a discussion of dynamic models with variable intercepts (describing why es-
timates are bias under these conditions). The bias of coefficients worsens as the number of time
periods decreases. Note that Gius [41] employs a random effects specification with a lagged depen-
dent variable, but does not account for the issues described here. His coefficients are possibly biased
due to the specification of his model. His data set, however, includes 15 time periods; thus, the bias
might be minimal.
24Virtually identical results were obtained when estimates were computed using a fixed effects
estimator. A Hausman specification test (Hausman [47]) indicated that the difference in coefficients
estimated using a random-effects model are not systematically different from the coefficients esti-
mated using a fixed-effects model (i.e., the state-specific disturbances are not correlated with the
regressors). Therefore, the random-effects specification seems appropriate. In addition, the Breusch
and Pagan [17] lagrangian multiplier test results indicate the presence of random effects.
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Most other empirical studies of medical malpractice insurance premiums account for
differences between states by adding several control variables to the empirical model
(e.g., differences in tort reforms, insurance regulations, access to lawyers, age distri-
bution of the population, etc.). The theories regarding how these variables interact
with one another and how they should enter the empirical model, however, are not
well developed. When using a relatively small number of observations, including a
large number of independent variables calls into question the model’s results. There-
fore, rather than specifying a model with several independent variables, the present
study employs a random-effects model to account more generally for variations across
states.
Serial Correlation of the Disturbances. Given the nature of data on premiums,
serial correlation of the disturbances is expected.25 First, the lag in closing claims
might induce strong correlation across years. Also, insurers might not be able to
set premiums freely in any given year. Insurance regulations in some states might
restrict changes to premiums from year to year. That insurance regulations are not
included in the empirical model might cause serial correlation of the disturbances.26
To account for this feature of the data, a linear model with an AR(1) disturbance
was used.27
It should be noted that estimation from first differences was attempted but un-
successful. The minimal variation in independent variables during the time period
under consideration probably led to this result (e.g., of 550 observations on change
in disclosure law, only 21 observations indicate a change).
Interaction Term. The interaction term, DISCLit∗CAPit, captures the fact that
caps might affect premiums differently for states with disclosure laws in place than
25In fact, a Breusch [18] – Godfrey [42] test indicates significant autocorrelation in the disturbances
when premiums are regressed on the independent variables.
26Other studies correct for autocorrelation in the presence of controls for random effects. See, e.g.,
Baltagi and Griffin [6], Jalan and Ravallion [55] and Egger [31].
27An AR(1) disturbance specification assumes that the disturbance term is first-order autoregres-
sive. Under this specification, each disturbance embodies the entire past history of the η’s with
the most recent observations receiving greater weight than those in the distant past. This is the
most widely used assumption for serial correlation. See Baltagi and Li [7] for a description of the
transformation that circumvents the problem of autocorrelation in an error component model.
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for states not mandating disclosure. The interaction term allows for estimation of
this effect. For example, the percentage change in premiums caused by implementing
a damage cap along with a disclosure law can be calculated as follows:
∂ln(PREMit)
∂CAPit
= φ2 + φ3
Similarly, the interaction term can be used to estimate the percentage change in
premiums caused by implementing a disclosure law in the presence of a damage cap
by considering φ1 + φ3.
4.4.3 Empirical Estimation of the Test Equation
The hypothesis that disclosure laws (weakly) decrease ex ante expected damages is
supported by the data if the coefficient on disclosure laws is significantly less than
(or equal to) zero (i.e., φ1 ≤ 0). This test determines the effect of disclosure laws
in regimes without damage caps in place. To test whether disclosure laws in the
presence of damage caps also (weakly) decrease ex ante expected damages, the sum
of the coefficients on DISCL and (DISCL*CAP) is considered. If φ1 + φ3 ≤ 0, then
the data further support this hypothesis.
Recall that the theoretical model does not make a clear prediction about the
relationship between damage caps and ex ante expected damages. Several previous
studies, however, suggest that damage caps in any environment will lead to a decrease
in ex ante expected damages.28 Therefore, the inquiry is slightly different in this case.
If the coefficient on damages turns out to be greater than or equal to zero (i.e., φ2 ≥ 0),
then the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 can be viewed as a explanation for
the result. On the other hand, if φ2 < 0, then the data here support the conventional
conjecture regarding how damage caps relate to ex ante expected damages. Likewise,
if the sum of the coefficients on damage caps and the interaction term is significantly
less than (or equal to) zero (i.e., φ2 + φ3 ≤ 0), then the model in Chapter 3 can be
viewed as an explanation for this result. Recall that the interaction term indicates
28See the studies discussed in the literature review supra in Chapter 2.
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whether the marginal effect of a damage cap on ex ante expected damages is increased
or decreased when a disclosure law is in effect. Thus, the sum φ2 + φ3 indicates the
relationship between damage caps in the presence of a disclosure law and ex ante
expected damages.
Table 4.3 presents the estimation results for the log premium regression equations.
The first set of results assumes no autocorrelation and the second set assumes sig-
nificant autocorrelation (i.e., AR(1)). The coefficient on YEAR indicates that, on
average, premiums decreased by roughly 2% per year during the period 1991–2001.
The results show that the coefficient on the first variable of interest, DISCL, is
negative and significantly different from zero. This indicates that disclosure laws
significantly decrease premiums. On average, mandatory disclosure laws decrease
premiums by 11.5% on average (8.2% under AR(1)). This result supports the model’s
prediction related to disclosure laws. In addition, an F-test on Ho : φ1+φ3 = 0, reveals
that the effect of a disclosure law in the presence of a damage cap is not statistically
significant at the 10% level.29 This result further supports the prediction regarding
the relationship between disclosure laws and ex ante expected damages.
The empirical results pertaining to the implementation of damage caps are mixed.
An F-test on Ho : φ2 + φ3 = 0 reveals that the effect of damage caps in the presence
of a disclosure law is not statistically significant at the 10% level.30 Therefore, the
conventional theory is not supported by the data. The model presented in this study
offers an explanation as to why damage caps in the presence of a disclosure law do
not have a significant effect on ex ante expected damages.
With respect to damages caps in the absence of a disclosure law, the results
show that damage caps alone decrease premiums by 8.2% on average (under the
assumption of no autocorrelation). The coefficient is statistically significant at the
5% level. This result supports the conventional theory. When autocorrelation of
the non-state-specific disturbances is assumed, however, the coefficient on damage
29The test resulted in a χ2 statistic of 0.13 with a p-value of 0.71. Similar results obtain under
AR(1).
30The test resulted in a χ2 statistic of 0.60 with a p-value of 0.44. Similar results obtain under
AR(1).
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Log Premiums Regression Results, 1991–2001
Random-Effects Linear Model
No Autocorrelation AR(1) Assumed
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
(p value) (p value)
Intercept 51.32∗∗∗ 5.513 9.12∗∗∗ 0.066
(0.000) (0.000)
Disclosure Law −0.115∗∗∗ 0.039 −0.082∗ 0.044
(0.003) (0.064)
Damage Cap −0.082∗∗ 0.042 −0.050 0.046
(0.048) (0.277)
Interaction Term 0.129∗∗ 0.051 0.089 0.058
(0.011) (0.124)
Year −0.021∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.020∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.05 0.04
Wald χ2 117.05∗∗∗ (0.000) 40.35∗∗∗ (0.000)
N 550 550
Table 4.3: This table provides the random-effects linear model results for medical mal-
practice insurance premiums assuming no autocorrelation. Results are also presented for
the model assuming AR(1) disturbances.
S.E. = standard errors.
∗ Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test
∗∗ Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test
∗ ∗ ∗ Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test
115
caps is not statistically different from zero. The result supports the present model’s
prediction.
Losses Incurred. Previous studies use data on insurance company losses incurred
as a proxy for ex ante expected damages.31 Losses are a measure of the amount
paid out by insurance companies for claims against insured physicians won by injured
patients though settlements or judgments. As mentioned, data on actual losses paid
are not available by state. Data on losses incurred, however, are available.
It should be noted that using incurred losses as a proxy for ex ante expected
damages has limitations. Losses incurred might not be a good measure of actual losses
paid because accruals greatly affect this variable. Accruals are made to create reserves
for future losses and are not related to actual losses paid out in the particular year they
are recorded. In fact, 13 of the 550 observations on losses incurred during the period
of interest indicate a negative amount, demonstrating that accruals significantly affect
reported losses incurred in a given year.
Table 4.4 provides estimates of the effects of the legal rules on ex ante expected
damages using the log of losses incurred as a proxy for ex ante expected dam-
ages. A Breusch [17] – Godfrey [42] test revealed no serial correlation of the dis-
turbances; therefore, the model does not adjust for autocorrelation. In addition, a
Breusch/Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test indicates the presence of random effects.
A Hausman test, however, indicates that the differences in coefficients under random
effects and fixed effects are not systematic. Therefore, Table 4.4 provides results for
both random effects and fixed effects. The reported results are virtually identical.
The results for incurred losses are similar to the results obtained using premiums.
The coefficient on DISCL is not significantly different from zero. In addition, an
F-test on Ho : φ1 + φ3 = 0, reveals that DISCL + (DISCL*CAP) is not statisti-
cally different from zero.32 These results support the prediction that disclosure laws
(weakly) decrease ex ante expected damages.
An F-test on Ho : φ2 + φ3 = 0 reveals that the sum of CAP + (DISCL ∗CAP ) is
31See, e.g., Viscusi et al. [100] and Viscusi et al. [101].
32The test resulted in a χ2 statistic of 0.06 with a p-value of 0.81.
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Log Losses Incurred Regression Results, 1991–2001
Random-Effects Linear Model Fixed-Effects Linear Model
No Autocorrelation No Autocorrelation
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
(p value) (p value)
Intercept 8.31∗∗∗ 0.124 8.32∗∗∗ 0.112
(0.000) (0.000)
Disclosure Law −0.078 0.133 −0.054 0.137
(0.560) (0.695)
Damage Cap −0.297∗∗ 0.122 −0.303∗∗ 0.153
(0.015) (0.049)
Interaction Term 0.109 0.175 0.072 0.179
(0.532) (0.686)
Year 0.048∗∗∗ 0.010 0.048∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.05 0.05
Wald χ2 33.75∗∗∗ (0.000) 7.91∗∗∗ (0.000)
N 537 537
Table 4.4: This table provides the random-effects linear model results for medical mal-
practice insurance losses incurred assuming no autocorrelation. In addition, the results
from a fixed effects specification are provided.
S.E. = standard errors.
∗ Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test
∗∗ Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test
∗ ∗ ∗ Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test
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Simple Averages and Medians of Premiums per Physician by Legal Rule
With Rule Without Rule
Legal Rule # Mean Median # Mean Median
Disclosure Law 80 $7,487 $7,128 470 $8,640 $8,034
Damage Cap 372 $8,277 $7,672 178 $8,880 $8,432
Table 4.5: This table provides simple averages and medians for premiums per
physician by legal rule. # indicates the number of observations.
not statistically different from zero.33 This result does not support the conventional
theory regarding damage caps. The present model offers an explanation for the
empirical result.
Finally, the results show that damage caps alone decrease losses incurred by ap-
proximately 30% on average. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level.
This result offers support for the conventional conjecture regarding the relationship
between damage caps and ex ante expected damages. That the empirical result does
not support the model’s prediction (i.e., that damage caps will lead to an increase
in ex ante expected damages) might be due to the specification of the model. The
empirical model does not account for the fact that legal rules directly affect physician
behavior. Using a simultaneous equations model might help in incorporating this
feature of the theoretical model.
Simple Averages. Table 4.5 provides simple averages and medians of medical mal-
practice insurance premiums for states with mandatory disclosure laws and damage
caps and for states without these particular legal rules.
The results are fairly consistent with those presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. States
with disclosure laws in place observe medical malpractice premiums that are, on av-
erage, lower (at the 1% level) than premiums in those states without mandatory
disclosure laws in effect.34 In addition, average premiums in states that have imple-
mented damage caps are lower (at the 5% level) than average premiums in states that
33The test resulted in a χ2 statistic of 0.97 with a p-value of 0.33.
34F statistic = 9.85; p-value = 0.0018.
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do not cap damages.35
Alternative Specification. Zuckerman et al. [103] also studied the effects of damage
caps on premiums. They observed that premiums for a particular year are announced
at the beginning of the year. Therefore, premiums can be influenced only by the
legislation in effect during the prior year. To account for this fact, they regressed
premiums in year t on the legal rules in effect during the year t–1.
Using the present study’s data, the following model was estimated:
ln(PREMit)=α+φ1DISCLit−1+φ2CAPit−1+φ3(DISCLit−1∗CAPit−1)+λY EARit+νi+it
Table 4.6 presents the estimation results for this alternative specification of the
model. The results do not differ substantially from the original specification.
4.5 Conclusion and Discussion
The empirical tests presented in this chapter were performed to test specific predic-
tions of the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3. First, the model predicts that
states forcing MCOs to disclose information regarding physician contracts to enrollees
should experience (weakly) lower ex ante expected damages than states not requiring
contract disclosure. The empirical results support this prediction. The results show
that medical malpractice premiums and incurred losses (proxies for ex ante expected
damages) in states mandating disclosure will be (weakly) lower than premiums and
incurred losses in states not forcing disclosure.
Second, conventional theory suggests that damage caps will decrease ex ante ex-
pected damages because injured patients will have less of an incentive to file a claim.
The theoretical model presented here shows that caps will not necessarily decrease
ex ante expected damages in states that do not force contract disclosure. The empir-
ical results are mixed. The results indicate that caps significantly decrease ex ante
expected damages in states not forcing disclosure (in all specifications except one).
The results, however, also indicate that damage caps in states forcing disclosure do
35F statistic = 4.70; p-value = 0.03.
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Log Premiums Regressed on Prior Year Legal Rules
Random-Effects Linear Model
No Autocorrelation AR(1) Assumed
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
(p value) (p value)
Intercept 9.17∗∗∗ 0.064 9.14∗∗∗ 0.066
(0.000) (0.000)
Disclosure Law(t−1) −0.097
∗∗ 0.040 −0.069 0.047
(0.015) (0.137)
Damage Cap(t−1) −0.095
∗∗ 0.041 −0.076 0.047
(0.021) (0.103)
Interaction Term(t−1) 0.108
∗ 0.055 0.073 0.062
(0.050) (0.238)
Year −0.023∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.020∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.04 0.04
Wald χ2 109.18∗∗∗ (0.000) 39.82∗∗∗ (0.000)
N 500 500
Table 4.6: This table provides the random-effects linear model results assuming no auto-
correlation when log premiums are regressed on legal rules in effect during the prior year.
Results are also presented for the model assuming AR(1) disturbances.
S.E. = standard errors.
∗ Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test
∗∗ Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test
∗ ∗ ∗ Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test
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not significantly affect premiums earned or losses incurred.
The fact that the results indicate that damage caps will decrease ex ante expected
damages (in the incurred losses regressions) might be due to the specification of the
empirical model as compared to the theoretical model described in Chapter 3. The
intuition behind the theoretical results suggests that legal rules affect not only liti-
gation decisions but also treatment decisions. The empirical model does not directly
account for this feature of the theoretical model. To investigate this hypothesis, the
empirical model should be modified to account for this discrepancy. One possibil-
ity would be to employ a simultaneous equations model to first estimate physician
behavior given a set of legal rules and then to estimate premiums given physician
behavior and the same set of legal rules. Additional data would be required to run
this particular specification.
It should be noted that the empirical model does not control for selection effects.
For example, the model does not take into account the fact that states with higher
premiums might implement particular sorts of tort reform (e.g., damage caps) with a
higher probability than states with lower premiums. This probably will not affect the
results of the empirical model for two reasons, however. First, disclosure rules seem to
be exogenous to the system given that states implement them to provide consumers
with more information about health insurance plans during the plan selection process.
Second, if selection effects were at work with respect to damage caps, one might be
worried that states with higher premiums would be more likely to implement damage
caps. The results, though, show the opposite effect: states with damage caps observe
lower premiums, on average, than state without damage caps. Therefore, selection
effects probably do not play a significant role in the results produced by the empirical
analysis.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
Together, the theoretical model and empirical results show that legal rules do, in-
deed, affect the behavior of market actors in systematic ways. The results suggest
that mandatory disclosure laws influence the mix of MCO-physician contracts, in-
crease the rate of compliant treatment and decrease claim rates. In addition, medical
malpractice damage rules and tortfeasor rules provide certain incentives that influence
medical care provider treatment decisions and injured patient litigation decisions.
As mentioned, the methodologies used to study the potential consequences of
legal rules are not without their limitations. The benefits of formal modelling are
tied inextricably to the methodology’s weaknesses. While game theory allows us to
capture essential features of complex situations involving asymmetric information, it
forces us to simplify down to a necessary level of abstraction. Some worry that this
process of simplification renders dubious the predictions of game theoretic models.
These concerns, though, suggest a misunderstanding of what game theory purports
to deliver. Kreps [64] succinctly states the main advantages of game theory: to give
“clear and precise language for communicating insights and notions,” “to subject
particular insights and intuitions to the test of logical consistency,” and “to see what
assumptions are really at the heart of particular conclusions.” In short, game theory
is simply an aid in understanding what will happen in various social contexts, and its
results must be viewed in light of its advantages and limitations.
The use of game theory to study health care regulations demonstrates the com-
plex ways in which the law affects the behavior of market actors. Without a clear
understanding of the complex interactions influenced by changes in the law, legal
rules likely will result in unintended consequences. Concrete steps can be taken to
avoid unintentional effects, though. Policy makers should take full advantage of the
tools of economics, including theoretical models, empirical analysis and economics ex-
periments, to analyze potential consequences of proposed laws before enacting them.
122
Formal analysis and testing can lead to a significant reduction in unintended conse-
quences caused by changes in the law.
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Appendix A Appendix
A.1 Notation
p represents the probability that a positive outcome results given that the physician
provides compliant treatment.
q represents the probability that a positive outcome results given that the physician
provides non-compliant treatment.
β ∈ [0, 1] represents the probability that the physician provides compliant treatment.
γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the probability that the patient decides to file a medical mal-
practice claim given a negative outcome.
α ∈ [0, 1] represents the patient’s belief that the physician provided compliant treat-
ment given a negative outcome.
f represents the fixed wage paid by the MCO to the physician. Assume f ≥ 0.
r represents the amount paid by the MCO to reimburse the physician for treatment
costs. Assume r ≥ 0.
κ = (r, f) represents a contract chosen by the MCO.
c represents the cost incurred by the physician to provide compliant treatment. As-
sume c > 0 if physician provides compliant treatment and c = 0 if not.
L represents the fees incurred by the patient to file and pursue a claim. Assume
L > 0.
Dm represents the damages awarded by the court to be paid by the MCO to the
patient. Assume Dm ≥ 0.
Dp represents the damages awarded by the court to be paid by the physician to the
patient. Assume Dp ≥ 0. Let D = Dm + Dp.
H represents the value of health to the patient if a positive outcome is realized.
Assume H > 0.
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I represents the insurance premium paid by the patient to the MCO to insure against
uncertain health care costs.
A represents ex ante expected damages.
um represents the ex ante expected payout to the MCO.
up represents the ex ante expected payout to the physician.
ui represents the ex ante expected payout to the patient.
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A.2 Equilibrium when Contracts Are Observable
by the Patient
This section provides proofs for claims made in the case when the contract formed
between the MCO and the physician is observable by the patient. Proofs are given
for the case in which patients are allowed to sue both the MCO and the physician
for medical malpractice. The proofs, however, are general and can be modified easily
to develop claims for the other tortfeasor rules: (1) patient can sue physician only
(set Dm = 0 in all cases), and (2) patient can sue MCO only (set Dp = 0 in all
cases). Also, results are given for the case in which total damages exceed litigation
costs. When they do not, the patient will never sue, MCOs will pay nothing to the
physician and the physician will never compliantly treat.1 The first step in solving
for the equilibrium is to analyze the strategies of the patient and physician.
A.2.1 Best Response of Patient to Physician Action
Claim 1 Taking β, q, Dm, Dp, and L as given, the patient’s best response to the
physician’s strategy is as follows:
If β < m, then the patient sues (γ∗ = 1) .
If β = m, then the patient is indifferent (γ∗ ∈ [0, 1]).
If β > m, then the patient does not sue (γ∗ = 0),
where m = (1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)+(1−p)L
.
Proof: Let α represent the patient’s belief that the physician compliantly treated
given a negative outcome. Specifically, α = β(1−p)
β(1−p)+(1−β)(1−q)
. If the patient chooses
not to file a claim, her payoff is simply zero. On the other hand, if the patient files
and pursues a claim, her expected payoff is (1 − α)(Dm + Dp) − L. Therefore, the
patient will sue if and only if (1− α)(Dm + Dp) > L. Substituting for α gives sue if
and only if β < (1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)+)(1−p)L
. 
1The case in which damages equal litigation costs is similarly uninteresting and is not considered
here.
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A.2.2 Best Response of Physician to Patient Action
Claim 2 Taking γ, r, f , c, q and Dp as given, the physician’s best response to the
patient’s strategy is as follows:
If γ > c−r
(1−q)Dp
, then the physician provides compliant treatment (β∗ = 1).
If γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, then the physician is indifferent (β∗ ∈ [0, 1]).
If γ < c−r
(1−q)Dp
, then the physician does not provide compliant treatment (β∗ = 0).
Proof: If the physician decides to provide compliant treatment, his payoff will be
f+r−c. In the event the physician does not, his expected payoff will be f−(1−q)γDp.
Therefore, the physician will provide compliant treatment if and only if r − c >
−(1− q)γDp. Therefore, γ >
c−r
(1−q)Dp
⇔ β = 1. 
A.2.3 Equilibrium of Patient and Physician Behavior
Claim 3 Taking r, f , c, q, Dm, Dp, and L as given, the equilibrium of patient
and physician behavior and best responses to the MCO’s reimbursement terms are as
follows:
If r > c, then β∗ = 1 and γ∗ = 0.
If r = c− γ(1− q)Dp, then (a) β
∗ ∈ (m, 1] and γ∗ = 0, or
(b) β∗ = m and γ∗ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, or
(c) β∗ ∈ [0,m) and γ∗ = 1.
If r < c− (1− q)Dp, then β
∗ = 0 and γ∗ = 1,
where m = (1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)+(1−p)L
.
Proof: Given patient and physician best responses, consider the possible cases:
(1) β = 1 and γ = 1. β = 1 ⇒ α = 1. Therefore, γ = 1 implies L < 0, a
contradiction.
(2) β = 1 and γ ∈ [0, 1]. β = 1 ⇒ α = 1. Therefore, γ ∈ [0, 1] implies L = 0, a
contradiction.
(3) β = 1 and γ = 0. β = 1 ⇒ α = 1. Therefore, γ = 0 implies L > 0, an
assumption of the model. Note that γ = 0 implies c−r
(1−q)Dp
< 0 ⇒ r > c.
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(4) β ∈ [0, 1] and γ = 0. These conditions imply r = c and α > Dm+Dp−L
Dm+Dp
. It is
possible to meet both conditions. Substituting for α gives β > (1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)+(1−p)L
.
(5) β ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 1]. These conditions imply γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
and α =
Dm+Dp−L
Dm+Dp
. It is possible to meet both conditions. Substituting for α gives β =
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)+(1−p)L
.
(6) β ∈ [0, 1] and γ = 1. These conditions imply r = c − (1 − q)Dp and α <
Dm+Dp−L
Dm+Dp
. It is possible to meet both conditions. Substituting for α gives β <
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)+(1−p)L
.
(7) β = 0 and γ = 1. These conditions imply r < c− (1−q)Dp and α <
Dm+Dp−L
Dm+Dp
.
It is possible to meet both conditions.
(8) β = 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1]. β = 0 ⇒ α = 0. This condition implies Dm+Dp−L
Dm+Dp
= 0, a
contradiction.
(9) β = 0 and γ = 0. β = 0 ⇒ α = 0. This condition implies Dm+Dp−L
Dm+Dp
< 0, a
contradiction. 
A.2.4 MCO’s Best Response to Physician and Patient Be-
havior and Resulting Equilibrium Contracts
Proposition 1 Taking c, q, L, Dm and Dp as given, the equilibrium contracts, re-
sulting equilibrium behavior of the patient and the physician and expected payouts are
as follows:
(1) If mc < (1−q)(Dm +Dp), then κ
∗ = (c, 0) with β∗ = m, γ∗ = 0, um = I−mc,
up = 0 and ui = mpH + (1−m)qH − I.
(2) If mc > (1−q)(Dp+Dm), then κ
∗ = (r∗ ≤ c−(1−q)Dp, (1−q)Dp) with β
∗ = 0
and γ∗ = 1, um = I−(1−q)(Dm+Dp), up = 0 and ui = qH+(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)−I.
Proof: The MCO will solve the following maximization problem.
max
(f,r)
I − f − β∗r − (1− β∗)(1− q)γ∗Dm
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subject to (1) f + β∗(r − c)− (1− β∗)(1− q)γ∗Dp ≥ 0
2
(2) β∗ = arg max
β
f ∗ + β(r∗ − c)− (1− β)(1− q)γ∗Dp
(3) γ∗ = arg max
γ
β∗γ(−L) + (1− β∗)γ(Dm + Dp − L)
Consider each case presented in Claim 3:
(1) If the MCO sets r > c, then β∗ = 1 and γ∗ = 0. To meet the physician’s IR
constraint, however, the MCO must set f = c− r < 0, which violates the assumption
that f ≥ 0. Therefore, this contract is unfeasible.
(2) If the MCO sets r = c− (1− q)γDp, consider the following:
(a) β∗ > m and γ∗ = 0
Given that the patient does not sue, r∗ = c. To meet the physician’s IR constraint,
the MCO must set f ∗ = β(c−r) = 0. Because the physician is indifferent between all
effort levels above m, the effort level is set to optimize the MCO’s payoff. Specifically,
the MCO will solve the following problem: maxβ>m I − βc. The MCO prefers the
lowest feasible β. Therefore, the contract specifies r∗ = c and f ∗ = 0. In equilibrium,
β = m + ε (ε small) ⇒ um → I −mc (from below).
(b) β∗ = m and γ∗ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
In this case the MCO sets r∗ = c−(1−q)γDp and f
∗ = m(c−r)+(1−m)(c−r) =
c− r. This contract provides
um = I − (c− r)−mr − (1−m)
(c− r)Dm
Dp
= I − c + r −mr − (1−m)c
Dm
Dp
+ (1−m)r
Dm
Dp
= I − c− (1−m)c
Dm
Dp
+ r(1−m + (1−m)
Dm
Dp
)
2Note that, in equilibrium, the MCO will set the fixed payment, f , and the reimbursement
amount, r, so that up = 0. Therefore, the maximization problem is solved assuming that the
constraint is binding.
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um is increasing in r. Therefore, the MCO prefers to set r as high as possible given
that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
and γ ≥ 0. Therefore, the MCO will set r∗ = c and f ∗ = 0. In
equilibrium, β∗ = m and γ∗ = 0 resulting in um = I −mc.
(c) β∗ < m and γ∗ = 1
Under these conditions, r∗ = c − (1 − q)Dp and f
∗ = (1 − q)Dp. Because the
physician is indifferent between all effort levels below m, the effort level is set to
optimize the MCO’s payoff. Specifically, it will solve the following problem:
max
β<m
I − (1− q)Dp − β(c− (1− q)Dp)− (1− β)(1− q)Dm =
I − (1− q)(Dm + Dp) + β((1− q)(Dm + Dp)− c)
Therefore, the MCO’s preferred probability of treatment depends on the relationship
between c and (1− q)(Dm + Dp):
(i) If c < (1−q)(Dm+Dp) ⇒ the MCO prefers β = m−ε and um = I−(1−q)Dp−
(m−ε)(c− (1− q)Dp)− (1− (m−ε))(1− q)Dm → I−mc− (1−m)(1− q)(Dm +Dp).
(ii) If c = (1− q)(Dm + Dp) ⇒ MCO is indifferent between all β < m (say β = l)
and um = I − lc− (1− l)(1− q)(Dm + Dp) = I − c.
(iii) If c > (1−q)(Dm +Dp) ⇒ the MCO prefers β = 0 and um = I−(1−q)(Dm +
Dp).
(3) If the MCO sets r < c − (1 − q)Dp, then β
∗ = 0 and γ∗ = 1. To satisfy
the physician’s IR constraint, the MCO must set f ∗ = (1 − q)Dp. This results in
um = I − (1− q)(Dm + Dp).
To summarize:
When c < (1− q)(Dm + Dp):
• If κ = (c, 0), then um = I −mc.
• If κ = (c− (1− q)Dp, (1− q)Dp), then um → I −mc− (1−m)(1− q)(Dm + Dp).
• If κ = (r < c− (1− q)Dp, (1− q)Dp), then um = I − (1− q)(Dp + Dm).
Therefore, the MCO will maximize its payoff by employing κ = (c, 0).
When c = (1− q)(Dm + Dp):
• If κ = (c, 0), then um = I −mc.
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• If κ = (c− (1− q)Dp, (1− q)Dp), then um = I − c.
• If κ = (r < c− (1− q)Dp, (1− q)Dp), then um = I − (1− q)(Dp + Dm).
Therefore, the MCO will maximize its payoff by employing κ = (c, 0).
When c > (1− q)(Dm + Dp):
• If κ = (c, 0), then um = I −mc.
• If κ = (c− (1− q)Dp, (1− q)Dp), then um = I − (1− q)(Dp + Dm).
• If κ = (r < c− (1− q)Dp, (1− q)Dp), then um = I − (1− q)(Dp + Dm).
Therefore, if mc < (1 − q)(Dp + Dm), then the MCO will maximize its payoff by
employing κ = (c, 0). On the other hand, if mc > (1− q)(Dp + Dm), then the MCO
will maximize its payoff by employing κ = (r ≤ c− (1− q)Dp, (1− q)Dp). 
A.3 Equilibrium when Contracts Are not Observ-
able by the Patient
This section provides proofs for claims made in the case when the contract formed
between the MCO and the physician is not observable by the patient. Just as in the
observable contract case, the following proofs apply to the case in which the patient is
allowed to sue both the physician and the MCO for medical malpractice. The claims
and proofs can be modified, however, to analyze the remaining tortfeasor rules: (1)
patient can sue physician only (set Dm = 0 in all cases) and (2) patient can sue MCO
only (set Dp = 0 in all cases).
Solving this case for the equilibrium proceeds in much the same way as in the case
with observable contracts. The patient, however, cannot observe the contract terms.
Therefore, the MCO best responds only to the physician’s strategy.
A.3.1 MCO’s Best Response to the Physician’s Strategy
Claim 4 Taking c, p, q, Dm, Dp, L and γ as given, the MCO’s best response to the
physician’s strategy is as follows:
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If γ > c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
, then the MCO sets (r, f) such that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely
κ = (c− (1− q)γDp, (1− q)γDp) with β = 1 resulting in um = I − c.
If γ = c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
, then the MCO is indifferent between: (1) setting (r, f) such
that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = ( cDm
Dm+Dp
, cDp
Dm+Dp
) with β ∈ [0, 1] and (2) setting (r, f)
such that γ < c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (r < cDm
Dm+Dp
, cDp
Dm+Dp
) with β = 0. Both contracts
result in um = I − c = I − (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp).
If γ < c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
, then the MCO is indifferent between: (1) setting (r, f) such
that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (c− (1− q)γDp, (1− q)γDp) with β = 0 and (2) setting
(r, f) such that γ < c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (r < c− (1− q)γDp, (1− q)γDp) with β = 0.
Both contracts result in um = I − (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp).
Proof: Consider the MCO’s decision regarding which contract to utilize to obtain
physician services given a fixed probability γ that the patient will sue if a negative
outcome occurs. Taking c, p, q, Dm, Dp, L and γ as given, the MCO will solve the
following problem:
max
(r,f)
I − f − β∗r − (1− β∗)(1− q)γDm
subject to (1) f + β∗(r − c)− (1− β∗)(1− q)γDp ≥ 0
(2) β∗ = arg max
β
f ∗ + β(r∗ − c)− (1− β)(1− q)γDp
Recall from Claim 2 that the cutoff point for physician action is γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
. That
is, if the probability that the patient will sue given a negative outcome is greater than
this cutoff point, the physician will provide compliant treatment. This cutoff point is
a choice variable for the MCO: when it selects an amount to reimburse the physician,
it fixes the cutoff point. Consider the following cases based on the physician’s strategy
in Claim 2 given a fixed γ:
(1) If the MCO sets (r, f) such that γ > c−r
(1−q)Dp
⇒ β∗ = 1. In other words, if the
MCO sets r > c − (1 − q)γDp, the physician will provide compliant treatment with
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certainty. The MCO’s maximization problem becomes max(f,r) I − f − r subject to
f+r = c. To meet the physician’s IR constraint, the MCO must provide f = c−r < 0,
which violates an assumption of the model. Therefore, this contract is unfeasible.
(2) If the MCO sets (r, f) such that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
⇒ β∗ ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, if
the MCO sets r = c− (1− q)γDp, the physician will be indifferent between all effort
levels. Therefore, the effort level is set to maximize the MCO’s payoff. Substituting
for r, the maximization problem becomes
max
(f,β)
I − f − β(c− (1− q)γDp)− (1− β)(1− q)γDm
subject to f = (1− q)γDp
Substituting for f gives
max
β
I − βc− (1− β)(1− q)γ(Dm + Dp)
max
β
β((1− q)γ(Dm + Dp)− c).
The MCO’s decision will depend on how the cost of compliant treatment relates to
ex ante expected total damages given non-compliant treatment:
(a) If c < (1 − q)γ(Dm + Dp) (or γ >
c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
), then β = 1 maximizes
the MCO’s payoff. Therefore, the contract will specify r = c − (1 − q)γDp and
f = (1− q)γDp. β = 1 ⇒ um = I − c.
(b) If c = (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp) (or γ =
c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
), then the MCO is indifferent
between all values of β. Therefore, the contract will specify r = c − (1 − q)γDp =
cDm
Dm+Dp
and f = (1− q)γDp =
cDp
Dm+Dp
and
um = I − f − βr − (1− β)(1− q)γDm
= I −
cDp
Dm + Dp
− β(
cDm
Dm + Dp
)− (1− β)(1− q)(
c
(1− q)(Dm + Dp)
)Dm
= I −
cDp
Dm + Dp
− β(
cDm
Dm + Dp
)− (1− β)
cDm
Dm + Dp
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= I − c = I − (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp)
(c) If c > (1 − q)γ(Dm + Dp) (or γ <
c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
), then β = 0 maximizes
the MCO’s payoff. Therefore, the contract will specify r = c − (1 − q)γDp and
f = (1− q)γDp. β = 0 ⇒ um = I − (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp).
(3) If the MCO sets (r, f) such that γ < c−r
(1−q)Dp
⇒ β = 0. In other words, if the
MCO sets r < c− (1− q)γDp, the physician will not compliantly treat. The MCO’s
maximization problem becomes maxf I − f − (1− q)γDm subject to f = (1− q)γDp.
Therefore, the contract will specify any r < c− (1− q)γDp and f = (1− q)γDp. This
implies um = I − (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp).
To summarize:
When c < (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp) (or γ >
c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
):
• If the MCO sets (r, f) such that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (c−(1−q)γDp, (1−q)γDp),
then um = I − c with β = 1.
• If the MCO sets (r, f) such that γ < c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (r < c− (1− q)γDp, (1−
q)γDp), then um = I − (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp) with β = 0.
Therefore, the MCO will maximize its payoff by setting (r, f) such that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
and employing κ = (c− (1− q)γDp, (1− q)γDp) with β = 1.
When c = (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp) (or γ =
c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
):
• If the MCO sets (r, f) such that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = ( cDm
Dm+Dp
,
cDp
Dm+Dp
), then
um = I − c = I − (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp) with β ∈ [0, 1].
• If the MCO sets (r, f) such that γ < c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (r < cDm
Dm+Dp
,
cDp
Dm+Dp
),
then um = I − c = I − (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp) with β = 0.
Therefore, the MCO is indifferent between the two contracts.
When c > (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp) (or γ <
c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
):
• If the MCO sets (r, f) such that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (c−(1−q)γDp, (1−q)γDp),
then um = I − (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp) with β = 0.
• If the MCO sets (r, f) such that γ < c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (r < c− (1− q)γDp, (1−
q)γDp), then um = I − (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp) with β = 0.
Therefore, the MCO is indifferent between the two contracts. 
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A.3.2 Equilibrium Contracts
Proposition 2 Taking c, p, q, Dm, Dp and L as given, the equilibrium contracts,
resulting equilibrium behavior of the patient and the physician and payoffs are as
follows:
(1) If c < (1 − q)(Dm + Dp), then the MCO will employ κ
∗ = ( cDm
Dm+Dp
,
cDp
Dm+Dp
)
with β∗ = m and γ∗ = c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
resulting in um = I − c, up = 0 and ui =
mpH + (1−m)qH + m(1− p) c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
(−L) + (1−m) c(Dm+Dp−L)
(Dm+Dp)
− I.
(2) If c > (1 − q)(Dm + Dp), then the MCO will employ κ
∗ = (r∗ < c − (1 −
q)Dp, (1 − q)Dp) with β
∗ = 0 and γ∗ = 1 resulting in um = I − (1 − q)(Dm + Dp),
up = 0 and ui = qH + (1− q)(Dm + Dp − L)− I.
Proof: Equilibrium contracts are found by considering the patient’s best response to
resulting physician behavior given the contract chosen by the MCO. Take c, p, q, Dm,
Dp and L as given. Consider each scenario listed in Claim 4:
(1) If γ > c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
, then κ = (c− (1− q)γDp, (1− q)γDp) with β = 1.
β = 1 implies γ = 0 (see Claim 3). Substituting γ = 0 into γ > c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
gives 0 > c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
, a violation of the assumptions of the model. Therefore, this
contract is not possible in equilibrium.
(2) If γ = c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
, consider the two contracts specified in Claim 4:
(a) The MCO sets (r, f) such that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = ( cDm
Dm+Dp
,
cDp
Dm+Dp
)
with β ∈ [0, 1]. When γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, however, in equilibrium β = m, where m =
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)+(1−p)L
(see Claim 3). This constitutes an equilibrium contract with
um = I − c.
(b) The MCO sets (r, f) such that γ < c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (r < cDm
Dm+Dp
,
cDp
Dm+Dp
)
with β = 0. In equilibrium, β = 0 implies γ = 1 (see Claim 3). Note that γ = 1
implies c = (1 − q)(Dm + Dp). Therefore, this constitutes an equilibrium contract
with um = I − c = I − (1− q)(Dm + Dp).
(3) If c > (1− q)γ(Dm + Dp), consider the two contracts specified in Claim 5:
(a) The MCO sets (r, f) such that γ = c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (c− (1− q)γDp, (1−
q)γDp) with β = 0. When γ =
c−r
(1−q)Dp
, however, in equilibrium β = m > 0; therefore,
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this contract is not possible in equilibrium.
(b) The MCO sets (r, f) such that γ < c−r
(1−q)Dp
, namely κ = (r < c − (1 −
q)γDp, (1− q)γDp) with β = 0. In equilibrium, β = 0 implies γ = 1. This constitutes
an equilibrium contract with um = I − (1− q)(Dm + Dp).
To summarize:
If c < (1 − q)(Dm + Dp), then the MCO will employ κ
∗ = ( cDm
Dm+Dp
,
cDp
Dm+Dp
) with
β∗ = m and γ∗ = c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
resulting in um = I − c.
If c > (1− q)(Dm +Dp), then the MCO will employ κ
∗ = (r∗ < c− (1− q)Dp, (1−
q)Dp) with β
∗ = 0 and γ∗ = 1 resulting in um = I − (1− q)(Dm + Dp). 
A.3.3 Effect of Disclosure Rules on the Likelihood of Law-
suits
Let γo represent the probability that an injured patient will file a claim when contracts
are observable and γu represent the probability of an injured patient filing a claim
when contracts are unobservable.
Proposition 3 Given any feasible point (c, p, q, L,Dm, Dp), γo ≤ γu.
Proof: Consider each possible case given Dm + Dp > L:
(1) If mc < c < (1 − q)(Dm + Dp), then γo = 0 and γu =
c
(1−q)(Dm+Dp)
> 0.
Therefore, γo < γu.
(2) If mc < (1− q)(Dm + Dp) < c, then γo = 0 and γu = 1. Therefore, γo < γu.
(3) If (1− q)(Dm + Dp) < mc < c, then γo = 1 and γu = 1. Therefore, γo = γu.
If Dm + Dp < L, then the patient never sues. Therefore, γo = γu.
A.3.4 Effect of Disclosure Rules on the Likelihood of Treat-
ment
Let βo represent the probability that the physician will provide compliant treatment
when contracts are observable and βu represent the probability of compliant treatment
when contracts are unobservable.
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Proposition 4 Given any feasible point (c, p, q, L,Dm, Dp), βo ≥ βu.
Proof: Consider each possible case given Dm + Dp > L:
(1) If mc < c < (1− q)(Dm + Dp), then βo = m and βu = m. Therefore, βo = βu.
(2) If mc < (1− q)(Dm + Dp) < c, then βo = m and βu = 0. Therefore, βo > βu.
(3) If (1− q)(Dm + Dp) < mc < c, then βo = 0 and βu = 0. Therefore, βo = βu.
If Dm+Dp < L, then the physician never compliantly treats. Therefore, βo = βu.
A.4 The Efficient Damage Rule
Proposition 5 Regardless of the observability of the contract terms, the following
specifies the efficient damage rule:
If (p − q)H > c, the court can approximate arbitrarily the first-best solution by
increasing damages. This results in κ∗ = (c, 0), β∗ → 1 and γ∗ → 0.
If (p−q)H < c, the court can achieve the first-best solution by setting Dm+Dp = 0.
This results in κ∗ = (0, 0), β∗ = 0 and γ∗ = 0.
Proof: Consider the case in which contracts are observable by the patient and treat-
ment maximizes social welfare. Recall that the patient’s cut-off point is m = (1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)
(1−q)(Dm+Dp−L)+(1−p)L
.
By setting Dp → ∞ and Dm → ∞, the physician treats with (near) certainty as
m → 1. Because the physician is treating at the patient’s cut-off point, the patient
will never sue. Also, large damage amounts result in mc < (1−q)Dm+Dp. Therefore,
the MCO employs a fee-for-service contract with full reimbursement to maximize its
payoff (see Proposition 1). The socially optimal outcome (treating with certainty and
no lawsuit) is approximated when the court sets damages high.
Alternatively, consider the case in which contracts are not observable by the pa-
tient. As in the observable contract case, by setting damages high, the court en-
courages the physician to treat with (near) certainty as limDm+Dp→∞m = 1. Like-
wise, when the court sets damages high, the patient is discouraged from suing as
limDm+Dp→∞ γ = 0. Finally, when damages are high, c < (1− q)(Dm + Dp). Accord-
ing to Proposition 2, the contract terms will depend on the relative rates at which
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damages against the MCO and damages against the physician increase.3
If social welfare is maximized when the physician does not treat (i.e., (p−q)H < c),
the analysis is the same regardless of the observability of the contract terms. The
court will set damages so that no treatment is provided and the patient does not sue.
This is accomplished by setting damages equal to zero (i.e., Dm = 0 and Dp = 0).
When damages are equal to zero, the patient will never sue because litigation costs
(L) exceed expected damages. Knowing that the patient will not sue, the MCO will
pay the physician nothing and the physician will not treat.
3This characteristic of the model is merely a feature of its assumptions. Intuitively, when both
physician and MCO damage amounts are high, the MCO must pay the physician the cost of treat-
ment. This payment can be split in any way between the reimbursement amount and the fixed
payment. The MCO is indifferent between the various splits because high physician damages pro-
vide the physician with an incentive to treat. The payment from the MCO merely satisfies his
individual rationality constraint.
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State Year in Effect Statute Cite
Arizona 1996 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §20-1076(A)
Vermont 1996 Vt. State. Ann. tit. 18, §9414
Virginia 1996 Va. Code Ann. §38.2-3407.10
Washington 1996 Wash. Rev. Code §48.43.095(1)
New York 1997 N.Y. Ins. Law §3217-a
North Carolina 1997 N.C. Gen. Stat. §58-3-191
Maine 1997 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24A §4302(1)
Rhode Island 1997 R.I. Gen. Laws §23-17.13-3
Connecticut 1998 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §38a-478g(b)(1)
Kentucky 1998 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §301.17A-510
New Jersey 1998 N.J. Stat. Ann. §26:2S-5
Georgia 1999 Ga. Code Ann. §33-20A-5
Hawaii 1999 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §432E-7
Iowa 1999 Iowa Code Ann. §514K.1
Minnesota 1999 Minn. Stat. Ann. §62J.72
Pennsylvania 1999 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §991.2136
South Dakota 1999 S.D. Codified Laws §58-17C-5
California 2000 Cal. Health & Safety Code §1367.10
Illinois 2000 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 134/15
New Hampshire 2000 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §420-J:8
Massachusetts 2001 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 176O, §7
Table A.1: This table provides statutory citations for disclosure laws passed by
state legislatures and the year each statute went into effect.
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State EC NEC PC
AL .. .. 91–5
AK .. P P
AZ .. .. ..
AR .. .. ..
CA .. P ..
CO P P P
CT .. .. ..
DE .. .. ..
FL P P P
GA .. .. P
HI .. P ..
ID .. P P
IN P P P
IL .. 95–6 P
IA .. .. P
KS .. P P
KY .. .. ..
LA P P P
ME .. .. ..
MD .. P ..
MA .. P ..
MI .. 93 ..
MN .. .. ..
MS .. .. ..
MO .. P ..
MT .. 95 ..
NE P P P
NV .. .. P
NH .. .. P
NJ .. .. 97
NM P P ..
NY .. .. ..
NC .. .. 96
ND .. 95 P
OH .. 97–8 96–8
OK .. .. 95
OR .. 91–8 P
PA P P 97
RI .. .. ..
SC P P P
SD 91–5 P ..
TN .. .. ..
TX P P P
UT .. P ..
VT .. .. ..
VA P P P
WA .. .. ..
WV .. P ..
WI P P P
WY P P P
Table A.2: Note: Entries indicate year statute went into effect. If the statute was repealed or
deemed unconstitutional prior to 2000, then a range is given to indicate the years in effect. A
“P” indicates that the cap went into effect prior to 1991. EC = economic damage cap; NEC =
non-economic damage cap; PC = punitive damage cap.
